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In the United States, the late 2000s were a time of crisis that tested many urban decision-
makers. The recession that started in 2007 was defined by a severe crash in the housing market 
and the proliferation of mortgage foreclosures across the country.  Foreclosures occurred in 
urban, suburban, and rural communities, but had a particularly devastating impact on larger, 
older cities and their low and moderate-income neighborhoods.  These cities had been dealing 
with economic and population decline for half a century.  In many of their urban neighborhoods, 
foreclosures affected as many as one in four households and added yet another challenge to 
improving the quality of life for residents.     
However, despite sharing historical characteristics of population and job decline and 
demographic change from majority white to majority black, some older, larger cities fared quite 
differently in the mortgage foreclosures crisis.  For example, in 2007, the Baltimore metropolitan 
region in Maryland had a foreclosure rate of 0.7 percent compared to the Detroit metropolitan 
region in Michigan whose rate was 4.9 percent (RealtyTrac 2008). Since 1950, these cities have 
seen drastic declines in population, as well as rising unemployment rates as major industries 
have left the area. Both cities have been left with high rates of vacant properties, high poverty 
rates, and low housing values for most of the past few decades.  Given these similarities, it is 
clear that the local economic environment cannot be the sole factor in determining the fate of 
  
 v 
cities like Baltimore and Detroit.  The disparity in foreclosure rates points to the possible 
explanatory value of other differences, such as local political arrangements and how those affect 
the ability of networks of stakeholders, or governing coalitions, to prepare for and respond to the 
crisis. 
Cities and their decision-makers provide an isolated and contained environment within 
which to examine responses to crises. By using the foreclosure crisis as a test, my research on 
Baltimore and Detroit aims to uncover what kinds of governing coalitions and their resultant 
actions may have contributed to resiliency in these cities to withstand and address the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis.  By examining the political histories of the governing coalitions in both cities, 
this dissertation argues that the greater involvement of community development interests in 
Baltimore contributed to a stronger community development sector overall.  During the 
foreclosure crisis, stakeholders in Baltimore were able to launch a quicker response to the crisis 
and the housing market in that city remained more stable. 
In addition to making a contribution to the literature on urban development and 
governance, this research will address the contemporary situation of urban, low and moderate-
income neighborhoods of color, many of which face on-going challenges from high crime rates, 
low public and private investment, low-quality services and loss of wealth.  High mortgage 
foreclosure rates in such neighborhoods compound these problems and make it difficult for these 
communities, and the cities which contain them, to become and remain stable and sustainable.  
Understanding how local policies affect these processes could help urban governments promote 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
A crisis is defined as a state of instability or danger that leads to change.  It is a test and a 
turning point; the Latin root of crisis, krisis, translates into “decision.”1  A crisis requires 
responsive action from people and institutions, lest the danger or instability remain.  How people 
and institutions address crises can have long lasting effects for those affected: other individuals 
and organizations, cities, and countries.  But responding is not often simple and can be 
influenced by social, economic, and political factors.  This is especially the case in cities, where 
existing political and economic structures help determine how stakeholders take action during 
such a turning point.  
In the United States, the late 2000s were a time of crisis that tested many urban decision-
makers. The recession that started in 2007 was defined by a severe crash in the housing market 
and the proliferation of mortgage foreclosures across the country.  Foreclosures occurred in 
urban, suburban, and rural communities, but had a particularly devastating impact on larger, 
older cities and their low and moderate-income neighborhoods.  These cities had been dealing 
with economic and population decline for half a century.  In many of their urban neighborhoods, 
foreclosures affected as many as one in four households and added yet another challenge to 
addressing chronic challenges and improving the quality of life (Living Cities 2009).     
However, despite sharing historical characteristics of population and job decline and 
demographic change from majority white to majority black, some older, larger cities fared quite 
differently in the mortgage foreclosures crisis.  For example, in 2007, the Baltimore metropolitan 
region in Maryland had a foreclosure rate of 0.7 percent compared to the Detroit metropolitan 
region in Michigan whose rate was 4.9 percent (RealtyTrac 2008). Since 1950, both cities have 
                                                
1 From www.dictionary.com: “crisis”.  
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seen drastic declines in population, as well as rising unemployment rates as major industries 
have left the area. Both cities have been left with high rates of vacant properties, high poverty 
rates, and low housing values for most of the past few decades.  Given these similarities, it is 
clear that the local economic environment cannot be the sole factor in determining the fate of 
cities like Baltimore and Detroit.  The disparity in foreclosure rates points to the possible 
explanatory value of other differences, such as local political arrangements and how those affect 
the ability of networks of stakeholders, or governing coalitions, to prepare for and respond to the 
crisis. 
Cities and their decision-makers provide an isolated and contained environment within 
which to examine responses to crises. By using the foreclosure crisis as a test, my research on 
Baltimore and Detroit aims to uncover what kinds of governing coalitions and their resultant 
actions may have had an impact on foreclosure activity above and beyond the effect of local 
economic and demographic environments.  My dissertation is guided by the following research 
questions: What explains why cities that were so similar in many structural respects took such 
different paths during the financial crisis?  How did local stakeholders respond to the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis in Baltimore and Detroit, two weak market cities with very different 
foreclosure rates and what explains the differences in their responses? Who were the primary 
actors in the local responses and what was the nature of the strategies employed? How were 
these actors and their responses influenced by the nature of the governing coalitions, political 
culture and leadership, or capacity of local government in each city?   
In addition to making a contribution to the literature on urban development and 
governance, my dissertation will address the contemporary situation of urban, low and moderate-
income neighborhoods of color, many of which face on-going challenges from high crime rates, 
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low public and private investment, and low-quality services and amenities.  High mortgage 
foreclosure rates in such neighborhoods compound these problems and make it difficult for these 
communities, and the cities which contain them, to become and remain stable and sustainable.  
Understanding how local policies affect these processes could help urban governments promote 
greater neighborhood equity, growth and opportunity.   
    
Framework 
My dissertation will address two main theoretical arguments in the field of comparative 
urban governance.  First, the question of why two weak market cities that face similar economic 
and demographic circumstances have fared so differently in terms of the foreclosure crisis sits 
squarely within the debate over the relative influence of markets and politics on urban outcomes.  
Second, it is also situated in the urban governance literature; whether and how various kinds of 
nongovernmental stakeholders influence urban governing agendas and whether the resulting 
agendas have an impact on neighborhood development in their cities.  In particular, my research 
will examine and use theories related to the roles of nonprofit organizations in urban political 
decision-making and policy implementation.  In addition to these theoretical arguments, this 
study will use a resiliency framework to analyze how stakeholders in Baltimore and Detroit 
responded to the foreclosure crisis and test the impact of the governing coalitions in each city.   
 The first debate is a long-standing one on both sides of the right-left political spectrum.  
Both the neo-Marxist and the rational choice perspective tend to see the actions of city 
governments as largely determined by economic forces (Mollenkopf 1983, Chapter 2).  The 
Marxist and neo-Marxist analysts see capitalism as dominating urban governance and 
determining the fate of cities (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 1989; Katznelson 1993; 
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Smith 1982).  These theorists argue, simply, that the expansion and contraction of the market 
determines the opportunities and constraints facing cities.  When the market deems the city 
profitable, the city flourishes, and when the market risks a loss, the city declines.  According to 
such theories, governmental and other local institutions must accommodate themselves to the 
needs of the market, and attracting business investment dominates the policymaking process 
(Friedland and Palmer 1984).  Marxist theories of urban governance, however, may not be able 
to explain why cities with similar positions and roles in the capitalist system, such as Detroit and 
Baltimore, have had different outcomes in the foreclosure crisis. 
 Regulationists are in the same family as the Marxists (Harvey 1989, Jessop 1997, Painter 
1995).  Regulation theory highlights the role of social and political institutions in creating the 
capitalist system.  It argues that cultural norms, values, and social and political activities shape 
the capitalist processes of accumulation, reproduction, consumption and circulation.  Norms and 
values do not regulate the market, but have a more circumstantial and passive impact.  The 
market is still central to urban governance, but operates at least in part through the domain of 
norms and values.  While regulation theory may seem like a better lens through which to analyze 
how policy has influenced the housing market because it allows for some variation in local 
norms and values, it still describes political actions as a function of a division of labor, as in 
industrial organization.  Regulation theory thus does not lend itself to a detailed deconstruction 
of the many possible influences and actions that may yield many varieties of urban 
policymaking, each of which can have a different impact on local market environments.      
 While public choice theorists are generally on the opposite end of the ideological 
spectrum, they also view the fate of cities from a market perspective (Peterson 1981; Tiebout 
1956).  They contend that if urban governments act in ways that are detrimental to a city’s 
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market competitiveness, such as by having a progressive tax system or many services for the 
poor, they will only stimulate capital to leave the city, yielding urban decline within a 
competitive system of cities.  It is in the interest of urban governments, therefore, to take actions 
that enhance the local economy.  Cities that are straddled with impoverished residents must pay 
even more attention to promoting economic growth if they are to pay for welfare services.  In 
public choice theory, residents vote with their feet and will move to communities that meet their 
service needs at the lowest cost.   
 Public choice theory, like the Marxist and regulationists, rests on the argument that 
private actors, be they employers or residents, and market mechanisms will have far more 
influence on the condition of their cities than do urban government coalitions.  Yet local decision 
makers in Detroit and Baltimore, both subject to deindustrialization and disinvestment, adopted 
unique and different policy strategies and governing agendas, which arguably have yielded 
different mortgage foreclosure rates.  Furthermore, while the public choice approach may explain 
why better-off people left Baltimore and Detroit as these cities proved less able to provide their 
desired services, it does not clarify why poor residents remained behind in both places despite 
lower quality of life and higher taxes and costs of living. 
 A third and potentially more helpful political perspective is provided by non-Marxist 
political economists who argue that the actors who make up urban governing coalitions have a 
large impact on the decisions and policies of urban governments (Ferman 1996, DiGaetano and 
Klemanski 1999, DiGaetano and Strom 2003, Jones-Correa 2001, Mollenkopf 1983, Pierre 1999, 
Sonenshein 2003, Stone 1989, 2005).  A body of stakeholder’s forms alliances with elected city 
leadership to comprise a governing coalition that adopts policies around specific issue areas.  
This idea differs from traditional pluralist approaches that might see governing coalitions as an 
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arena where different stakeholders negotiate policies based on competing interests (Dahl 1961, 
Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 21995).  Stakeholders can include business elites, unions, civic 
groups, educational and health institutions, philanthropic and charitable sectors, ethnic 
associations, nonprofit community-based organizations, and political party organizations.  This 
theory contends that varying alliances result in different kinds of short-term policy orientations 
and therefore different economic, social, and geographic outcomes, with markets playing mainly 
a background role in local urban governance.  My comparison of the development and impact of 
foreclosures responses in Baltimore and Detroit will contribute to the development of this strain 
of theory.   
Theorists of governing coalitions have argued that the makeup of the urban leadership 
alliance determines the policy choices sought.  They have identified a range of governing 
formats, including urban regimes, progrowth coalitions, growth management coalitions, and 
social reform alliances.  Regimes are partnerships among business, social, and political interests 
whose jointly negotiated program or agenda persists through multiple mayoral administrations 
(Stone 1989).  Because private sector elites are a core partner, urban regimes tend to prioritize 
growth and economic development.  Yet governing coalitions may also include interest groups 
working to preserve environmental sustainability in the metropolitan region, thus yielding a 
green form of growth management, or when community-based organizations and activist groups 
have greater involvement in forming the coalition, decision-making may prioritize social reform 
policies to support public welfare, affordable housing, and anti-poverty measures (Mossberger 
and Stoker 2001).    
The role of nonprofit and/or community-based organizations in shaping governing 
coalitions and agendas is important to highlight.  Over the past few decades, nonprofit and 
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community-based organizations have played a steadily increasing role as service providers and 
constituents of urban governance structures (Ferris 1998, Jackson 1995, DiGaetano and 
Klemanski 1999, Salamon 2002).  Hula, Jackson, and Orr go so far as to argue that nonprofits 
can “restructure local political agendas” because of their growing “number of roles and 
responsibilities traditionally identified with formal governmental authorities, including the 
identification of citizen preferences, program design, securing public resources, and marshaling 
public opinion” (1997, p. 478).  Salamon also argues that nonprofits and other third-party 
contractors have become an integral part of urban governance, in part due to their growing role 
in service delivery structures (1987). Because this service delivery role occurs independent of 
government activity, and in many places, at the neighborhood level, some contend that 
nonprofits have greater capacity than government agencies to respond to crises and be problem 
solvers (Clarke 2001).  Taking it a step further, Nichole Marwell found that community 
organizations engender their own relationships with economic and political institutions and are 
not just the recipients of urban governance, but can also drive it (2007).  On the other hand, 
DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge argue that the focus of nonprofits and community organizations 
to deliver services has made them apolitical moderators between citizens and local government, 
decreasing their ability to substantially address economic and social justice (2010).  The role and 
influence of community organizations in urban governance varies across cities, and may depend 
on whether urban governments are more or less open to “more conventional means of making 
claims,” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, p. 1459).  All of these factors may affect how policies are 
formulated, funded, adopted, and implemented, evaluated and changed.   
How and how well local stakeholders respond to crisis is a central theme in this 
dissertation.  Increased foreclosures created severe declines in the economic wellbeing of many 
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homeowners as well as the overall condition of many neighborhoods, which challenged the tax 
base and quality of life of the cities that contained them.  This study will use the lens of regional 
resiliency to analyze local responses in Baltimore and Detroit.  Described by Swanstrom, 
Chapple, and Immergluck (2009) and Foster (2006), resiliency speaks to the ability of local 
stakeholders to assess a problem; to plan and implement a response; and ultimately to recover 
from some form of disturbance.   This literature views resilience as a function of institutional 
capacities to undertake these activities.  Thus, my dissertation will examine whether and how 
local institutions came together to address increased mortgage foreclosures and their impact on 
these cities.   
Kathryn Foster (2006) provides a framework for understanding and measuring resilience. 
A region’s ability to withstand great challenges, whether slow and chronic or sudden and 
traumatic, can be evaluated in two parts, according to Foster.  First, “preparation resilience” 
occurs when regions have “assessed” possible challenges and created strategies to develop a 
“readiness” for when those challenges occur (Foster 2006).  Second, “performance resilience” is 
present when regions have a solid and organized “response” to crises and undergo “recovery” 
(Foster 2006). Foster developed a Resilience Capacity Index (RCI), which creates a score for 
each city based on three capacities (Regional Economic Capacity, Socio-Demographic Capacity, 
and Community Connectivity Capacity) each made up of four weighted factors including 
education attainment, income inequality, homeownership, voter turnout, and others (Foster 
2012). Compared with other cities in the United States, Baltimore ranks 30th and Detroit 159th in 
terms of their RCI score (Building Regional Resiliency 2015).   
According to Foster’s RCI calculations, Baltimore ranks higher than Detroit in Regional 
Economic Capacity and Socio-Demographic Capacity.  Regional Economic Capacity includes 
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income equality; the diversification of industries; affordability in the region; and the extent to 
which the business environment is considered dynamic measured by a high number of small 
businesses, the degree of internet connectivity, and other factors.  Socio-Demographic Capacity 
factors include the degree to which populations are educated, not in poverty, not disabled, and 
covered by health insurance.  Detroit, however, ranked higher than Baltimore in Community 
Connectivity, which measures the extent to which residents have stayed in the region, the 
homeowner and voter participation rate, and the per capita concentration of civic organizations 
(including social and service organizations, labor unions, and advocacy organizations).  The 
findings from the RCI are instructive to the contexts in which local stakeholders were responding 
to the foreclosure crisis and more of this will be explored throughout this dissertation.  The 
finding about community connectivity is particularly interesting since my dissertation argues that 
Baltimore’s network of organizations and funders is more connected than in Detroit.   
 
Argument: Strong Community Development Networks Matter 
As described above, my dissertation will use the resiliency framework and the theory that 
urban governments prioritize policies based on the makeup of the governing coalition in order to 
address the question of whether local policies and governing arrangements have a clear impact 
on the dynamics of the foreclosure crisis. Specifically, it will explore how local stakeholders 
worked to respond to the foreclosure crisis in Baltimore and Detroit and examine how the 
community development infrastructure differentially shaped those responses in each city. With 
Detroit’s foreclosure rate being significantly higher than Baltimore’s, with severe negative 
neighborhood consequences, and given that Baltimore and Detroit are both weak market cities 
that have suffered from significant declines in population and housing occupancy, my hypothesis 
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is that market forces alone cannot explain this diversity of outcomes.  With regard to the 
foreclosure crisis, my hypothesis is that Baltimore has a governing coalition comprised of a 
broad and deep network of organizations that engage in and support community development, 
giving it comparatively greater resilience against the rate of foreclosures and its impact on 
neighborhoods. Though mortgage foreclosures hit both cities, preexisting relationships between 
its community development organizations and foundations, along with a supportive city 
government, better prepared Baltimore’s governing coalition, enabling it to show greater 
resiliency to the crisis. In Foster’s terms, preparatory resilience generated performance resilience.   
Inspired by the resilience framework, the outline for my argument is explained in Figure 
1.1 below.  Starting from the outcomes, “Housing Market Stability” will be described by 
measuring foreclosure rates and any changes in the housing market in both cities. The measure 
compares the citywide rate of foreclosure starts annually between 2007-2010.  The methodology 
is described in greater detail below.  The argument hypothesizes that overall housing market 
stability depends a great deal on how local actors developed an initial “Response to 
Foreclosures.” This includes how local actors utilized data to assess the problem and develop 
readiness and what strategies they deployed to assist homeowners undergoing foreclosure as well 
as remediate negative neighborhood effects from vacant, foreclosed homes. How local actors 
respond to the foreclosures depends, however, on the local “Opportunity Space:” the legal, 
economic, and institutional context in each city, including local community development 
stakeholders and their roles, such as government agencies, city leadership, foundations, and 
nonprofits; as well as the composition of the governing coalitions. There were limitations in the 
degree that my dissertation could evaluate the recovery of each city.  Given the timeframe of my 




























measured.  For both cities, the programs and initiatives developed to respond were still nascent.  
As such, my dissertation focuses more on the assessment, readiness and response, than on the 
recovery.   











 My dissertation will argue that the differences in the formation of community 
development infrastructures of Baltimore and Detroit strongly shaped how local stakeholders 
responded to the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  It hypothesizes that where the local governments, 
foundations, and nonprofit organizations had a history of supporting and engaging in such a 
community development infrastructure, such as in Baltimore, stakeholders were quicker and 
more effective at recognizing the problem, addressing neighborhood needs, and ultimately 
stemming greater loss of homes. When mortgage foreclosures began to rise in 2007, these 
stakeholders had systems in place that equipped them to respond.  In turn, this response helped 
prevent the mortgage foreclosure crisis from growing larger.  This hypothesis will be tested by 
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comparing the opportunity spaces, responses to foreclosures, and housing market stability 
outcomes across the cities.   
 
Methodology  
 My dissertation is a comparative analysis of the case-oriented type and follows a process-
tracing framework.  The comparative method is described by Della Porta (2008) as one of three 
approaches to comparative analysis, along with experimental method and the statistical method.  
The experimental method creates data by controlling for the effect of changes on a dependent 
variable by keeping other independent variables constant.  In the social sciences, there is rarely 
an opportunity to create situations where an experiment such as this can be conducted as 
researchers primarily study phenomena after it occurs.  The statistical method uses large sample 
sizes or n, Della Porta explains, to compare empirical evidence through “mathematical 
elaboration” (2008, p. 201). There are limitations to such studies, however, according to King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1994). Large n studies rely on each case as on independent observation, 
without considering the context in which that observation took place.  In addition “Large-scale 
studies may depend upon numbers that are not well understood by the naïve researcher working 
on a data base…the researcher working closely with the materials and understanding their origin 
may be able to make the necessary corrections,” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 69). 
 Unlike these two methods, using the comparative method with small samples (anywhere 
from two to twenty cases) is appropriate for studying complex historical phenomena.  The 
comparative method uses a “systemic comparative illustration” to hypothesize relationships 
between variables (Smelser 1976, p. 158).  This systemic process includes a careful selection of 
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cases that is both representative of the phenomenon being studied and that evaluates similarities 
and difference between the cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Safford 2004).   
My methodology is also inspired by Charles Ragin’s qualitative comparative analysis, 
which argues for small to medium size n studies that systematically analyze similarities and 
differences in order to discover factors or combinations of factors that, when occurring or not 
occurring, appear to lead to certain outcomes (2004).  In these comparisons, small n studies 
benefit from choosing cases that are similar, except for the particular outcome of interest.  In the 
case of my dissertation, Baltimore and Detroit are two weak market cities with similar 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, but whose housing markets and resulting 
mortgage foreclosure rates diverged.  According to Della Porta, the comparative method is 
common and preferred among social and political scientists in order to study institutions or 
macropolitical dynamics (2008). It allows for a deeper understanding of historical processes as 
well as individual and institutional actions because it can go beyond statistical descriptions of 
phenomena.   
Comparing processes and actions in two cities enables researchers to be able to identify 
factors that make one city more resilient than other, particularly by examining what is different 
and what is the same.  Comparative analyses are useful as a way to unearth potential explanatory 
variables by examining whether processes occurring in one case also occur in another.  The 
analysis finds the processes that do not exist in both cases as a way to determine what factors 
may explain disparate outcomes.  In other words, if an outcome exists in one case, the 
explanation may not be apparent until comparing it to a case where a difference in the process 
led to a different outcome.  Without comparing the two cases in such a detailed manner, the 
potential explanatory variable may not have been discovered because it did not exist in the first 
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case.  This was particularly salient to bringing Detroit and Baltimore together in this study. 
Adhering to a systemic analysis, my research focused on comparing standardized pieces of data 
and elements across both cities, both in the primary and secondary data collection processes.   
The comparative method in this instance is case-oriented, described by Della Porta (2008, 
p. 204): 
The case-oriented strategy focuses upon a relatively small number of cases, analyzed 
with attention to each case as an interpretable whole, seeking to understand a complex 
unity rather than establish relationships between variables…with a large number of 
characteristics being taken into account, often together with their interaction within long-
lasting processes. 
 
This method is ideal for my study of the complex institutional and organizational relationships 
within two cases.  In both cities, the research identifies several different characteristics including 
political history, governing coalitions, demographic and socioeconomic data, housing market 
indicators, philanthropic and public funding, role of non-profits, types of foreclosure mitigation, 
and neighborhood revitalization strategies that have helped define resilience in the environment 
of economic crisis.   
The final piece of my methodological framework is to use a process tracing approach to 
bring the data together to form a “causal mechanism” that can highlight relationships between 
independent and dependent variables (Vennesson 2008).  Process tracing allows for in-depth 
investigations into what happened, as well as how and why it happened. It often takes a 
qualitative research approach incorporating interviews, observations, and review of historical or 
programmatic documentation to create a detailed narrative that develops analytical explanations 
and a causal route to specific findings about the occurrence in question.  Process tracing frames 
my approach to data collection and analysis in the case of studying local responses to the 
foreclosure crisis.  Using interview data and historical research, in particular, enabled me to 
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study the institutional context in which local responses occurred.  This, combined with the 
primary and secondary data, creates an analytical narrative about how local stakeholders took 
action and what influenced those practices.   
 
Data Collection: Mixed Methods Approach  
My research and data collection focused on the years 2007-2010, beginning with the start 
of the Great Recession in December 2007, as well as adoption of major federal initiatives to 
address the foreclosure crisis, namely the three rounds of the National Stabilization Program 
approved through Congress in 2008, 2009, and 2010.  The majority of my data collection, 
discussed below, was focused on that period of time.  However, some attention is given to the 
early stage foreclosure crisis, in particular, as early as 2005, because important events occurred 
in each city that influenced the way stakeholders responded to the crisis.  To follow up on 
longer-term outcomes, foreclosure and housing market data between 2010 to 2014 was also 
collected.   
My research collected both primary and secondary data.  In each city, in-depth interviews 
were conducted with stakeholders in the community development sector, including staff at city 
or state government agencies, nonprofit organizations who worked at a city or state-wide level, 
community nonprofits that focused on specific neighborhood geographies, and foundations, 
which were active in their city’s response to the foreclosure crisis.  Table 1.1. reports the number 
of respondents in each of those categories in both cities. 
Table 1.1. Interview Respondents 
City Gov. Agencies Nonprofits Community Orgs. Foundations Total 
Baltimore  3 8 4 3 18 
Detroit 1 11 3 3 18 




Each interview was sixty to ninety minutes long.  The majority of the conversations were 
conducted in person over two visits each to Baltimore and Detroit. A few interviews were done 
over the phone.  The interviews included the following questions: 
• Please first tell me about your background and what your organization/agency does? 
• How did you or your organization first hear about mortgage foreclosures? 
• How did your organization choose to respond?  Please tell me about how you came to that 
decision and strategy? 
• What were your biggest challenges? 
• Who were your biggest partners? 
• To what degree did you work with government agencies, state or local? 
• What other organizations and entities did you work with? Foundations? Banks?  
• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently? 
• What would you have done more of if you had the resources? 
• What would you say are the City’s biggest community development priorities? 
• Who would you say are the stronger community development actors in this city? Who has 
influence over developing and implementing community development strategies? 
 
My initial list of potential interview subjects was developed through document analysis, 
initial conversations with academic and professional contacts, and an Internet search. Many of 
the foundation plans, white papers, and community development websites listed individuals who 
were either the executive director or responsible for planning and implementing community 
development or foreclosure-related initiatives.  In a snowball sampling technique, each of these 
individuals provided recommendations for additional participants. 
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While my interviews did not exhaust the community development field in either city, my 
sample of informants is representative of the organizations involved in foreclosure response 
activities undertaken between 2007-2010. Interviews were conducted with people from a wide 
variety of organizations that work on community development to better understand how the 
organizations worked together. As more interviews were conducted, they mentioned the same 
names and activities over and over, and the information from informants largely corresponded 
with written reports on foreclosure response activities. Where possible, written reports provided 
background information for understanding the community development context and, for periods 
that were not covered by written reports, or covered sparsely, the interviews informed my 
understanding of the local foreclosure response strategies. The majority of the subjects were 
willing and able to meet with me; two government officials (one in each city) did not respond to 
repeated requests for an interview. No current representatives from Detroit city government 
departments were willing to be interviewed, though three respondents were former members of 
city government; a former councilperson who had been in office for sixteen years, including 
during the foreclosure crisis; a researcher who worked in the City’s budget office for over a 
decade; and two practitioners were a part of the staff of two former mayors.  All of the 
participants gave informed consent to participate in the study as confidential subjects (this study 
was approved under IRB #09-03-1712). 
To provide further background, my document review included academic papers; 
foundation data and organizational reports; city, state, and federal documents; and newspaper 
articles from local and national newspapers, related to foreclosure responses activities. Finally, 
my comparison of Baltimore and Detroit drew on population, demographic, economic, and 
housing market data sourced primarily from the U.S. Census and American Community Survey.  
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Foreclosure data were obtained from local government agencies and data clearinghouses such as 
Baltimore Housing and Data Driven Detroit.  The next section sets the stage for this dissertation 
by outlining overall historical data and the results from the analysis of secondary data.   
 
The Case Study Cities 
In 1950, Detroit and Baltimore were the 5th and 6th largest cities in the United States.  
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 below document general population and socioeconomic data for the two cities 
and their surrounding metropolitan regions.   
 
Table 1.2. Population Change 1950-2010* 
 Baltimore City Metro Without 
Baltimore 
Detroit City Metro Without 
Detroit 
Population 1950 949,708 387,665 1,849,508 1,166,689 
Population 2010 620,961 2,089,528 713,777 3,582,473 
% Change -35% 439% -61% 207% 
*Source: U.S. Census, 1950, 2010.   
 
Both cities of Baltimore and Detroit have declined in population, while their metropolitan 
regions have grown.  Detroit’s population decreased by a much greater percentage than 
Baltimore, and Metropolitan Baltimore’s population also grew at a greater percentage than 
Detroit’s.  
Table 1.3. Population Race and Ethnicity* 
 Baltimore City Detroit City 
Race/Ethnicity 1950   
Non-Hispanic Black/African American 23.2% 15.9% 
Hispanic  0.5% 0.7% 
Non-Hispanic White 76.1% 83.2% 
Non-Hispanic Asian 0.01% 0.0% 
Non-Hispanic Other 0.0% 0.0% 
   
Race/Ethnicity 2010   
Non-Hispanic Black/African American 63.7% 82.7% 
Hispanic  4.1% 6.8% 
Non-Hispanic White 29.6% 7.8% 
Non-Hispanic Asian 2.3% 1.1% 
Other 2.2% 3.4% 
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*U.S. Census, 1950, 2010.   
 
Between 1950 and 2010, the White and Black/African American populations inverted in 
both cities.  In Baltimore, Whites were the majority in 1950, making up 76.1% of the population.  
In 2010, Black/African Americans made up the majority at 63.7%.  Similarly, in Detroit, 83.2% 
of the population was White in 1950, and in 2010, 82.7% was Black/African American.  While 
both cities are majority people of color and minority White, in Baltimore, the Black/African 
American population is 23% less of the population than Detroit’s. Conversely, Detroit’s White 
population is only about a 1/3 of Baltimore’s share of the White population.  Table 1.4 presents 















Table 1.4. Employment & Income 
 Baltimore City Detroit City 
Median Household Income   
20001 $31,767 $29,526 
2009-20132 $41,385 $26,325 
Unemployment Rate3   
2000 10.7% 13.8% 
2010 11.2% 24.8% 
% Employment in Manufacturing   
19504 29.0% 46.0% 
20001 7.8% 18.8% 
% Change -73.1% -59.1% 
Poverty Rate   
20001 22.9% 26.1% 
2009-20132 23.8% 39.3% 
1Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
  
 20 
2Source: American Community Survey, 2009-2013 
3Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
4Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1950 
 
Differences begin to emerge between Detroit and Baltimore in the economic indicators, 
particularly between 2000 and 2013. The median household income (MHI) in both cities was 
right around $30,000 in 2000, but by 2009, Baltimore’s increased to $41,385, about $15,000 
more than the MHI in Detroit, and Detroit’s MHI actually decreased between 2000-2009 to 
$26,325.  The change in unemployment and poverty rates followed a similar pattern.  Detroit had 
a higher unemployment rate in 2000, 13.8% compared to 10.7% in Baltimore.  Yet, in 2010, 
Baltimore had increased only slightly to 11.2%, while Detroit’s unemployment rate almost 
doubled.   
The manufacturing share of employment is one way to explore how industry has changed 
in each city and to observe the diversity of the employment market.  Employment in 
manufacturing declined significantly in both cities.  Baltimore decreased by 73% and Detroit by 
59%.  By 2000, manufacturing only made up 7.8% of the job market in Baltimore, compared to 
18.8% in Detroit.  Detroit’s poverty rate was higher than Baltimore’s in 2000, then it increased 
by about 13 percentage points by 2009, compared to Baltimore, which only increased by 1 
percentage point.  To measure and compare the housing market in both cities, data was collected 
on a number of housing indicators, shown in Table 1.5. 
Table 1.5. Housing Market in Baltimore and Detroit 
 Baltimore City Detroit City 
Homeownership Rate1   
2000 50.3% 54.9% 
2010 48.3% 51.9% 
Median Housing Value1   
2000 $69,100 $63,600 
2010 $157,900 $50,400 
Vacancy Rate1   
2000 5.6% 4.7% 
2010 7.7% 11.3% 
Mortgage Foreclosure Rate (Foreclosure   
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Filings/% of Housing Units)2 
2007 1.29% 3.41% 
2008 1.22% 3.85% 
2009 2.00% 3.18% 
2010 1.47% 3.36% 
1Source: U.S. Census, 2000, 2010 
2Source: Baltimore Housing, 2010; Data Driven Detroit, 2010 
 
Both cities have been challenged by significant population losses, leading to weak 
housing markets and oversized footprints.  The rate of home ownership in both decreased 
slightly from 2000 to 2010.  The median housing value, however, changed dramatically in each 
city from 2000 to 2010. During those years, Baltimore’s median housing value almost doubled, 
while Detroit’s decreased by 21%.  The vacancy rate increased in both cities, but only by about 2 
percentage points in Baltimore compared to almost two and a half times in Detroit.   
When the mortgage foreclosure crisis really started to hit cities across the country, Detroit 
was in the top 5 major cities with the highest foreclosure rates.  In 2007, the Detroit metropolitan 
region ranked first in the nation for foreclosure rates, while the Baltimore metropolitan region 
was number 66 in the top 100 metro regions (Realty Trac 2008). From 2007-2010, Detroit’s 
foreclosure rate remained high, never dipping below 3% of all housing units.  Baltimore started 
out very low, at 1.29% of housing units in mortgage foreclosure, peaked in 2009 at 2%, then 
decreased back down to 1.47%.  At Baltimore’s highest mortgage foreclosure rate in 2009, the 
metro region ranked 108th and Detroit ranked 35th across the nation, as more cities began to feel 
the repercussions of the economic recession (Realty Trac 2010). 
My research collected data on funding related to local responses to the mortgage 
foreclosure.  Such funds came from two sources in both cities, philanthropy and the federal 
government including Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), the National Foreclosure 
Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) program, Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 
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Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), and Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives 
(HAFA).  NSP provided resources for localities to acquire and redevelop foreclosed properties. 
HAMP funded incentives for lenders and servicers who voluntarily modified the loan terms of 
mortgage in order to lower loan payments for homeowners.  More about HAMP and how it was 
used in Baltimore and Detroit is discussed in Chapter 4.  HARP offered refinancing for 
homeowners with mortgages backed by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and whose home value had 
fallen below the value of their mortgage.  Finally,  HAFA allows qualifying homeowners to 
undergo either a short-sale where the home is sold at below the value of the mortgage, but the 
lender forgives the remaining mortgage amount; or a Deed-in-Lieu of foreclosure, which returns 
the title for the home and the ownership back to the lender without consequence.  Funding data is 
not available for HAMP, HARP, and HAFA, but Table 1.6., below, reports the amount of NSP 
funding allocated for each city, as well as how NSP funds were used.  In Baltimore, NSP funds 
were used to acquire and rehab foreclosed properties, as well as assistance to new homeowners 
for financing and purchase incentives.  In Detroit, funds were used for this as well as demolition, 
new construction to replace demolished properties, and a very small amount for housing 
counseling.  These data were obtained by the U.S. Housing and Urban Development from the 
action plans developed by the local applicants.  In total, Baltimore was allocated $31.8 million 
dollars and Detroit was allocated $109.9 million dollars, almost 3 and a half times as much as 
Baltimore.  
Table 1.6. Neighborhood Stabilization Program Funding* 







2009 $4,112,239 City of Baltimore 
Acquisition $2,500,239 60.8% 
Rehab $1,412,000 34.3% 






Admin $2,609,288 10.0% 











State of MD-East 
Baltimore Dev. 
Inc. 
Acquisition/ Rehab $1,600,000 
N/A 
Total $31,805,119  






2009 $47,137,690 City of Detroit 
Acquisition $4,000,000 8.5% 
Admin $4,713,769 10.0% 
Demolition $14,000,000 29.7% 
Disposition $4,200,000 8.9% 
Housing Counseling $500,000 1.1% 




Rehab $13,723,921 29.1% 
NSP2 
2010 $40,799,351 
State of MI- City 
of Detroit 
Demo/Acquisition/ 
Rehab $40,799,351 N/A 
NSP3 
2011 $21,922,710 City of Detroit 
Planning/ Admin $2,192,271 10.0% 




Demolition $1,192,271 5.4% 
Redevelop $1,500,000 6.8% 
 Total $109,859,751        *HUD Exchange. About Grantees: Detroit & Baltimore.  Accessed August 30, 2015. https://www.hudexchange.info/grantees/ 
 
Financial support for local responses to foreclosures was also provided by private 
philanthropy in each city. In Baltimore, seven (7) foundations provided a total of $2.7 million 
dollars to eleven (11) nonprofit organizations from 2005-2010. Table 1.7. provides more detail 
on these data.  In both the tables for Baltimore and Detroit (Table 1.8), “foreclosure prevention” 
strategies primarily included counseling for homeowners facing foreclosure.  “Neighborhood 
revitalization” refers to redevelopment activities for foreclosed properties.  In addition, there 
were related activities, such as research on mortgage foreclosure activity that was is also 
included below.  
Table 1.7. Baltimore Philanthropic Support for Foreclosure Response1 









Community Law Center $50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 
$55,000 Foreclosure Prevention, 
Neighborhood Revitalization 
Abell Foundation St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 








$60,000 Neighborhood Revitalization 
Baltimore Homeownership 
Preservation Coalition 
$5,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 












$50,000 Neighborhood Revitalization 
Baltimore Neighborhood 
Collaborative 
$35,000 Neighborhood Revitalization 
Baltimore Efficiency & 
Economy Foundation, Inc 
$12,500 Lending and Mortgage 
Foreclosure Research Project 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 
$100,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Abell Foundation Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 




Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 












$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 
$35,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Maryland ACORN $35,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
2008 
cont… 
Annie E Casey 
Foundation 
 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 
$20,000 Foreclosure Prevention 






$230,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Civil Justice, Inc. $250,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Citi Foundation St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 







$50,000 Neighborhood Revitalization 





$120,000 Foreclosure Prevention 








Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 
$20,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Baltimore Homeownership 
Preservation Coalition 
$20,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Baltimore Neighborhood 
Collaborative 





$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 
$35,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 






$400,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Public Justice Center $200,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Baltimore Homeownership 
Preservation Coalition 
$110,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Harry and Jeannette 
Weinberg 
Foundation 
Bel-Air Edison Neighborhoods 
Inc. 
$40,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Baltimore 
$25,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
  Total $2,667,500  
1“Foundation Maps” The Foundation Center.  Accessed August 30, 2015. http://maps.foundationcenter.org/home 
 
The philanthropic sector in Detroit also contributed grant funds to support local responses 
to the foreclosure crisis.  Between 2007-2010, seven foundations contributed a total of $8.0 
million to 5 nonprofit organizations to support foreclosure response strategies, which included 
homeowner counseling and mitigation activities, as well as rehabilitation of real estate owned 
(REO) properties.  The same number of foundations in Detroit provided almost three times as 
much in grant funding to less than half of the number of grantees in less time than in Baltimore. 
Table 1.8 details each grant.  
Table 1.8. Detroit Philanthropic Support for Foreclosure Response1 
2007 
JP Morgan Chase 
Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$20,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Kresge Foundation Southwest Housing Solutions $500,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
2008 
Bank of America 
Charitable Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$100,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Community Foundation 
for Southeast Michigan 
DEGC-Office of Foreclosure 
Prevention & Response 
(OFPR) $25,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Ford Foundation DEGC-OFPR $2,000,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
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$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
JP Morgan Chase 
Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$79,000 Foreclosure Prevention 





Living Cities, Inc. DEGC-OFPR $500,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
The Skillman 
Foundation 
Community Dev. Advocates 
of Detroit $210,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
DEGC-OFPR $175,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Southwest Housing Solutions $250,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
2009 
Bank of America 
Charitable Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$100,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
Community Foundation 
for Southeast Michigan 
DEGC-OFPR 




$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
JP Morgan Chase 
Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 




$100,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
2010 
Bank of America 
Charitable Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 




$50,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
JP Morgan Chase 
Foundation 
Southwest Housing Solutions 
$230,000 Foreclosure Prevention 
 
 Total $8,019,250 
 1 “Foundation Maps” The Foundation Center.  Accessed August 30, 2015. http://maps.foundationcenter.org/home 
 
More details on the response activities in both cities are discussed in Chapter 4.  The tables 
above only present a summary. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the fraction of philanthropic funding that 
was contributed to foreclosure prevention compared to rehabilitation of foreclosed and REO 
properties. More than twice the funds were used for demolition in Detroit than in Baltimore.  
Because Baltimore has more attached row houses, demolition there is more difficult, so fewer 
























”Foundation Maps,” The Foundation Center. Accessed August 30, 2015. http://maps.foundationcenter.org/home  
 
The secondary data presented here indicate the two cities had quite similar past trajectories in 
terms of their local economies and the impact of a declining population base.  Differences in 
their housing markets over the last decade, however, offer an opportunity to explore differences 
in housing and community development strategies.  The primary data collection, described here, 
will provide the foundation for that exploration.  Thus the next chapter will present evidence, 
within the context provided in the previous chapters, which suggest what those factors may be.   
 
 
Summary of Dissertation Findings 
Baltimore and Detroit both had strengths and weakness with regard to how well they 
were able to respond to the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  While this researched aimed to 
determine whether the local response to the foreclosure crisis influence housing market outcomes 
in each city, it found that the opportunity space seemed more important than the specific 














weakness of the community development sector was a contributing factor to outcomes in the 
housing market, rather than how local stakeholders responded to mortgage foreclosures.  In 
addition, in both cities, practitioners were working against an increasingly struggling economy, 
so preventing mortgage foreclosures and addressing affected properties was, and continues to be, 
an almost unattainable goal. Despite this, local stakeholders in each city ramped up their efforts 
to help homeowners and revitalize neighborhoods.   
The opportunity space, meaning the context of policies and organizational infrastructure, 
in Baltimore was stronger in supporting the community development sector in the following 
ways.  There were deep connections between community development organizations, funders, 
and policymakers, particularly on the state level.  This prepared Baltimore to be able to put 
strategies in place to respond to the crisis and those strategies were well informed by research 
and data.  However, in an attempt to use the power of state laws to help homeowners, policy 
changes made by the State of Maryland to extend and delay foreclosures may have inadvertently 
increased the foreclosure rate in the later years, and put more pressure on practitioners on the 
ground.   
Prior to the foreclosure crisis, Detroit had a weaker and narrower opportunity space than 
Baltimore.  There were few collaborative relationships between organizations, funders, and city 
government, nor did those entities work together within those groups.  This translated into a 
longer ramp up time for responses to the foreclosure crisis to occur and to more fragmentation of 
those responses.  Many organizations were responding in different ways, but those activities 
were not always coordinated or connected in ways that could have increased the impact.  The 
City of Detroit’s applications for National Stabilization Program (NSP) grants is an example of 
this.  The areas targeted for NSP activities were not coordinated with existing priorities of 
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community organizations or funders and led to activities that were too dispersed, with less 
chance of impact in the city.  The foreclosure crisis, however, galvanized the community 
development sector in new ways.  Funders became more organized amongst each other, as did 
community development organizations, into separate coalitions.  These structures have grown 
and outlived the major responses to the foreclosure crisis.  In many ways, the foreclosure crisis 
helped strengthen the community development sector in Detroit.      
 
Outline of Dissertation 
 This chapter has introduced the research questions and hypotheses framing my study.  It 
outlined the literature that influenced my research, the methodology, and my data collection 
activities and quantitative results from both cities, as well as a summary of overall findings.  
Chapter 2 introduces the two case cities in greater detail, interweaving extensive political and 
organizational histories that provide a foundation for exploring how the foreclosure crisis 
occurred and manifested in each city.  In particular, this chapter describes the origins and 
development of the community development sector in each city and its relationship with other 
stakeholders in the city, namely mayoral administrations and the rising philanthropic sector.  
Chapter three outlines the source of the mortgage foreclosure crisis on the national level and how 
the crisis unfolded in Baltimore in Detroit.  It then provides a rich description of the timeline of 
each city’s response to the foreclosure crisis through the different players: the organizations, 
funders, city and (where applicable) state governments.  Chapter four interprets these dynamics 
within the resiliency framework described above analyzing the responses in terms of opportunity 
space, policy responses, and housing market stability. Finally, chapter five provides a brief 
update on how each city has developed since 2010, and presents my dissertation’s overall 
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conclusions.  It also describes the limitations of my research, as well as lessons learned from the 




Chapter 2: Introduction to the Cases 
  
Introduction 
By exploring how local stakeholders responded to the mortgage foreclosure crisis in 
Baltimore and Detroit, this research sheds light on how these cities express resilience and take 
action in the face of difficult circumstances.  However, understanding the context of governance 
and local organizational infrastructure matters before seeking to understand how stakeholders 
responded. Thus, this chapter provides a historical overview and comparison of the local 
economies, mayoral politics and the housing and community development sectors in Baltimore 
and Detroit prior to the foreclosure crisis.   
 As outlined in the previous chapter, both are old industrial cities that have suffered 
decades of economic decline, racial change, and depopulation.  Both experienced high rates of 
poverty and unemployment concentrated in African-American communities as blacks comprise 
the great majority of their populations.  In 1950, both cities were bustling manufacturing and 
business centers, but now, through deindustrialization, hospitals and universities are the largest 
employment sectors.  Though many similarities will surface in this comparison, this chapter will 
also identify significant differences between the contexts in which community development 
actors are situated.  
 
Local Economy 
 As post-industrial, weak market cities, Baltimore and Detroit shared a history of 
declining economic status over the last fifty years.  Their experience was also common to other 
rustbelt cities of the Midwest and post-industrial towns and cities in Northeastern United States.  
Throughout the nation, post-World War II affluence meant the growth of suburbs as industry 
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moved out of central cities in favor for more land, and national subsidies and discriminatory 
housing practices paved the way for white flight, and suburban highway and housing 
development (Pietera 2010; Manning Thomas 1997; Drier, Mollenkopf, Swanstrom 2001).  As 
jobs moved out of the city limits of Baltimore and Detroit, so did many middle- and upper-
income white and African American households, leaving many cities with low-income, African 
American populations.   
 Baltimore was a large steel manufacturing town and an active port that provided high-
earning union jobs for residents for decades (Olsen 1997). Bethlehem Steel, Smith and 
Westinghouse, American Can Company and other smaller manufacturers made their home in the 
city.  After the 1960s, however, federal contracts and incentives drove manufacturing out of the 
downtown and over the years that followed, the majority of low-skill jobs grew in the service 
industries, including education and health care, which tended to have lower wages and less 
security.  Over subsequent decades, this led to an overall decline in population in the city that 
resulted in empty houses, as well as communities where poverty increased because stable 
economic opportunities were harder to find.  As will be described later, mayors and other local 
stakeholders made attempts to improve conditions in these communities, using local and federal 
resources.  However, so many of the challenges brought by poverty are complex and entrenched 
and, without a robust economy with good, stable employment, those strategies did not eliminate 
the root causes of poverty.   
 Detroit fared similarly.  The city and region developed as the center of automobile 
manufacturing, being the home of the three largest car companies in the United States: Ford 
Motor Company, General Motors, and Chrysler.  Starting in the 1960s, many manufacturing 
facilities relocated outside of downtown and into surrounding suburbs, as auto-manufacturing 
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changed from Henry Ford’s vertical warehouse to being spread out in factories that covered acres 
of land (Manning Thomas 1997).  Jobs left the city and in their wake, the remaining Detroiters 
struggled with fewer opportunities, poor quality schools, and vacant properties contributing to 
the declining condition of their neighborhoods, among other challenges faced by many urban 
communities.  During the mid-2000s, the automakers started declining as long term pension and 
retirement costs increased while sales decreased as a result of weaknesses in the national 
economy. General Motors and Chrysler faced bankruptcy.  Those companies were eventually 
provided loans through TARP to prevent their collapse (U.S. Treasury 2015), but the entire 
Detroit region suffered huge job losses because of this downturn.   
At the same time, the City of Detroit’s budget deficit and debt levels were growing and 
beginning to cripple the City’s ability to provide basic services.  After decades of depopulation, 
which left parts of the city almost empty, the City was struggling to provide even rudimentary 
services for its 139 square miles.  Saddled with a shrinking tax base, high pension and retiree 
costs, declining state revenue sharing, and a legacy of corruption and poor financial 
management, the City began taking on debt in order to function at the most basic level, debt 
totaled over $18 billion when the city filed for bankruptcy in 2013 (Diehm 2013, Turbeville 
2013).   
 When the national economy began taking a downturn in the mid-2000s, both Baltimore 
and Detroit were already in a weak position.  As described in Chapter Three, when the housing 
bubble burst and the recession began, jobs began to vanish and more homeowners struggled to 
make their mortgage payments.  For these cities, which were already facing high unemployment 
and poverty rates, and tens of thousands of vacant properties due to population declines and tax 
foreclosures, the future looked dire.   
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Shared Histories of Discrimination 
 One important contextual factor in both cities is the legacy of racism and uneven 
development in urban planning and housing development.  While many American cities share 
this history, Baltimore and Detroit may be extreme cases. Discriminatory policies and practices 
shaped neighborhood development patterns as well as the trajectory of the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis in both cities.   In many ways, discrimination determined the causes and responses to the 
foreclosure crisis, so understanding how the foundation of these practices is important.  The 
following section describes and interweaves how these policies and practices manifested in both 
cities.   
According to Antero Pietila (2010, p. 22), Baltimore was a national leader in residential 
segregationist practices and took part in overtly discriminatory practices “more than any other 
place in the county.”  In 1910, the Baltimore City Council passed a local law that prohibited 
blacks from moving to white residential blocks and whites from moving to black residential 
blocks (Pietila 2010).  The city council claimed they passed the ordinance, “for preserving order, 
securing property values and promoting the greater interests and insuring the good government 
of Baltimore City” (Pietila 2010, p. 22).  A few decades later, Detroit instituted its own 
segregationist policy related to the development of public housing.  In 1943, the Detroit local 
housing authority determined that public housing projects built in black neighborhoods could 
only house blacks and those in white neighborhoods would only house whites, so that, “No 
housing project shall change the racial characteristic of a neighborhood” (Manning Thomas 
1997, p. 25).  
As in many other cities, speculative real estate practices contributed to racial segregation 
in Baltimore, including blockbusting practices. Real estate agents used the fear of black 
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integration to get white homeowners to sell their homes below value, while raising the prices on 
black homeowners who purchased them (Pietila 2010). Developers and real estate agents also 
engaged in land installment payment programs and rent-to-own agreements with black 
homeowners that involved exorbitant interest rates, making housing costs much higher for blacks 
than whites.   
Urban renewal projects funded as a result of the Federal Housing Act of 1949 occurred 
between the 1940s and 1970s in Baltimore and Detroit and provided resources to municipal 
governments for slum clearance. In both cities, such projects were concentrated in or near 
downtown, low-income African American communities, and resulted in the massive 
displacements of low-income black residents.  In Detroit, a 78-acre portion of the neighborhood 
known as Black Bottom, originally named for the dark soil French settlers found there, then later 
for its majority African American residents, was declared a slum by city planners and the City 
completely razed it in order to build mixed-income townhomes and high-rise apartment buildings 
famously designed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (Manning Thomas 1997).   
In Detroit, civil rights organizations, such as the Urban League and a coalition of 
African-American ministers known as the Detroit Fellowship for Urban Renewal Churches, 
brought suit against public and private entities aimed at redeveloping the medical center district, 
another urban renewal development (Darden et al 1990).  Their efforts brought important 
concessions, namely land set-asides for the churches to build affordable housing as well as an 
institutionalized process for citizen approval of future urban renewal redevelopment projects. 
This citizen approval process was later required for redevelopment efforts part of the federal 
Empowerment Zone implementation in Detroit.  
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In Baltimore, city planners used urban renewal funds to redevelop the distressed 
downtown harbor and waterfront district into mega office buildings and a retail marketplace, 
displacing long-standing, low- to moderate-income neighborhoods nearby.  In the 1940s, 
Baltimore even hired Robert Moses to propose improvements to the highway system.  He 
proposed a new highway to cut through 200 blocks in the middle of downtown, where 19,000 
mostly African American residents lived.  Moses commented that, “Nothing which we propose 
to remove will constitute any loss to Baltimore” (Pietila 2010, p. 219). Ultimately, residents and 
neighborhood organizations formed MAD (Movement Against Destruction) and successfully 
pushed back against the highway, but this example speaks to how city planners and officials 
valued communities of color in the city.   
Officials and planners in both cities relocated many of the residents pushed out of urban 
renewal neighborhoods into public housing developments that were built in existing low-income, 
African American communities, furthering racial segregation and concentrated poverty. The 
economic and physical distress experienced in these communities has been at the center of any 
neighborhood redevelopment policies and practices through shifting political priorities in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. As the foreclosure crisis is described in both cities in the next 
chapter, we will see how discrimination, again, played a role, and how this impacted these two, 
largely African American cities.    
 
Neighborhoods and Municipal Politics in Baltimore 
 Baltimore’s governing coalition during the foreclosure crisis was influenced by changes 
in mayoral politics as well as new actors that came into the fold in more recent years, namely 
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foundations and community organizations.  This section will outline how these changes created 
the roster of actors who were involved in the foreclosure response of the mid-2000s.   
 
Organizing and Mayoral Priorities  
Neighborhood organizing and resistance against racist practices grew in both cities 
during the urban renewal and redevelopment projects described above.  In Baltimore, MAD was 
a multiracial group of neighborhood activists that organized against Moses’ proposed highway 
plan (Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2015).  They were active in the 1960s and 1970s.  In the early 
1980s, Baltimore’s Industrial Areas Foundation affiliate, called Baltimoreans United in 
Leadership Development (BUILD) started organizing campaigns against the city’s then mayor, 
William Schaefer, who was in office from 1971-1986.  Founded as a community-based 
organization whose power came primarily from the city’s major African American churches, 
BUILD led a movement against discriminatory practices such as redlining (Orr 2000).   
Mayor Schaefer, on the other hand, was well known for his alliance with the Greater 
Baltimore Committee (GBC), an association of the major players in the business committee that 
was very influential in the city up until the 1990s.  Together with the GBC, Schaefer devoted 
federal and local government funding to redevelop Baltimore’s downtown and Inner Harbor 
(Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2015).  With regard to neighborhood groups, Schaefer selectively 
used employment posts and small pots of public funding to gain allegiance from community 
organizations.  However, he provided this patronage primarily to white ethnic neighborhoods and 
their leaders, which helped to dissipate such efforts as MAD and segregate future neighborhood 
organizing efforts in Baltimore (Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2015).   
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BUILD continued to organize against Mayor Schaefer’s pro-downtown development 
policies until he was elected Governor of Maryland in 1986. Baltimore elected its first African 
American mayor, Kurt Schmoke, in 1987.  Schmoke’s priorities aligned with those of the long-
neglected African American neighborhoods in Baltimore and he quickly shifted the City’s 
attention to addressing community redevelopment.  Partnering with BUILD and the Enterprise 
Foundation (a national community development intermediary now known as Enterprise 
Community Partners), Mayor Schmoke funneled city dollars towards a comprehensive initiative 
to address housing, job training, economic development, community policing, and civic pride in 
Baltimore’s Sandtown-Winchester community (Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2015).  Though not 
without significant challenges in maintaining community engagement, the Sandtown project was 
seen as a national model for community redevelopment at the time and helped Schmoke to win 
$100 million in Empowerment Zone (EZ) resources for Baltimore in 1994.  The EZ initiatives 
tackled job creation, workforce development and housing, and attracted neighborhood, 
philanthropic, government, and corporate stakeholders to collaborate on defining local priorities 
and programs.  Each EZ community had an advisory committee and nonprofit community center 
that managed its projects.   
Mayor Schmoke also launched a neighborhood development plan for the city.  He 
divided the city into four classifications from high homeownership and high stability to the 
lowest classification requiring major redevelopment and two neighborhood categories in between 
that either tipped toward stability or distress (Stoker, Stone, and Worgs 2015).  Mayor 
Schmoke’s intention was to tailor public and private investments in each neighborhood based on 
these classifications.  However Schmoke decided not to run for mayor again and when Martin 
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O’Malley was elected in 1999, he summarily dismantled Schmoke’s gains in neighborhood 
development.   
O’Malley disregarded all of the planning that Schmoke undertook to invest in 
neighborhoods based on their classification and did not pursue any activities related to building 
neighborhood capacity.  O’Malley established an office of neighborhoods, but it focused solely 
on constituent services, not neighborhood planning and development.  He also shifted Schmoke’s 
safety efforts from community policing in favor of more Giuliani-style policing with harsh 
tactics targeted toward low-level crimes primarily in communities of color (Stoker, Stone, Worgs 
2015).  Several interviewees from community development organizations, foundations, and even 
the public sector described Mayor O’Malley’s approach to neighborhood development as more 
responsive then strategic and his administration’s actions were characterized more as staying out 
of the way rather than leading any neighborhood efforts (Personal Interviews).   
Mayor O’Malley was elected as governor of the state of Maryland in 2006 and was 
replaced by City Council President Sheila Dixon, who then won the 2007 general election for 
Mayor.  She was Baltimore’s first female mayor.  Mayor Dixon reinstituted a priority on 
neighborhood development, exemplified by the hire of Jacqueline Cornish as Deputy 
Commissioner of Baltimore Housing to oversee the Office of Neighborhood Investment.  For the 
previous 20 years, Cornish had been the Executive Director of Druid Heights CDC, and a well-
respected leader in the community development sector.  This move to Baltimore Housing 
signaled that Mayor Dixon’s administration placed a renewed value on neighborhood 
redevelopment.  
However, progress in this regard was stalled because in 2008, Mayor Dixon was 
investigated for fraud and misappropriation of public funds.  In, 2009, she was found guilty on 
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one misdemeanor embezzlement charge related to her use of over $600 worth of retail store gift 
cards that were intended for needy families.  Mayor Dixon resigned in early 2010 as part of a 
plea deal, and was replaced by Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, who had succeeded Dixon as 
President of Baltimore City Council (WBAL 2010).  
 
Foundations Invest in Neighborhoods 
In 1999, as Schmoke transitioned out and O’Malley transitioned in, local foundations 
began showing greater interest in neighborhood development.  The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
the Abell Foundation, Goldseker Foundation and the Baltimore Community Foundation all 
began expressing concern about the direction many neighborhoods were heading and recognized 
the attention that Schmoke had paid to low-income communities.  In the mid 1990s, these 
foundations had formed the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC), an entity that sought 
to coordinate and streamline neighborhood development efforts and investment (Thomson 2013).  
In 1999, the local Goldseker Foundation released a report finding that the focus on development 
and funding in Baltimore’s central business district had led to distress and neglect in its 
neighborhoods.  The report quoted an unnamed civic leader as calling the situation, “rot beneath 
the glitter,” (Smith 1999, p. 262).  
An alliance between the BNC and the Citizens Housing and Planning Association 
(CHPA), a long-standing neighborhood planning and advocacy organization, promoted a focus 
on improving the quality of life and the market value of Baltimore’s middle income 
neighborhoods.  They defined these as not severely distressed, with potential for stable 
homeownership and attracting new middle-income households to Baltimore, which could help 
stabilize the tax base of the city.  Called the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative (HNI), it piloted 
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the program in six neighborhoods. In 2004, HNI was incorporated as a nonprofit organization, 
which served as an intermediary for philanthropic and government funding as well as a technical 
assistance provider.  By 2008, HNI rolled out its strategy in 37 neighborhoods (Thomson 2013).   
Mayor O’Malley publicly supported HNI and the City directed anywhere from $400,000 
to $1,500,000 in city funding starting in 2000, primarily for street improvements and a matching 
program for residents who received home purchase or improvement loans from HNI (Thomson 
2013).  However, as one local practitioner observed, “O’Malley didn’t totally understand HNI or 
asset-based community development. And the head of Baltimore Housing had more of a public 
housing focus” (Personal Interview).  The funding for HNI was more the result of support from 
city council members, namely Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, who would later become Council 
President, and eventually Mayor of Baltimore (Thomson 2013). 
In the early 2000s, the President of Johns Hopkins University came to Mayor O’Malley 
with an idea for promoting science-based community development in the distressed 
neighborhoods surrounding its medical campus, known as the Middle East neighborhood.  The 
Middle East neighborhood had been in decline for many years, with large numbers of vacant and 
distressed properties, as well as vacant land. The University sought to redevelop the area with 
businesses and institutions focused on science and medicine, which would then support the 
development of housing, schools, and other community amenities.  O’Malley liked the idea and 
supported the formation of a quasi-governmental organization, East Baltimore Development 
Incorporated (EBDI).   
EBDI used a mix of Tax-Increment Finance (TIF) dollars (where tax revenues are 
devoted to specific uses within a designated geographic district), foundation investments 
(primarily from the Annie E. Casey Foundation), and Federal Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
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(Personal Interview).  In partnership with Johns Hopkins University, EBDI’s plan was to 
purchase and demolish distressed and vacant structures and rebuild the neighborhood through 
housing and commercial development, attracting science and medicine industries that would 
employ residents, and building early education and elementary schools to serve existing and new 
families.  With an aim to be a model for equitable land clearance and acquisition, and with 
significant backing and involvement from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, EBDI helped existing 
residents to either temporarily or permanently relocate into improved housing in other 
neighborhoods and gave residents the first opportunity to live in new housing rebuilt in the target 
area (Personal Interview). Overall, EBDI was supported primarily by Johns Hopkins and the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation, as well as additional foundation partners.  According to a 
practitioner involved in the project, the O’Malley administration had very little involvement 
besides expressing support and processing land dispositions (Personal Interview).   
 
Baltimore’s Community Development Intermediaries, Organizations, and Advocates 
 The formation of the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative in 1996 was the first time in 
Baltimore’s history that several local foundations came together specifically to support 
neighborhood development.  The purpose of the BNC was to raise private and corporate support 
for community development.  The BNC institutionalized a strong and broad network of 
community development organizations, helped to build their capacity, and increase 
understanding within local stakeholders of community development strategies.  Functionally, it 
became a community development intermediary.  The BNC facilitated collaboration between 
practitioners and funders and aggregated resources to then provide grants to community 
development organizations based on collectively defined strategies.   
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Besides engaging in the targeted community development initiatives and the 
Empowerment Zone-related efforts during Mayor Schmoke’s administration, the nonprofit 
community development sector in Baltimore was characterized by many practitioners as small, 
even “anemic in terms of the number of units produced and the number of organizations who do 
it” (Personal Interview).  If nonprofit community development organizations developed housing, 
it was primarily for special needs populations such as senior citizens, veterans, and women with 
children.  Nonprofit developers were more engaged in housing development that was paired 
closely with social services provided by the developers. A small number of organizations 
produced and managed such multifamily developments, but small, private developers were the 
primary producers of both subsidized and market rate housing. 
Another common theme among community development organizations in Baltimore was 
that many had been formed out of community activism and organizing.  Besides BUILD, there 
were several other organizations whose roots were in community organizing, including the South 
East Community Organization (SECO), North East Community Organization, Patterson Park 
Community Development Organization and Druid Heights Community Development 
Corporation.  Residents started these groups to advocate for better services or attention towards 
blight, then institutionalized to form nonprofit organizations and community development 
corporations whose purpose shifted toward nonprofit real estate development, primarily to 
develop housing through Low Income Housing Tax Credits (Davidoff 2015).   
Many cities have at least one financial intermediary who is very active and engaged in 
the local community development real estate industry.  National organizations like Enterprise 
Community Partners, Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), The Reinvestment Fund, or 
other community development financial intermediaries (CDFI) function as national funders, 
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lenders, and technical assistance providers to community nonprofit housing developers.  Despite 
Enterprise having roots in Baltimore (it was started by the Baltimore business leader and private 
developer James Rouse), and being headquartered in Columbia, Maryland, it did not have a 
significant presence in Baltimore’s community development sector.  Enterprise was deeply 
involved in the Sandtown-Winchester initiative with Mayor Schmoke and provided other 
project-based support to nonprofits in the city, but Enterprise did not participate in the BNC, and 
practitioners did not identify it as a major stakeholder locally (Personal Interview).   
During late 1990s, Baltimore experienced increased predatory lending and flipping, like 
many other cities across the United States, primarily in its low-income communities and 
communities of color.  Representatives from city and state agencies, along with community 
development practitioners, housing activists, and funders formed the Baltimore City Property 
Flipping Task Force, which met to develop strategies to prevent and mitigate the effects of 
predatory lending in the City.   After meeting and conducting research for 2 years, the Task 
Force presented its recommendations to U.S. Senators Barbara Mikulski and Paul Sarbanes, who 
represented Maryland, which included proposed changes in policies for HUD and state and local 
housing agencies, as well as funding to help homeowners stuck in overvalued mortgages (Sabar 
2002).   
After and out of the Task Force, members of the BNC formed the Baltimore Housing 
Preservation Coalition (BHPC).  A leader in this effort described the BHPC as an effort to get 
community development organizations, lenders, funders, and representatives from city 
government enforcement agencies around a table to network and share information about trends 
and best practices to address predatory lending and flipping in Baltimore neighborhoods 
(Personal Interview).  BHPC met regularly for a number of years before the mortgage 
  
 45 
foreclosure crisis hit Baltimore.  In the beginning, BHPC included a representative from 
Baltimore Housing, the City’s public housing and community development agency: “Initially 
there was a staff person, [named Jennifer Mielke], from Baltimore Housing who was co-chair of 
BHPC, who was really involved.  In 2007, she changed jobs [to a different department in 
Baltimore Housing] and left her role with BHPC, and we had trouble reengaging the city on this 
issue.  That was frustrating.  [City officials] didn’t think it was a strong factor affecting 
neighborhoods” (Personal Interview). Staff from many entities participated in BHPC meetings 
including the Abell Foundation, Goldseker Foundation, and Healthy Neighborhoods, as well as 
longstanding community development organizations including St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center, 
Neighborhood Services Organization, Druid Heights Community Development Corporation 
(Druid Heights CDC), and others.  The collaborative continued to meet and implement 
homeowner preservation and foreclosure prevention activities through Baltimore’s several 
subsequent mayoral transitions.  
 
Valuing Community Development Practitioners 
Though Dixon resigned, her appreciation for neighborhood development was evidenced 
by the hiring of the former Druid Heights CDC director.  This was just one example of 
practitioners who moved in and around different parts of the community development sector.  
Another such example is Kenneth Strong, who served in various capacities in the public sector, 
but was also the Executive Director of South East Community Organization (SECO) (Baltimore 
Housing 2015a).  Around since the 1970s, SECO was an umbrella organization founded by 
community activists that engaged residents and other stakeholders around issues to improve 
quality of life (Southeast CDC 2015).  He was also president of SECO’s development arm, 
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Southeast Development, Inc., which acted as a more traditional community development 
corporation, redeveloping distressed residential and commercial real estate to revitalize the 
neighborhood that SECO served.   When Strong became Deputy Commissioner at Baltimore 
Housing in 2010, he also became the city’s representative at BHPC meetings.  According to a 
member of the BHPC, this again strengthened the coalition’s relationship with the City (Personal 
Interview).   
Carol Gilbert is also an example of a community development advocate who moved 
around the sector.  With a background in neighborhood design, Gilbert was a program officer 
with the Goldseker Foundation and, while there, founded BHPC, serving as its co-chair for many 
years.  In 2007, she was offered the opportunity to lead community development initiatives at the 
state level as Assistant Secretary for the Division of Neighborhood Revitalization.  As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, from this position, Gilbert used her background in community 
development and mortgage foreclosure prevention to lead the State’s response to the housing 
crisis across the state, as well as local responses, particularly in Baltimore. According to other 
members of the BHPC, her commitment to Baltimore’s community development sector followed 
her from philanthropy to state government, and benefited Baltimore for years to come (Personal 
Interview).  
Finally, Anne Norton was the Director of Foreclosure Prevention at St. Ambrose Housing 
Aid Center until July 2010, when she was appointed as Assistant Commissioner for Non-
Depository Institutions with the State of Maryland’s Commissioner of Financial Regulation at 
the Department of Labor, Licensing and Registration (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing 
and Regulation 2010). St. Ambrose was her first role in community development.  Prior to her 
position there, she was general counsel with a national mortgage lender with responsibility over 
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origination and compliance of secondary market and state licensing related to lending.  While at 
St. Ambrose, Norton had served on O’Malley’s statewide mortgage task force, which helped 
solidify relationships between local practitioners and state agencies.  Including Cornish, these 
four examples contribute to the notion that community development work is valuable experience 
that can contribute to the public sector.  
Thus, prior to the foreclosure crisis, Baltimore moved from a political machine-like 
governing coalition with Schaefer, which helped foment community organizing and resistance 
that built the foundation for the community development sector.  Mayor Schmoke’s focus on 
low-income communities and neighborhood development triggered greater interest in these 
issues from local foundations organized as the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC).  
The BNC helped develop a community development infrastructure whereby organizations and 
foundations strategically identified and implemented community development projects such as 
Healthy Neighborhoods and the East Baltimore development initiative.  This infrastructure grew 
amidst O’Malley’s lackluster engagement in neighborhood development (Personal Interviews).  
Within local and state government, community development experience was valued evidenced 
by the individuals who moved to different roles within the sector.  By the time the foreclosure 
crisis was springing up in Baltimore, the governing coalition included organized philanthropy 
who was engaged in neighborhood development, community organizations who had a voice at 
the table, and a minimalist public sector which didn’t get in the way. When Rawlings-Blake 






Mayoral Politics and Development in Detroit 
The governing coalition in Detroit shifted in composition and focus from the 1970s to the 
present day.  As this section will describe, the foreclosure crisis was a time during which a new 
arrangement of power brokers was being formed.  How and why Detroit arrived there, and the 
degree of involvement from and impact on the community development sector will be explored 
in the following section.   
 
A Focus on Downtown 
Like Baltimore, Detroit had its own large share of downtown redevelopment efforts, 
patronage, and mayoral alliances with the business community.  Coleman A. Young was mayor 
of Detroit from 1974-1994, and his governing methods were consistent with urban progrowth 
partnerships between mayors and business leaders that were common during this era (DiGaetano 
and Lawless 1999, Levine 1989). Young was the city’s first African American Mayor during a 
period in which Detroit was still recovering from widespread riots in 1967 spurred because of 
racial tensions.  He was well known for making great strides to reverse racial discrimination in 
Detroit, particularly in public sector employment, and for being publicly defiant against racist 
sentiments from suburban residents and politicians (DiGaetano and Lawless 1999).   
At the same, he built strong alliances with business leaders who, in the 1970s, formed a 
powerful civic association known as Detroit Renaissance (DiGaetano and Lawless 1999, Waters 
and Brown 1985).  Created as a roundtable of corporate executives in the city, Detroit 
Renaissance implemented downtown development strategies, advocated for public policies 
favorable to downtown business development, and coordinated investment opportunities in the 
city with a mission to expand economic development (Business Leaders for Michigan 2015.)  
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Members of Detroit Renaissance, in partnership with Mayor Young, were instrumental in 
investing in and producing much of the office, commercial, and residential development in the 
downtown and riverfront areas during a time when the city was undergoing white and middle 
class flight from the city to the suburbs. In 2009, Detroit Renaissance became Business Leaders 
for Michigan, as its members decided to turn its economic development focus to the entire state, 
instead of just the Detroit metropolitan region.   
Besides his partnership with Detroit Renaissance, Mayor Young solidified government 
partnerships with business leaders by forming quasi-governmental and public-private partnership 
agencies that exist to this day, including the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC) and 
the Downtown Development Authority (DDA).  The governing boards of these entities included 
some of the city and region’s biggest corporations and financial institutions, as well as Detroit 
public officials, and who acted as the centers for coordinating the city’s economic redevelopment 
agenda.  Mayor Young devoted the City’s major redevelopment resources from the city’s budget 
into projects aimed at rebuilding downtown and the east riverfront.  These areas were primarily 
redeveloped with housing and amenities aimed at middle and high-income neighborhoods.  He 
utilized federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to leverage private 
investment from developers and corporations for building downtown skyscrapers, retail and 
entertainment locations, and luxury housing (Darden, Hill and Thomas 1990).   
  
Neighborhood Resistance and Fragmentation 
Two groups challenged Mayor Young’s CDBG funding decisions.  One was the 
Michigan Avenue Community Organization (MACO), a multiracial, Saul Alinsky-inspired 
organization based in a Corktown, a neighborhood just west of downtown.  Using aggressive and 
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media-friendly tactics, they brought attention to discriminatory development practices, subpar 
public services, the proliferation and dangers of vacant lots, and HUD foreclosures occurring in 
their community (Shaw 2003).  In addition, a “majority white but progressive alliance” of 
community development leaders known as the Savor Our Spirit (SOS) coalition challenged 
Mayor Young’s CDBG funding decisions between 1985-1993 (Shaw and Spence 2004).  To 
SOS, not enough funding was being directed to Detroit’s neighborhoods, which were rapidly 
declining in quality and population.  
In response to SOS, to solidify more of their own power, and to focus more attention and 
resources on neighborhood organizations serving low-income residents and community 
redevelopment efforts, the Detroit City Council formed the Neighborhood Opportunities Fund 
(NOF) in the late 1980s to funnel CDBG funds to neighborhood and community development 
organizations.  While SOS began as a challenger to how NOF funding decisions were made, 
eventually it became an informal advisory body to the City Council.  During every funding 
cycle, SOS conducted analyses on NOF grants and applications, and provided recommendations 
for recipients of CDBG funding (Shaw and Spence 2004). Despite this, the CDBG system was 
still considered ineffective.  One former government representative with deep involvement in the 
CDBG process characterized its impact in Detroit as (Personal Interview): 
CDBG funds have generally been fifteen percent public service, eighty-five bricks and 
mortar.  It built a scattered, unstrategic, and ineffective system of affordable housing 
construction that has really suffered in the crisis.  CDBG is distributed, though, without 
much rhyme or reason.  It’s the culture of the system.  There are a lot of good people 
doing good things, but there’s no vision.  Community groups are generally divided and it 
just replicates a process of dysfunction in the city.   
 
Much like Mayor Schaefer in Baltimore, Mayor Young also used CDBG funds to try to 
quiet challenges to his redevelopment efforts.  For example, MACO, once a strong source of 
protest in the city, ended up receiving NOF funds to focus some of their efforts on housing 
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development and neighborhood revitalization in their community (Shaw and Spence 2004).  
Ultimately, strong neighborhood organizing dissipated in Detroit as many community 
development organizations focused less on community engagement and more on affordable 
housing development or provision of social services.   
Despite the focus on neighborhood development through NOF, the city government’s 
community development functions were otherwise disjointed and neighborhood organizations 
were, structurally, kept out of policymaking.  The City of Detroit has two agencies charged with 
planning activities.  The City Planning and Development Department (PDD) is a mayoral agency 
and primarily deals with zoning and the rare occurrence of mayor-led master planning.  A 
longtime researcher and planner in Detroit who has worked with Detroit city agencies described 
the PDD as a reactive agency, primarily responding to development proposals from community 
development organizations and private developers (Personal Interview).  The City of Detroit also 
had a Housing Department from the 1970s and through the foreclosure crisis, but its role was 
limited to managing public housing.   
Departing from normal practice, the Detroit City Council, however, had its own planning 
agency, called the City Planning Commission (CPC) (Manning Thomas 1997).  The CPC was 
staffed by lawyers and administrators who managed the distribution and monitoring of CDBG 
funds. As one respondent commented, “CPC doesn’t do as much as you’d think given how many 
people they [have on] staff,” (Personal Interview).  The City Council claimed to be guided by 
neighborhood organizations, but neighborhood advocates were not formally integrated into CPC.  
At one time, the Executive Directors of the Southwest Business Development Association, an 
economic development organization based in Southwest Detroit; and USNAPBAC, a community 
development corporation on the eastside of Detroit, sat on the CPC’s advisory body.  However, 
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because both organizations received CDBG funds, they were both removed for fear of a conflict 
of interest (Personal Interview).  
 
 
New Attempts at Neighborhood Development 
Mayor Coleman’s successor, Dennis Archer tried to reinvigorate a focus on 
neighborhoods by securing federal Empowerment Zone funds.  Elected in 1994, he promoted a 
consensus with both neighborhood organizations and business leaders to strengthen Detroit as a 
recipient for EZ funds, as well as to differentiate his priorities from his predecessor (Manning 
Thomas 1997).  During his two terms, Mayor Archer tried to enhance neighborhood 
development while continuing Young’s progress on downtown redevelopment.  He created the 
Greater Downtown Partnership comprised of business, civic, and philanthropic leaders, which 
helped coordinate and lead investment and redevelopment efforts in downtown and the 
surrounding neighborhoods (DiGaetano and Lawless 1999).  A former staffer of Mayor Archer 
reported that he engaged the city in a broad community planning effort, asking residents from all 
over the city to envision what they wanted in their neighborhoods (Personal Interview).  This 
effort, called the Community Revitalization Strategy (CRS), guided community development 
efforts, but it was limited in a couple of ways.  First, it did not commit funds to implement the 
resulting plans, so many neighborhood projects remained just ideas.  Second, it was centered 
primarily on land use decisions, rather than comprehensive revitalization initiatives. For instance, 
CRS did not address such challenges as jobs development or improving education and health.  It 
did, however, fill a strategic gap in planning activities in the city, and many thus saw it as a 
logical start to redevelopment efforts in Detroit (Personal Interview).   
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Kwame Kilpatrick became mayor of Detroit in 2001 and, at the age of 31, was the 
youngest mayor in that city’s history.  Despite a first term that was marred with mismanagement 
of city funds for personal use, growing budget deficit, rumors of violent parties at the Mayor’s 
mansion, and being called one of the worst mayors in the country by TIME magazine, Kilpatrick 
masterfully ran a media-friendly, community-level campaign and was reelected in 2005 
(Thottam 2005)2.   In 2006, Kilpatrick launched a targeted community development effort called 
the Next Detroit Neighborhood Initiative (NDNI) that would concentrate public and private 
investment into 6 neighborhoods (Thomson 2013).  A former member of Kilpatrick’s 
administration reported that in order to get approval for public funding for NDNI, City Council 
members required that Mayor Kilpatrick choose two poor, two middle class, and two upper 
income neighborhoods to be included in the initiative (Personal Interview). NDNI’s aim was to 
improve the quality of life in those communities through neighborhood revitalization and 
strategic coordination and targeting of city services. Mayor Kilpatrick and his well-respected 
Director of Philanthropic Affairs, Anika Goss Foster, brought many of the city’s philanthropic 
entities together for the first time to try and garner support for this initiative. Goss was 
previously the Executive Director of the Detroit Local Initiatives Support Corporation office and 
a longstanding leader in community development (Personal Interview).  Her move to work for 
the City is also a rare example of a more common occurrence in Baltimore, that community 
development practitioners join government efforts.  Initially, several local foundations supported 
NDNI and, in its first year and half of operations, NDNI raised upwards of $9 million from 
foundations, corporate donors, and state grants (Begin 2008). In early 2008, Goss Foster helped 
                                                
2 Conversely, Mayor Martin O’Malley was named one of TIME magazine’s “Top 5 Big City 
Mayors” in 2005 (Thompson, 2005). 
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NDNI to spin off into its own nonprofit organization until she left the Kilpatrick administration 
later that year to join the national office of LISC as a Vice President.   
Then, two events occurred which changed the balance of power and the community 
development sector in Detroit.  First, the mortgage foreclosure crisis had begun to devastate 
Detroit.  In 2007, the Detroit metropolitan region had the highest foreclosure rate in the country 
(Realty Trac 2008), and city stakeholders began trying to focus on how to address challenges 
brought on by foreclosures’ accelerated impact on Detroit’s neighborhoods.  Second, despite a 
slightly more productive second term, Mayor Kilpatrick continued to face scandals in his 
administration.  Text messages subpoenaed during a whistle blower trial brought to light his 
affair with his chief of staff, which he had denied under oath.  In addition, accusations and 
evidence of deep, broad corruption and mismanagement continued against his administration. 
Finally, in September of 2008, Kilpatrick resigned after pleading guilty to felony perjury charges 
and City Council President Kenneth Cockrel, Jr., temporarily took his place (Schaeffer et al 
2008).  Kilpatrick’s resignation couldn’t have happened at a worse time, as it contributed to a 
vacuum in leadership during a major economic crisis.   
 
Foundations Fill the Leadership Void 
Some of Kilpatrick’s initiatives survived his resignation.  NDNI continued under Mayor 
Cockrel’s administration, though it was not a major priority during this time. During Mayor 
Cockrel’s tenure, the DEGC, who had fiscal responsibility for NDNI before it became an 
independent nonprofit, hired new leadership for the effort.  During late 2008 and into 2009, 
NDNI worked, “almost underground,” to do research and collect data in order to deepen and 
expand the NDNI strategy (Personal Interview).  In May of 2009, Dave Bing was elected as 
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Mayor of Detroit during a special election to replace Kilpatrick permanently.  A former 
developer (and Piston’s basketball player), Mayor Bing had been on NDNI’s advisory board.  He 
understood the strategy and supported it.  A former NDNI staffer recalled, “Bing was elected in 
May, and I was in his office in July laying out the plans to roll out the program,” (Personal 
Interview).   
However, during the time between when Kilpatrick had first brought the foundations 
together and Bing was elected, Detroit’s philanthropic community had changed their approach to 
NDNI.  Several foundations led by the Kresge Foundation, and including the Knight Foundation, 
Hudson-Webber Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and others had continued to meet 
together regularly under the auspices of the newly created Detroit Neighborhood Forum (DNF).   
At first, the purpose of the DNF was to keep supporting NDNI, but during that year, foundation 
stakeholders began inviting other players to the table, including local intermediaries, community 
development nonprofits, and representatives from city agencies and departments.  A foundation 
officer indicated that through these discussions, the foundations began developing their own self-
financed strategies to address broader community development challenges in Detroit, including 
the mortgage foreclosure crises (Personal Interview).  Developing a coordinated response to the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis became the first order of business for the Detroit Neighborhood 
Forum, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.   
Beyond the foreclosure crisis, however members of the Forum also became engaged in 
much larger planning efforts.  The Kresge Foundation spearheaded a citywide planning process, 
called the Detroit Works Project (DWP).  Though it was administered out of Mayor Bing’s 
office, it was actualized almost exclusively with over a million dollars of foundation funding, 
primarily from Kresge, but others as well.  The Kresge Foundation commissioned a nationally 
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recognized planning consultant, Toni Griffin, out of Boston, Massachusetts, to implement 
Detroit Works Project. The first round of results from the DWP devised a plan for the city that 
would shrink some neighborhoods while growing others.  When this plan was presented to the 
public, citizens responded with skepticism and resistance: “People were standing on chairs and 
shouting at the public meetings,” (Personal Interview).  Detroiters and community development 
practitioners expressed criticisms towards Kresge and Mayor Bing, who criticized each other, for 
a process that brought in outside expertise, but kept major local stakeholders out of the planning 
process (Dolan 2011, Oosting 2011, Patterson and Silverman, 2013).  Additionally, long-time 
residents were unhappy with the notion that some neighborhoods would not exist, or that they 
would be forced to move to more populated areas.  Over the course of the next 3 years, the 
University of Detroit’s Detroit Collaborative Design Center took over the strategic planning 
process with backing by Kresge and other funders.  Planners there engaged thousands of 
residents about their needs, wants, and vision, and the plan was rebranded as Detroit Future City.  
In this, there was no mention of shrinkage, but rather, that every neighborhood had different 
characteristics that would lend themselves to specific plans for development.  For instance, 
neighborhoods with significant and even majority of vacant land would become prairie-type 
neighborhoods with large swaths of managed green space, whereas other neighborhoods would 
grow as manufacturing hubs, and yet others as traditional residential neighborhoods (Detroit 
Future City 2013).  The DWP began what would be a growing alignment of philanthropy, which 






Detroit’s Community Development Intermediaries and Advocates 
While some considered the community development sector in Baltimore as anemic, in 
Detroit by comparison, the sector there may have been characterized as bloated.  There were 
many, some would say too many, community development corporations in the city that focused 
more on affordable housing than neighborhood revitalization.  Many funders and community 
development practitioners characterized the city’s CDCs as small, low-capacity, dispersed, and 
unorganized, and that the city contained upwards of a hundred CDCs (Personal Interviews).   
A local office and program of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) was 
brought to Detroit by local funders and practitioners in 1990.  As it does in all of the cities where 
it works, LISC is governed by a local advisory board comprised of private and corporate funders, 
as well as representatives from city government and the nonprofit community development 
sector.  LISC’s local activities are shaped by needs defined by these and other local stakeholders.  
LISC Detroit helped direct national funding and technical assistance resources to build the 
capacity of the community development sector, primarily through grants and loans provided to 
affordable housing development projects and their sponsoring community development 
corporations (CDC).  
 The CDC sector grew prolifically in the 1980s and 1990s, and its primary function was 
the production of affordable housing throughout the city using federal subsidies such as Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME).  
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC provides tax credits to investors who develop 
low-income rental housing (Schwartz 2006).  Rules governing how the LIHTC is used require 
that tenants have restricted incomes, the amount of which depends on the project. The HOME 
program provides annual formula grants to states and localities to support development of low-
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income rental or ownership housing.  In Detroit, between 1987 and 2013, a total of 13,909 units 
were produced with LIHTCs (HUD 2015). According to Lan Deng who studied the amount and 
geographic locations of LIHTC projects in Detroit, LIHTC units made up about half of all new 
housing construction activity in the city between 1990-2007 (2013).  During this time, private, 
for profit developers made up the majority of LIHTC producers.  Low-income housing was seen 
by many as a stronger investment in the city than market rate housing, which speaks to the weak 
nature of Detroit’s housing market as well as the nature of the market demand.   
Deng’s research identified that about half of LIHTC projects between 1987 and 2013 
were located in the greater downtown or riverfront districts, consistent with development 
priorities of several mayoral administrations during this time period (2013).  The other half of 
LIHTC developments was widely dispersed in neighborhoods throughout the city.  Many of 
these neighborhoods, however, were declining not only in population, but also in socioeconomic 
stability (Deng 2013).  One private developer turned nonprofit community developer indicated 
that neighborhood developments were more likely to be developed and managed by local 
entrepreneurs who started CDCs as a vehicle for real estate development, or neighborhood 
improvement CDCs who viewed housing as one of the primary solutions to the decline of many 
neighborhoods in Detroit (Personal Interview).   
 When LISC was established in Detroit in 1990, the nonprofit community development 
sector had been uncoordinated and unorganized.  There was little to no strategic direction to 
where housing developments were placed.  For its first several years, LISC used its funding and 
technical support to try and build the capacity of neighborhood-based CDCs.  In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, LISC underwent a strategic planning process to identify a small number of 
neighborhoods where it could target its investments, called Strategic Investment Areas.  The 
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planning process was based on knowledge gained during LISC’s years of community 
development work, as well as feedback from its community partners and local advisory board 
(Personal Interview).   
LISC’s Strategic Investment Areas work helped start a conversation among other local 
stakeholders about a greater need for more targeted and strategic focus to funding, development, 
and planning, particularly in the neighborhoods outside of downtown. Prior to this, foundations 
were not as involved in neighborhood development.  Up until the mid-2000s, foundations did not 
even have a major role in the city.  The Kresge Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Hudson-
Webber Foundation, and others provided significant charitable contributions to organizations 
serving residents or to capital projects that funded major institutions such as the city’s hospitals, 
universities, and museums.  However, one funder admitted that, during that time, each 
foundation had its own mission, goals, and priorities, and did not share their work or strategies 
(Personal Interview).  In a city with 140 square miles of land, which was increasingly becoming 
vacant and abandoned as the population declined and the housing crisis took hold, trying to make 
an impact in the city as a whole would be impossible.  Many funders and other stakeholders 
realized that it was going to be necessary to have a more targeted approach if they were going to 
be able to make an impact.  As one respondent former city staffer and researcher commented, 
“the strategic investment focus helped everyone look at the city as a whole for rational strategic 
development.  Here it was, after almost 20 years of struggle, people with private money were 
finally beginning to agree that we had to focus” (Personal interview).  So, when Mayor 
Kilpatrick had first reached out to the city’s major foundations about the Next Detroit 
Neighborhood Initiative in the mid-2000s, LISC’s efforts to target funding and community 
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development activity helped create a greater appreciation for strategic planning.  Thus, funders 
were ripe for an effort to establish consensus on strategic community development.   
Looking back to Coleman Young’s administration, Detroit created a progrowth 
governing coalition almost solely, though not strategically, focused on downtown development.  
Despite some efforts by the City Council and organizations to incorporate community needs into 
decision-making, Mayor Young and City Council ultimately and systematically excluded 
neighborhood stakeholders.  The community development sector then grew within this 
environment into a disparate group of organizations focusing primarily on affordable housing 
with incremental impact in declining neighborhoods.   
As Detroit faced continued economic problems and rising mortgage foreclosures, it also 
suffered another blow from corruption and then transitions in the mayor’s office.  These events 
created a void in public sector leadership that was replaced by the growing strength of the 
philanthropic sector, which decided to become ever more involved in and directive of 
neighborhood development efforts in the city.  Thus, when it was time to take action against the 
foreclosure crisis, a new governing coalition, arguably led by foundations, was already practicing 
significant leadership of community development activities.   
 
The Long-Standing Problem of Vacant Properties 
In Baltimore and Detroit, the mortgage foreclosure crisis was merely the tip of the 
iceberg with regards to the larger problem of abandoned and vacant properties. For decades prior 
to the foreclosure crisis of 2007-2010, depopulation, abandonment, property flipping, and tax 
foreclosures had left huge numbers of homes and properties vacant. As one practitioner 
commented, (Personal Interview):  
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So, when you are talking about bank foreclosures, it’s an added layer on already 
desperate situation.  There was a ton of surplus land that was once in use for residential, 
commercial, industrial use, but now hasn’t been in use for a long time.  Abandonment 
had been happening for a long time, so the bank issue just adds to it.  We’d been creating 
blight and declining property values for owners and investors.  It is exacerbating an 
already desperate situation. 
 
For community development practitioners in both cities, dealing with vacant properties was a 
major challenge and neighborhood development could not be separated from this problem. This 
section outlines the ways in which actors tried to address vacant properties, as well as what these 
practices say about the priorities and capacity of the community development sectors.   
In Detroit, that number of vacant properties is currently at about 84,000 according to the 
Detroit Blight Task Force, a public-private effort that inventoried every property in the city in 
2014 (Detroit Blight Task Force 2014).  Baltimore Housing, the city’s public housing and 
community development agency, documented 30,000 vacant properties as of 2015, including 
homes and lots (Baltimore Housing 2015b).  To some, the foreclosure issue took attention away 
from the cities’ bigger problems.  A member of Baltimore city government expressed concern 
that, “The sexy thing is foreclosure work, but for the city of Baltimore, that is d-u-m-b, dumb.  
For a city like Baltimore, it is not where our needs are.  For this city, the problem is vacant 
property, not foreclosure” (Personal Interview).  Despite the breadth of the vacant property 
problem in both cities, there was not been the same kind of attention from the media, funders, or 
federal government to address this issue. 
Mayor O’Malley tried to tackle the vacant property problem in Baltimore by initiating 
what he called Project 5000.  The purpose of this program was to use streamlined acquisition and 
disposition processes to get vacant properties back into private ownership and productive use.  
During O’Malley’s administration, about 6,000 properties were acquired and half of those put 
back into productive use through homeownership or other designated uses (U.S. Conference of 
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Mayors 2015).  During the height of the foreclosure crisis, Mayor Rawlings-Blake’s 
administration launched a new program, called Vacants-to-Value.   This initiative aimed to 
strategically identify blocks with potential for redevelopment, then use code enforcement, 
acquisition, and disposition, and primarily, but not solely, worked with private developers, to 
redevelop vacant properties (Personal Interview).  These initiatives are examples of the way the 
City has tried to take on this seemingly intractable problem especially because Baltimore’s 
housing stock consisted primarily of row housing, which made demolitions more difficult. 
Before the mortgage foreclosure crisis, advocates and practitioners in Detroit had been 
trying to garner support from the City for solutions to address the growing vacant property 
problem there.   There was an increasing recognition of the risks and dangers that vacant 
properties posed to communities throughout the city, especially among neighborhood-based 
CDCs, and organizational intermediaries like LISC Detroit and Community Legal Resources 
(CLR)  (Note: CLR later changed its name to Michigan Community Resources); the latter, which 
provides legal, research, and planning resources to Detroit’s community development sector.  
For several years, CDCs had come to CLR seeking assistance around how to address increasing 
numbers of vacant properties in their communities.  CDCs were struggling to find the owners 
and either acquire the properties themselves or help neighbors acquire them as side-lots in order 
to prevent blight and get properties back to productive use.   
Many CDCs started sharing information about strategies to address the vacant properties 
in their communities through the local trade association, Community Development Advocates of 
Detroit (CDAD).  Started around the year 2000, CDAD was formed as a membership 
organization that would help support the sector by strengthening the networks between 
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community organizations, building their capacity, and advocating on behalf of policies and 
practices that support CDCs and the communities that they serve.   
A practitioner who was involved in this effort reported that as CDAD, CLR, and LISC 
Detroit learned about increasing challenges with vacant properties, they tried approaching the 
City of Detroit Department of Planning and Development about what could be done (Personal 
Interview). In doing so, these organizations would learn that the City of Detroit did not keep 
track of these properties. There was little to no enforcement of code violations due to lack of 
resources and the City had incomplete property ownership information.   After properties went 
into tax foreclosure with the county, they were sold at an auction by the County Treasurer.  
Before properties were auctioned, however, the City of Detroit had right of first refusal to 
acquire these properties.  However, such land dispositions were often haphazard and uninformed, 
and this lack of attention to the process helped speculators and property flippers to purchase 
hundreds of properties in the city (Personal Interview).  One advocate said, “On the city level, 
we did try, on the tax foreclosure issue, to get into Planning and Development, who was turning 
down [foreclosed properties from the county treasurer].  We asked if they understood what was 
happening.  Some bureaucrat was somewhere signing a form, but they didn’t really understand 
what was happening,” (Personal Interview).  For many Detroit neighborhoods, this resulted in 
more and more properties that continued to be vacant and blighted.   
Realizing that the City of Detroit was not going to be able to be of much assistance to 
CDCs and residents dealing with vacant properties, CLR, CDAD, and LISC Detroit decided to 
form the Detroit Vacant Property Campaign (DVPC) to formalize strategies and initiatives 
around this issue.  LISC Detroit provided a grant to CLR and CDAD in December of 2007 to 
work closely with CDCs to research the vacant property problem and develop tools to address 
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the issues in the communities.  Described by a local practitioner, CLR and CDAD wanted to 
incorporate advocacy in the work in order to try and influence elected officials for more 
permanent and systematic solutions, such as the creation of a land bank, however, LISC Detroit 
wanted more focus on providing direct assistance to CDCs (Personal Interview).   
The first thing that the DVPC wanted to do was to research the extent of the problem and 
create better data on vacant properties in the city.  One respondent commented that, “In many 
other places, you would call the city for that information, but at this time, the city was incapable 
of providing that, so we had to step in, in their place,” (Personal Interview).  The DVPC worked 
with Data Driven Detroit (D3), a nonprofit data center created and funded by foundations in the 
Detroit Neighborhood Forum in 2008. D3 was tasked to create a depository for information on 
tax foreclosures, property owners, and eventually, mortgage foreclosures, as well (Personal 
Interview).  To address vacant properties directly, DVPC created a menu of services for 
nonprofits.  It would help CDCs to identify property owners and navigate foreclosure and 
acquisition processes to get the properties back into use.  For vacant lots, DVPC helped CDCs 
and residents through the process of acquiring and cleaning them to be able to then create new 
assets in the neighborhood, such as community gardens and pocket parks (Personal Interview).  
It was shortly after the DVPC was formed that the magnitude of the mortgage foreclosure was 
beginning to be understood. It was then also, that local funders, especially participants in the 
Detroit Neighborhood Forum, began to put a laser-like focus on addressing this problem.  
The problem of vacant properties was another common element between Baltimore and 
Detroit, though, as seen here, it was addressed in different ways in each city.  In Baltimore, the 
City spearheaded efforts to lessen the negative impact of vacant properties in its neighborhoods. 
In Detroit, community development practitioners and nonprofits eventually led this effort 
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because of the City’s inattention and inability to even provide basic property information.   
Though vacant properties were a massive problem in both cities, the actions taken demonstrate 
that city government and community development organizations in Baltimore had a greater 
capacity to deal with this issue than in Detroit.  Nonprofit organizations were forced to take on 
this problem in Detroit. Despite their strong capacity and progress they may have been able to 
make in neighborhoods, the lack of a public sector partner limited their activities to providing 
data and assisting nonprofit groups, rather than any widespread property demolition or clearance, 
which would have to be done with government tools.   
 
Conclusion: Community Development Culture  
This chapter has identified the many ways in which the histories of Baltimore and Detroit 
are similar as well as where they diverge.  The cities share many aspects of their historical paths 
including their transitions out of manufacturing economies, discriminatory planning and housing 
practices, corporate-public partnerships that focused redevelopment on the cities’ downtown at 
the neglect of neighborhoods, and the rising power of the philanthropic sectors.  They even share 
the element of political scandal and, during the foreclosure crisis, both had the same experience 
of having three mayors within three years.   
They diverge in terms of the origins of their community development sectors.  
Baltimore’s community development organizations were spawned decades ago out of organizing 
and activist origins, whereas the growth of the community development sector in Detroit was 
based primarily in affordable housing production by nonprofit real estate developers and service 
providers.  Community organizing played a much more diminished and short-lived role in 
Detroit’s neighborhoods.  In Baltimore, there was a stronger flow of community advocates who 
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moved throughout the local and state neighborhood development sector, bringing Baltimore’s 
community development priorities with them to increasingly higher levels of decision-making 
and resources.   
In addition, the philanthropic sector in Baltimore was highly organized around 
neighborhood development priorities in partnership with community development organizations, 
beginning about 10 years before foundations began collaborating, or even sharing information, in 
Detroit.  In Detroit, a political leadership void combined with the housing crisis galvanized the 
foundations to both be more strategic and to work together, and to set a community development 
agenda themselves.  In Baltimore, the flow of information about neighborhood priorities was 
more bottom-up because the infrastructure was developed as more of collaboration between 
community organizations, foundations, and city administrators.  As a result, and as will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, the formation of BHPC proved pivotal to the ability of 
Baltimore stakeholders to rally around and implement a response to the mortgage foreclosure 








 The mortgage foreclosure crisis that occurred in the United States between 2007-2010 
triggered what has become known as the Great Recession, the longest economic downturn in this 
country since the World War II (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).  Despite great 
efforts to mitigate the effects of the crisis, the impacts are still felt among individuals whose 
homes were foreclosed, the neighborhoods where foreclosures occurred and were concentrated, 
organizations that served those communities, and the cities where all this took place.  This 
chapter will provide background on the origins of the foreclosure crisis on the national level and 
detail how it affected Baltimore and Detroit.   
The federal government responded to the crisis with major initiatives to support mortgage 
lenders, homeowners and the communities affected by mortgage foreclosures.  Those programs 
will also be described.  In order to understand the nature of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
community development sectors in both cities, this chapter will then outline local responses to 
foreclosures, built upon earlier discussions of these sectors.  First, it will summarize the timeline 
of activities that stakeholders in each city undertook, then it will detail the local responses 
through the actions taken by neighborhood and nonprofit organizations, foundations, city 
agencies, and elected bodies. 
 
Homeownership, Financialization, and Foreclosures 
 In the early 2000s, policymakers expressed a renewed focus on homeownership across 
the country.  The federal administration established a national priority on homeownership to 
  
 68 
increase the number of families, particularly low and middle-income African American and 
Hispanic families, who could own homes and to build assets.  In 2002, then President George W. 
Bush articulated this goal (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2002): 
There is a homeownership gap in America.  The difference between Anglo-American and 
African-American and Hispanic homeownership is too big.  And we’ve got to focus the 
attention of this nation to address this.  And it starts with setting a goal.  And so by the 
year 2010, we must increase minority homeowners by at least 5.5 million.    
 
Investments in education, jobs and workforce development may have been part of a 
sustainable solution to this gap as it would have better enabled families to increase their 
household income. However, the financial system’s response to the homeownership gap was to 
expand access to mortgage lending for low and moderate-income borrowers based on the notion 
that homeownership by any means necessary would be the key to overcoming disparities and the 
gap between white wealth and black wealth. Until the 1980s, banks only provided mortgages to 
homebuyers who could provide a twenty-percent down payment on the home for a traditional 30-
year mortgage.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the subprime mortgage market grew and expanded, 
where banks and lenders provided mortgages to families with lower credit or other higher risk 
factors, and often led to higher interest rates, balloon payments, and adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARM) (Immergluck 2009).  Seeing subprime loans as a potential risk to homeowners and the 
housing market, the U.S. Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection act 
(HOEPA) in 1994 and promoted consumer protection through disclosure activities, but only for 
very large loans with high fees.  However, lenders adapted by growing the subprime market for 
lower loan amounts and fees just low enough to be under the radar of HOEPA (Immergluck 
2009). 
Other changes happened in the financial markets, as well.  Traditionally, banks lent to 
homeowners and kept those loans on their financial books.  If borrowers encountered difficulty 
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repaying their loan, banks were very likely to assist those borrowers to get them back on track.  
However, the growth of securitization changed this.  Securitization enables lenders to pool 
together and sell different types of loan debt to investors on the secondary market.  In the 
mortgage industry, banks created mortgage-backed securities that were sold from lenders to 
securitizers, thereby taking debt off the books of banks and providing them with additional 
capital to lend (Simkovic, 2011.)  The largest securitizers of home loans were Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), namely the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae).   
While the intent of the GSEs was to free up more lending capital to increase loans for 
homeownership, securitization dis-incentivized lenders to be responsible for the loans they made.  
If borrowers couldn’t really afford their mortgages, subprime or traditional, lenders were off the 
hook once those mortgages were sold on the secondary market and then securitized.   As such, 
by the middle of the middle of the 2000s, securitization became the main tool to increase 
liquidity of home financing across the country (Krippner 2011).  During this time, the subprime 
market began exploding and policies further deregulated it such that loans were allowed to have 
introductory low interest rates, which would then double, triple, or worse after a certain time 
period.  In addition, many had prepayment penalties, included low or no down payments, or no 
longer required documentation and proof of income, (Immergluck 2009).  Certain banks actually 
incentivized subprime loans with high and adjustable interest rates. For example, later in 2012, 
Wells Fargo Bank, one of the largest mortgage lenders in the country, settled a lawsuit filed by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (as a response to suits filed the City of Baltimore in 2008) 
claiming the bank steered African American and Latino homeowners to subprime loans. The suit 
stipulated that Wells Fargo offered larger commissions to independent mortgage brokers who 
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enrolled homeowners in those loans even if those homeowners qualified for prime loans (Mui 
2012).3  These practices had led to significant increases in subprime loans in the market.  By 
2005, subprime loans made up about 20% of all mortgages (Apgar and Duda 2005).   
With the national focus on spreading homeownership opportunity to African American 
and Hispanic households, the subprime market targeted these communities. As shown in Figure 
3.1, predominantly black, low poverty areas had subprime loans at more than double the rate of 
predominantly white low poverty areas and predominantly Hispanic areas had almost three times 
the density of subprime loans.  For higher poverty areas, the disparity continued between 
predominantly white communities and predominantly black or Hispanic communities.  These 
findings align with many other studies that have found that African American and Hispanic 
borrowers receive subprime loans far greater than whites (Bybee 2011).  
For example, Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2006, p. 16-17) found that black borrowers were up 
to 34.3 percent more likely and Latinos 44.6 percent more likely than white borrowers with 
comparable types of mortgage-products, credit scores, loan to value ratios, and other variables to 
receive subprime loans.  Thus, for cities, such as Baltimore and Detroit, whose populations are 
majority African American, subprime loans, and mortgage foreclosure crisis that started within 
this sector of the housing market, hit particularly hard in many communities throughout both 
cities.  For example, a 2015 study by the Detroit News found that 68 percent of all mortgages in 
Detroit in 2005 were subprime, compared to 27 percent in the state of Michigan, and 24 percent 





                                                
3 Municipal governments and federal agencies brought similar lawsuits against other lenders in the years after the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis as well including HSBC and Bank of America (Stuart, 2014). 
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Figure 3.1 Density of Subprime Loans by Predominant Race and Poverty Rate of Census 
Tract, 100 Largest Metro Areas. (Average no. of high cost loans per year (2004-2006) per 
1,000 units in 1-4 unit structures).  (Kingsley and Petit 2009) 
 
  When policymakers and practitioners began to recognize the problem of subprime 
mortgages, interest rates on those mortgages were resetting at much higher levels and balloon 
payments started coming due.  In addition, homeowners, lenders, and loan servicers began to 
realize that some household incomes, for which no documentation had been required at 
origination in many cases, could not sustain continued homeownership, especially for loans that 
with increasing interest rates that became more and more expensive.  Subprime mortgages 
started going delinquent and into foreclosure in great numbers in the early to mid-2000s across 
the United States.  Then, mortgage foreclosures spread to prime mortgages too, as the economy 
began going into recession in 2007.  The financial markets, reeling from losses from securitized 
mortgage holders, were losing value, and investments in housing came to a standstill, as did 
housing construction.  Unemployment rose as the recession spread throughout the economy.   
  
 72 
When homeowners tried to refinance to be able to keep their mortgages, the lending 
industry had become much more stringent leaving few options for borrowers.  As the value of 
homes everywhere decreased, homeowners often found themselves underwater in their 
mortgages; the value of the house was less than their mortgage.  Many homeowners could not 
afford their mortgages and delinquencies and foreclosures increased in both the subprime and 
prime markets (Immergluck 2009).  This process and the impact it had on communities was 
described by a practitioner in Detroit (Personal Interview): 
For people who were refinancing, the bank wanted a new appraisal, but that 
would come in at a lower value.  So people just started walking away, and would 
buy another foreclosure. When banks are in control of the property, they are 
supposed to maintain it.  But, when people leave and the bank doesn’t know it, no 
one is maintaining the property. 
 
In many cities, foreclosures brought housing values down in the communities of color 
where they were often concentrated.  As described in the above quote, when homeowners 
vacated their properties, abandonment and blight increased as the banks of took ownership the 
properties did not maintain or secure them (Kingsley, Smith, and Price 2009).   
In addition, crime became a greater problem as homes were subject to stripping and 
vandalism, and city governments were overwhelmed with providing needed safety and public 
services to a declining population tax base (Kingsley, Smith, and Price 2009). According to a 
study of the impact of mortgage foreclosures on municipal governments, one foreclosure can 
cost a city upwards of $34,000 including enforcement of codes and nuisance abatement, 
maintaining and securing properties, attending to fire and safety needs, and in losses from 
property taxes (Apgar and Duda 2005). Mortgage foreclosures hit all cities hard, but for cities 
already struggling with weak markets, the crisis deepened and expanded financial wounds that 
would require great human and capital resources to repair.   
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State Foreclosure Laws  
Foreclosure laws are determined by each state and the process usually occurs in one of 
two ways: as a judicial foreclosure or non-judicial foreclosure.   A judicial foreclosure requires 
the involvement of a court for lenders to file and finalize foreclosures.  Non-judicial foreclosures 
involve administrative processes that notify homeowners and the public of an intent to foreclose, 
then the process proceeds through the sale of the property at a public auction via a third party.  
Judicial foreclosures offer better protections for the borrower because it requires that judges 
review foreclosure documents and ensure the process adheres to state law.  The length of a 
foreclosure process and how friendly it is to homeowners depends on the laws in each state. 
The general process of a foreclosure starts with a homeowner who misses a mortgage 
payment and goes into default after a certain number of days, determined by state law.  A notice 
of foreclosure is sent to the homeowner, and then the bank starts the foreclosure process either 
through the courts or an administrative party depending on whether it happens in a judicial or 
non-judicial state. After another period of days determined by state laws, the home in question 
undergoes a foreclosure sale either through the court or at a public auction.  Many states also 
have a redemption period, where the mortgage-holder may continue to reside in the house and try 
to purchase it back from the lender.  During the entire foreclosure process, there are multiple 
points of contact between the lender and mortgage-holder.  The number and methods of contact 
is also determined by state law, and the mortgage-holder may pay what is owed at any time to 
stop the foreclosure process and retain full ownership of the home.   
In Maryland, foreclosures go through a judicial process or a “quasi-judicial” process 
(Maryland Housing Counselors Network 2014).  A quasi-judicial foreclosure is similar to a non-
judicial foreclosure, though in Maryland, there are certain steps that require court notification 
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and involvement, which is different than most other non-judicial foreclosures.  The majority of 
foreclosures in Maryland are judicial and go through court processes, and it is largely considered 
a judicial state (RealtyTrac 2015). Since 2008, foreclosure laws in Maryland have undergone 
changes to make it more friendly toward homeowners.  In 2008, the laws changed that 
lengthened the time between when a servicer sends a notice of foreclosure to homeowners and 
the start of the foreclosure process by 30 days, for total of 120 days (Maryland Housing 
Counselors Network 2014).  This allowed housing counselors more time to establish contact and 
work with homeowners in trouble.  In 2010, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Maryland 
State Legislature passed new foreclosure laws that required lenders to offer and engage in 
mediation with homeowners at either of two stages in the foreclosure process (Williams 2010).  
Mediation could occur either after the notice of foreclosure and before the foreclosure process is 
started, or after the foreclosure process is initiated, but before the foreclosure sale.  If the 
foreclosure sale occurs, a redemption period is determined by the courts.   
Michigan is known as a non-judicial state, though both judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosures are allowed there.  Homeowners are notified of delinquency and, if there is no 
attempt to pay what is owed to the lender after 120 days, the lender files a notice of foreclosure 
with the County Sheriff’s department and the homeowner (Michigan State Housing 
Development Authority 2014).4  A notice of foreclosure sale must be posted in a local paper for 
four weeks and directly to the homeowner within two weeks of the first publication.  If the 
homeowner does not redeem the property during this time, the home enters a public auction, 
known as a Sheriff’s sale, where the property is sold to the highest bidder.  If there is no bidder, 
the home becomes the property of the lender, as real estate owned (REO) property.  After this, 
                                                
4 In 2014, the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau passed laws requiring lenders to undergo a processed 
called loss mitigation analysis, which explored and considered alternatives to foreclosure such as loan modifications 
(Michigan Housing Counselor Network, 2014).  
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Michigan law allows for a redemption period of at least six and no more than twelve months, 
depending on how much of the mortgage had previously been paid by the homeowner. During 
this time the homeowner may stay in the home, and if desired, make an attempt to redeem the 
property by paying the price paid for at the Sheriff’s sale.  If the former homeowner vacates the 
property during this time, the redemption period may be shortened to thirty days.   
 
How Mortgage Foreclosures Affected Baltimore and Detroit 
 For most of the period between 2007-2010, Detroit and its metropolitan region had some 
of the highest foreclosure rates in the country. For a major city, and a weak-market city, 
Baltimore’s rates were relatively low compared to similar cities like Detroit and Cleveland.  In 
2007, metropolitan Baltimore rated 66th highest foreclosure rate compared to 1st for Detroit, and 
6th for Cleveland (ReatlyTrac 2008).  In 2009, the Detroit region ranked 35th, Cleveland ranked 
59th, and Baltimore ranked 108th (RealtyTrac 2010).  Figure 3.2 shows the mortgage foreclosure 
rates for the cities of Baltimore and Detroit.    
 
Figure 3.2: Mortgage Foreclosure Rates (Foreclosure Filings Per Housing Units)*  
 













In both Baltimore and Detroit, the effects of the foreclosure crisis described above 
manifested in neighborhoods and were confirmed by local practitioners.  Respondents told 
detailed and common stories about how the mortgage foreclosure crisis unfolded in their cities 
and how it affected their work and the communities they served. The experiences many 
practitioners, policymakers, and funders faced during this time are important to highlight, and as 
this section shows, their voices are the best evidence.  Thus, the section that follows summarizes 
those stories in both Baltimore and Detroit.   
In the early stage of the crisis, community practitioners in Baltimore noticed a trickle of 
homeowners affected by subprime lending beginning to seek assistance from neighborhood 
organizations. One counselor described what she experienced: “In the beginning, in 2005 or 
2006, it was mainly predatory lending.  We heard, ‘I didn’t know I was getting an ARM loan. 
They told me it was fixed.’ And then, it came out that, from a marketing standpoint, there aren’t 
any real laws that prohibit them from saying it’s a fixed-rate loan, even if it is only fixed for two 
years…They didn’t know what type of loan they were getting” (Personal Interview). 
The need for foreclosure counseling grew substantially over subsequent years.   
For many organizations in Baltimore that already provided financial counseling, they shifted 
their services from providing primarily homeownership to foreclosure counseling, “Starting in 
2005 or ’06, I received maybe one or two calls about foreclosure.  Now [in 2010] we probably 
get 50-60 calls a day.  When I say one or two calls, I mean for the first two years, it was 
nothing…Now, it’s like 75% of my client base” (Personal Interview). Another organization 
reported that its counseling staff tripled in just two years, from one attorney and two volunteers, 
to three attorneys and three full-time counselors (Personal Interview).  
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One organization in Detroit recalled hiring its first post-purchase counselor in May of 
2007, and by 2010, it had eight fulltime counselors on staff (Personal Interview).  At another 
organization there that only started offering foreclosure counseling in late 2008, its Director had 
a similar experience: “We [saw] over 200 people who are in foreclosure [in 2009]. These are not 
homeowners who are in our housing that we built, but others who live in the neighborhood” 
(Personal interview). In 2009, as the economy worsened, staff at organizations saw the shift in 
homeowners coming to them for assistance.  The numbers grew, but homeowners also changed 
from subprime to traditional borrowers.  A practitioner in Baltimore described it, “So then, the 
curve kind of switched; now most of the calls are not so much the predatory loans, but the ‘I lost 
my job,’ ‘Both of us lost our jobs,’ It’s the unemployment thing now” (Personal Interview). 
 In addition to causing changes at their organizations, all of the nonprofits involved in this 
study recounted how foreclosures changed the communities they served.  For some, they saw 
middle-income neighborhoods become worse off. Speaking in 2010, one Detroit community 
development practitioner explained, “With the foreclosures, values sometimes dropped in half.  
Many other families are underwater, the values of their mortgages are more then their house is 
worth,” (Personal Interview).  Another Detroiter recalled, “It imploded for everybody in 
2007…[Many] mortgages began to mature, balloon, and default.  We saw in Detroit that 
neighborhoods that were already fragile, (not CDC neighborhoods, those were hit back in the 
1980s), that were more stable to low-moderate income, with small brick housing, we saw those 
neighborhoods empty out.  Even the upper-middle and upper income homes emptied out” 
(Personal Interview). The same happened in Baltimore, “The foreclosure crisis affects 
everything. Driving around neighborhoods, we’re now [in 2010] seeing boarded up homes; 
vacant homes that are much more prevalent in more stable neighborhoods” (Personal Interview). 
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Others saw the progress they had made in low and middle-income neighborhoods slowed 
to a halt and even reversed, such as in these lengthy, but rich, descriptions of the impact of high 
rates of foreclosures on neighborhoods in Detroit (Personal Interviews): 
Originally, in the beginning of the crisis, banks put houses up for sale for what 
they were owed, but the houses were sitting vacant because they were overpriced. 
Then the houses became safety problems; the plumbing was stolen or worse.  
Then the banks lowered the prices and the homes started turning over. They went 
from $100,000 to $20,000 within months.  This further depressed prices.  Plus, 
these buyers were primarily cash buyers, investors, so the typical homeowner was 
left out in the cold (Personal Interview).   
 
In Osborn, the northeast section of the city, entire blocks are empty.  A strategy 
had initially been developed in mid-2006 to late 2007.  Now we needed a new 
workplan because people weren’t there and the condition totally changed.  This 
was one of the original targeted neighborhoods because of the high numbers of 
children and the high violent crime. That neighborhood had the highest rate of 
violent crime in the city…To now see it, it’s interesting.  Now foreclosures took 
place, and then there were secondary foreclosures of rental properties.  Now 
families are doubled up in already substandard housing.  Even if housing prior to 
foreclosures was moderately poor, now it’s substandard.  There are twelve 
children in one little house with four adults.  
 
For community development practitioners, the impact described in these quotes created an 
urgency to respond to try and help both homeowners and the neighborhoods impacted by 
mortgage foreclosures.   
In Baltimore, stakeholders working within the Healthy Neighborhoods strategy realized 
that the progress they were making in attracting homeowners to middle income neighborhoods 
may have had the unintended consequence of also attracting predatory and subprime mortgages.  
These mortgages began to threaten the growing stability that had been created in those 
neighborhoods in more recent years.  As one community developer in Baltimore commented, 
“We saw values in our neighborhoods go up consistent with or more than the region…That was 
really good, but it ended up creating opportunity for predatory lending and investor development 
so foreclosures started to come up.  We probably don’t really want to admit that, but that’s the 
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reality” (Personal Interview).  In instances like this, community developers felt especially 
responsible for responding to mortgage foreclosures because they felt partly responsible for 
creating the problem.  While HNI was encouraging growth in their target neighborhoods, they 
had not been able to protect homeowners from being targeted for subprime loans or mortgage 
foreclosures.  
Seeing the potential for the devastation that the mortgage foreclosure crisis could have 
across the country, the federal government launched major programs to assist homeowners and 
to address growing vacancy and decreasing property value experienced by many communities.  
The next section will describe those programs and how Baltimore and Detroit captured some of 
those resources.   
 
Federal Responses to the Great Recession and Foreclosure Crisis 
Between 2008-2010, the federal government infused over $52 billion into initiatives aimed at 
addressing the mortgage foreclosure crisis.5  These included funds aimed at helping homeowners stay 
in their homes by supporting counseling and loan modification programs.  It also supported efforts by 
local governments to address the vacant properties left behind from foreclosures through property 
rehabilitation or demolition.  
In the summer of 2008, the federal government established the National Stabilization Program 
(NSP) as part of the passage Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).  Under HERA, the 
federal government allocated $3.92 billion in funding to localities for the “emergency redevelopment 
of abandoned and foreclosed homes,” (HudExchange 2015c). As this round of funding was working 
its way down from federal to local recipients, Congress approved a second round of NSP funding, 
                                                
5 NSP1: $3.2 billion, NSP2: $1.93 billion; NSP3: $1 billion; TARP: $45.6 billion; NFMC Round 1: $180 million; 
NFMC Round 2: $180 million; NFMC Round 3: $50 million; NFMC Round 4: $65 million.  
  
 80 
totaling $1.93 billion, in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (HUD 
Exchange 2015b).  In 2010, one more round of NSP funding, an additional $1 billion, was approved 
as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (HUDExchange 2015a).  
Over the three years of NSP funding, Baltimore received a total of $31,805,119 and 
Detroit received $109,859,751.  As outlined in Table 1.6 in Chapter 1, both cities used large 
portions of their NSP funding to acquire and rehabilitate foreclosed homes in order to resell them 
to new homeowners.  Stabilizing the housing market by getting homes back into homeownership 
was a significant goal of the program.  The NSP funds also allowed grantees to provide 
purchasing funds to new homeowners, including funds for down payment assistance or subsidies 
to guarantee lower interest rates on mortgages.  Detroit, however, also used NSP funds to 
demolish vacant foreclosed homes for which it was not feasible to rehabilitate, whereas 
Baltimore did not use NSP funds for demolition.  For the first round of NSP funds, Detroit 
allocated upwards of 30% of its $47 million award toward demolition.  The difference here lies 
in the housing stock in the two cities.  Detroit’s homes are predominantly single-family, detached 
homes compared to Baltimore’s traditional blocks of attached row houses.  Demolition of 
individual homes in Baltimore did not occur primarily because of this structural challenge.   
The NSP represented a massive investment in the back end of the mortgage foreclosure 
process, after homeowners completed the foreclosure process.  However, practitioners and 
researchers understood that it was both more cost-effective and less destabilizing for families if 
homeowners were able to stay in their homes.  Researchers at the Chicago Federal Reserve, for 
instance, found that foreclosure sales were at least 8 times more expensive for families as well as 
city governments than the cost of providing foreclosure counseling that could result in 
alternatives to foreclosure, such as short-sales or loan modifications, described below (Hatcher 
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2006).  Thus, in terms of the federal government’s response to the foreclosures crisis, the vast 
majority of funds, over $45 billion, were allocated towards counseling and financing assistance 
to help homeowners keep their homes with a more affordable mortgage payment.  Or, in the 
worst-case scenario, homeowners would undergo a short sale.  In this case, the home was sold at 
the then market rate, which was often far below what the homeowner owed, but the lender would 
write-off the difference and the homeowner would no longer owe any money to the bank.     
The first of these federal programs was part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) passed by Congress within the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) 
passed into law on October 3, 2008 (U.S. Treasury 2015).  The purpose of TARP was to address 
the instability in the financial markets caused by the recession, to restart economic growth, and 
help homeowners avoid foreclosure.  It included a number of programs for the auto industry, the 
secondary credit markets, and investments in banks and in AIG to keep them from failing.  
TARP also included two programs aimed directly at preventing mortgage foreclosures.  The 
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was launched in early 2009 and provided 
incentives to lenders and servicers to voluntarily modify mortgages in order to lower interest 
rates and monthly payments for homeowners facing financial hardship.  The U.S. Treasury 
reports the number of permanent modifications by metropolitan statistical areas (MSA).  
Through the end of December 2010, the Baltimore MSA completed 5,221 permanent loan 
modifications, and the Detroit MSA had completed 10,673 modifications (U.S. Treasury 2010).  
Numbers for each of the cities alone are not available.  The U.S. Treasury also implemented the 
HARP and HAFA programs, other loan modifications described in detail in Chapter 1.  Data for 




The second homeowner assistance program was the Hardest Hit Funds (HHF), which was 
created in 2010 and provided funds to 18 states hardest hit with foreclosures to tailor assistance 
programs for homeowners facing foreclosure. Michigan was a recipient of HHF totaling $498.6 
million and it was administered through the Michigan Homeowner Assistance Nonprofit 
Housing Corporation (MHA) (Michigan State Housing Development Authority 2015).  The 
MHA was created by the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA), the State’s 
housing finance agency.  The MHA’s program, called Step Forward Michigan, provided 
assistance to homeowners in three main ways.  First, homeowners could receive temporary 
monthly payments toward their mortgage if they were unemployed and receiving unemployment 
benefits.  Second, funds could be provided to households in hardship in order to pay money 
owed to lenders to reinstate a delinquent mortgage, condo association fee, or property taxes.  
Third, funds could be used in a loan modification to help pay down a mortgage principal or 
toward mortgage delinquency.   
The State of Michigan reported that by the end of 2010, 49 borrowers in Wayne County, 
which contains Detroit, had received assistance through Step Forward Michigan; by September 
2015, that number was 8,763 (Michigan State Housing Development Authority 2015).  In 2013, 
the federal government modified the HHF program to also allow funds to be used for demolition 
of foreclosed homes, and the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) was awarded over $52 
million for such demolitions (City of Detroit 2013).  Neither the City of Baltimore, nor the State 
of Maryland received any Hardest Hit Funds.   
The last national program dedicated to mortgage foreclosure counseling and prevention is 
the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) program.  The program was first 
authorized by Congress and President George W. Bush on December 27, 2007, and thought to be 
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a one-time appropriation.  However, the program has been reauthorized and funded every year, 
for a total of 10 rounds (NeighborWorks America 2015).  The NFMC program is administered 
through NeighborWorks America (NWA), a national community development intermediary, 
which disperses NFMC funds to competitively selected state agencies and organizational 
grantees across the United States.  The funds were targeted towards “areas of greatest need” 
defined as areas that experienced high rates of subprime lending, delinquent loans, and 
foreclosures starts (Neighborworks America 2015).  Table 3.1 outlines funds received by all 
grantees in Michigan and Maryland.   
Table 3.1 National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Funds and its Direct Grantees 
Awarded in Maryland and Baltimore; and Michigan and Detroit.*   
NFMC Round Maryland Award/Grantee Michigan Award/Grantee 
Round 1 $901,697: MD Department of 
Housing and Community 
Development (MDHCD) 
$661,916: MI State Housing 
Development Authority (MSHDA) 
$315,652: Southwest Solutions 
Round 2 $1,391,260: MDHCD $3,060,730: MSHDA 
Round 3 $85,150: MDHCD 
$26,640: Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Baltimore, Inc. (NHS) 
$85,150: MSHDA 
$255,780: Southwest Solutions 
Round 4 $50,102: MDHCD 
$25,020: NHS 
$50,102: MDHCD 
$25,020: Southwest Solutions 
TOTAL $2,479,869 $4,454,350 
*Source: Neighborworks America, 2015 (http://www.neighborworks.org/Homes-Finances/Foreclosure/Foreclosure-Counseling-
(NFMC)  
 
 Particularly early on in the program, NFMC provided critical funds to help counseling 
agencies in Baltimore and Detroit to work with homeowners to prevent foreclosures.  Funds 
could be used to build counseling capacity by hiring staff, for training counselors, and for 
providing legal assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure.  Between 2007-2010, the State of 
Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development received $2,428,209 in NFMC 
funds.  A portion of these were subgranted to counseling agencies in Baltimore, including 
ACORN Housing Corporation, Belair-Edison Neighborhoods, Inc., Druid Heights CDC, 
Eastside CDC, Inc., Neighborhood Housing Services of Baltimore, Inc., Southeast CDC, and St. 
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Ambrose Housing Aid Center, Inc.6 In addition, the Neighborhood Housing Services of 
Baltimore (NHS) was a NeighborWorks America network member, which meant it was audited 
by NWA and assessed every year to ensure it is providing high quality services to residents.  As 
a member, NHS received NMFC funds directly, totaling over $50,000 in Rounds 3 and 4.   
 During the same period, the Michigan State Housing Development Authority received 
$3,889,450 in NFMC funds.  Subgrantees in Detroit included many small housing and 
counseling agencies such as Mission of Peace National Corporation, Michigan Neighborhood 
Partnership, and New Hope Community Development Nonprofit Housing Corporation.  
Neighborworks America also had a network member in Detroit, Southwest Solutions, which 
received almost $600,000 across all but one round of NFMC funding.   
For both cities, the foreclosure crisis was an issue that needed great attention.  Despite the 
fact that the housing crisis was a national problem, with causes that were national in scope, as 
well, it was the local actors that had to take action to try and stop the hemorrhaging of 
homeowners and the impact of foreclosed homes on their cities. The next section will outline 
how stakeholders in Baltimore and Detroit worked to address the challenges brought on by the 
massive mortgage foreclosures in their cities.   
 
A Chronological Account of Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis  
 To establish a good foundation for understanding local responses, this section will first 
summarize the timeframe of activities in each city.  Figure 3.3 diagrams this summary amidst 
mayoral transitions in each city. Following sections will describe the responses in more detail 
based on different types of activities and amongst different stakeholders.   
                                                



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Responses to Mortgage Foreclosures in Baltimore 
Baltimore’s story begins in 2005.  The Baltimore City Predatory Lending and Flipping 
Task Force (Task Force), established in 2001, had brought many in the community development 
and real estate sector together to address deceptive lending practices.  In 2005, the Task Force 
produced a final report with recommendations that included creating a task force with more 
members from regulatory and enforcement agencies (Community Law Center 2005).  The 
Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition (BHPC) had been formed as the body that 
would bring the community development sector together among community, nonprofit, 
philanthropic, corporate and public stakeholders.  Thus, the Task Force re-formed as the 
Enforcement Committee of BHPC, and it included representatives from regulatory and code 
enforcement agencies from the local, state, and federal levels, local nonprofits, and the 
community development divisions of banks. 
 Out of the recommendations from the Predatory Lending Task Force, BHPC aimed to 
focus investments and activities toward increasing homeownership in Baltimore’s communities.  
This strategy, it was thought, would help decrease opportunities for predatory lenders and 
investors to purchase homes without also contributing to long-term sustainability in the 
neighborhood (Davidoff 2015).  Many community organizations, such as Belair-Edison, Inc. and 
Druid Heights CDC began stepping up their efforts to prepare residents to be homeowners 
through homeownership counseling (Personal Interview).  Other nonprofits, such as Healthy 
Neighborhoods, Inc., and Neighborhood Housing Services provided alternative lending products 
to help steer residents away from predatory loans (Personal Interviews).  
One funder described what happened next: “As Belair-Edison began implementing the 
Healthy Neighborhoods Strategy in 2005, the group started marketing to new residents, but 
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realized they were competing with growing foreclosures in the area” (Personal Interview).  
Hearing about this through the BHPC, the Goldseker Foundation then funded The Reinvestment 
Fund, a national community development intermediary based in Philadelphia and Baltimore, to 
conduct research on the extent of the foreclosure problem in Baltimore. As one funder related, 
“The study found the incidences of foreclosure overlapped with parts of the city with high rates 
of minority homeownership. It was real startling at the time and pretty disturbing” (Personal 
Interview).  The map produced by The Reinvestment Fund in the fall of 2006 is shown in Figure 
3.4.  
A local funder, armed with this new data, recalled, “I showed an executive director of a 
nonprofit more than 100 foreclosures in the neighborhood, but she was proud of the two new 
homeowners she had brought into the neighborhood.  We realized we had to convince people 
that preserving homeownership was as important to creating ownership” (Personal Interview).  
With the findings from the TRF study, BHPC now could corral resources to address mortgage 
foreclosures.   
 In the fall of 2006, the BHPC and CHPA held community-wide meetings to share the 
TRF data more broadly.  Members of BHPC stated that these meetings helped shift resources in 
the city among organizations and additional funders towards a homeownership preservation 
strategy (Personal Interviews).  In 2007, then Governor O’Malley convened a new Maryland 
Homeownership Preservation Task Force (MD Task Force) comprised of counseling and 
regulatory stakeholders to create a statewide strategy for addressing foreclosures.  Out of MD 
Task Force, the Maryland Housing Counseling Network was formed (later called Maryland 
HOPE Housing Counseling Network or MD HOPE), where housing counselors could be trained  
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Figure 3.4 Mortgage Foreclosures in Baltimore Between 2000-2005* 
*Source: (The Reinvestment Fund, 2006) 
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to serve homeowners in foreclosure, as well as network and share information about what they 
were seeing in the communities (Personal Interviews).  The MD HOPE network was coordinated 
out of the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, where Carol Gilbert, 
former Program Officer for the Goldseker Foundation had recently moved.   
Also in 2007, BHPC received CDBG funds from the City of Baltimore for foreclosure 
response activities and immediately started several publicity campaigns. They utilized billboards, 
radio advertisements, and bus placards to spread information with a campaign, “Mortgage Late? 
Don’t Wait!”  Practitioners described the purpose of the media campaign to get homeowners at 
risk of foreclosure to seek help from counselors as early as possible to increase the chances of 
keeping them in their homes (Personal Interview).  With support from Baltimore Housing, the 
local utility company agreed to include information on the campaign in utility bills and the City 
included a link in its 311-information phone hotline to statewide counseling efforts (Personal 
Interview).  
During this time, between 2007-2010, nonprofit and community organizations worked to 
bolster their foreclosure counseling services, funded by local foundations such as Abell 
Foundation, Goldseker Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation, and Baltimore Community 
Foundation. In total, foundations contributed $2,297,500 between 2005-2010 to foreclosure 
prevention counseling during this period (The Foundation Center 2015). The MD HOPE network 
and BHPC provided networking and training opportunities for counselors on the state and 
citywide levels.  More detail on the BHPC’s role is provided later in this chapter, but the focus 




In January of 2008, the City of Baltimore made national headlines with a lawsuit against 
Wells Fargo Bank, alleging predatory and racially discriminatory lending practices (Morgenson 
2008).  Those practices, the suit claimed, contributed to the high numbers of foreclosures in 
Baltimore, which led to costs incurred by the city in terms of lost tax base as well as increased 
expenditures related to social services and community stabilization.  Housing advocates saw this 
as a bold move for the City and supported it, though several interview respondents collectively 
agreed that this strategy was done without consulting them (Personal Interviews).  Many of the 
stakeholders who had already been involved in the anti-predatory lending and foreclosure crisis 
work reported that they would have suggested different targets for the lawsuit and/or been able to 
provide evidence from their research and data collection, which may have strengthened the 
City’s case (Personal interviews). 
Several other cities followed Baltimore’s lead in suing Wells Fargo, including: Oakland, 
California; Miami, Florida; Memphis, Tennessee; and Chicago’s Cook County in Illinois (Stuart 
2014).  Eventually, the United States Department of Justice launched its own investigation into 
Wells Fargo.  In 2012, the bank agreed to a $175 million settlement for damages to borrowers in 
six metropolitan areas who had been steered towards subprime mortgages, as well as an 
additional $3 million in homeowner assistance and $125 million in prime loans to low and 
moderate income borrowers in Baltimore (Mui 2012).  
The lawsuit against Wells Fargo was not the only way that stakeholders in Baltimore 
tried to hold lenders and services more accountable for the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  
Respondents in both Baltimore and Detroit complained about the lack of responsiveness from 
lenders and servicers.  It was common to the point of normal practice for counselors to have to 
send the same documents to servicers multiple times, and that the servicers would change their 
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assigned representatives to homeowners, which would require starting the process over again 
(Personal Interview).  Some respondents were somewhat sympathetic to the banks.  For instance, 
a counselor commented, “This wasn’t something we dealt with all the time, the lenders included. 
So now coming forward, they’re hiring people because of the volume [of foreclosures], but at the 
same time those hires they don’t know what’s going on.  This whole thing was new to 
everyone,” (Personal Interview).  Others felt differently: “There was a lot of frustration within 
the city and state with lender response, or lack thereof.  [The banks] said they were trying hard 
and ramping up modifications, but weren’t doing enough.  It should be criminal how inefficient 
they are,” and “In the media, servicers are saying that the HAMP program is not successful 
because homeowners are not responding.  There’s not reason. The process takes so long because 
the banks aren’t getting back to us and getting it right,” (Personal Interviews).   
Starting in 2008, U.S. Representative Elijah Cummings, who represents Baltimore, began 
holding citywide “Foreclosure Prevention Workshops” in the city (Personal Interview).  He held 
nine of these workshops by 2013 (Citizens Planning and Housing Association 2013).  These 
sessions provided overall education about the foreclosure process, but Cummings also invited 
representatives from the lenders and services to meet directly with homeowners facing 
foreclosure.  In a fair-like atmosphere, homeowners could speak face to face with their lenders, 
who were there with their computers and files and could provide homeowners with answers on 
the process of their foreclosure or modification.  While it is unclear how many homeowners were 
assisted at these workshops, practitioners indicated they made a difference for those that 
attended: “I’ve seen people walk out [of those workshops] with modifications or with answers.  
It may be that they had the modification before they got there, but they didn’t know it because 
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they couldn’t get anybody on the phone [at the bank] or the paperwork never reached their house 
or whatever,” (Personal Interview).  
In addition, in 2009, according to a state official, Governor O’Malley convened a meeting 
of the major lenders and servicers impressing upon them the importance of being responsive to 
homeowners and cooperative with counselors and other stakeholders to prevent widespread 
foreclosures (Personal Interview).  Many of lenders used the meeting as an opportunity to 
present their perceived accomplishments related to assisting homeowners, so some practitioners 
thought the meeting was not very useful since the Governor did not have any proper mechanism 
for holding the lenders accountable.   However, according to the state official, it was a start: “It 
let lenders know we are not going to sit and let this happen and it did lead to some more willing 
lenders’ participation in events,” (Personal Interview).  Whether or not this meeting or 
Representative Cummings’ events led to real or limited change, it demonstrated significant 
leadership on the part of elected leaders to address the foreclosure crisis.   
While the focus of many local community development practitioners and funders was on 
foreclosure prevention and keeping people in their homes as an appropriate strategy for targeting 
scarce resources, stakeholders also saw a need for addressing the increase in real estate owned 
properties (REO) left behind when families lost their homes.  Baltimore Housing, the City’s 
housing and community development agency, received $4.1 million of funding through NSP1 in 
2008 and administered funds through four partners who would redevelop foreclosed properties 
including St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center, Healthy Neighborhoods, Inc., the local Habitat for 
Humanity affiliate, and the Greater Baltimore Housing Consortium, a coalition of three nonprofit 
special needs housing developers (Baltimore Housing 2009).    
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As part of NSP1, Baltimore became one of the early sites of a national initiative to 
address foreclosed, real estate-owned (REO) properties. After homeowners underwent 
foreclosure and vacated the homes, servicers and lenders became the owners of the homes, and 
the properties become classified as REO.  The National Community Stabilization Trust (NCST) 
was an national intermediary established in 2009 by Enterprise Community Partners, LISC, 
Neighborworks America, the National Urban League and National Council of La Raza, as a way 
to simplify the transfer of REO properties to nonprofit housing organizations such that those 
entities could work to return the properties back to homeownership (National Community 
Stabilization Trust 2015).  The NCST received lists of REO properties directly from lenders and 
servicers, then shared those lists with community nonprofit housing developers.  If a property 
was located in an organization’s target area, it could purchase the property at a discount directly 
from the lender before it was listed on the market.  In Baltimore, St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center and Habitat for Humanity participated in this initiative (Smith Hopkins 2009).  The 
NCST continued the program throughout the NSP1 round of funding. 
The City of Baltimore did not intend to apply for NSP2 funding, so Healthy 
Neighborhoods, Inc., applied and received over $26 million to acquire, rehabilitate and sell a 
proposed 349 foreclosed homes (Healthy Neighborhoods, Inc. 2010).  This was more than six 
times the amount received by Baltimore Housing the year before.  HNI worked in partnership 
with developers (3 nonprofit and 1 for profit) in seven neighborhoods, providing rehabilitated 
homes for sale for households with incomes up to 120% area median income.   
The State of Maryland received the allocation for NSP3, and $1.6 million was directed 
towards East Baltimore Development, Inc., (EBDI).  The federal government changed the 















































































































































































































vacant or demolished property, not just foreclosed properties.  Since EBDI’s focus was primarily 
on redeveloping the distressed and vacant land in its target area, it was able to utilize NSP3 
funding, something that would not have been allowed in previous rounds.  Figure 3.5 shows the 
target areas for all three NSP rounds.  
Also in 2010, the Maryland State Legislature made changes to regulatory laws governing 
the mortgage foreclosure process (Williams 2010).  The new law required servicers to provide an 
option for mediation with homeowners facing foreclosure.  This was intended to force servicers 
to be more responsive to homeowners who were trying to keep their homes through loan 
modifications or refinancing.  In addition, the changes also required servicers to pay a fee of 
$350 per foreclosure.  These fees were used by the State of Maryland to fund MD Hope and 
other foreclosure prevention counseling efforts.   
 
Responses to Mortgage Foreclosures in Detroit 
While predatory lending and property flipping had also occurred in Detroit in the early to 
mid-2000s, the City government did not, nor did advocates, devote the same attention to  
it as in Baltimore.  The Detroit LISC office had participated in an initiative started by the 
Congressional Black Caucus called With Ownership Wealth (WOW).  WOW operated in several 
other cities across the country.  LISC provided small grants to groups providing homeownership 
counseling and financial assistance to steer new homeowners away from predatory and subprime 
loan products (Personal Interview).  Many major financial institutions were involved, including 
J.P. Morgan Chase, Fifth Third Bank, National City, in addition to the Detroit Realtors 
Association.  However, after 2006, there isn’t any evidence that WOW continued.   
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In 2006 and 2007, community development practitioners who were members of the 
Community Development Advocates of Detroit (CDAD) began sounding the alarm about 
mortgage foreclosures in their neighborhoods.  Out of a meeting between CDAD members, 
Southwest Solutions and USNAP BAC, and the state community development trade association, 
the Community Economic Development Association of Michigan, these organizations decided to 
form the Michigan Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF) (Personal Interview).  The MFTF was a 
statewide entity that coordinated training for foreclosure counselors, advocated on behalf of 
stronger foreclosure process policies to protect homeowners, and provided information and best 
practices to practitioners related to buying foreclosed properties, protecting tenants and 
homeowners in foreclosed properties, and addressing vacant properties (Michigan Foreclosure 
Task Force 2015).  
Around the same time, community organizations had started to share news about the 
proliferation of mortgage foreclosures with funders at the Detroit Neighborhood Forum (DNF), 
who had been meeting since 2006.  In mid-late 2007, foundation members of the DNF, including 
the Kresge Foundation, Skillman Foundation, McGregor Fund, Hudson Webber Foundation, and 
the Community Foundation for Southeast Michigan began strategizing about how they could 
support efforts to address the mortgage foreclosure crisis (Personal Interview).  The collaborative 
responded in two major ways.  First, the DNF created the Office of Foreclosure Prevention and 
Response (OFPR), which was intended to conduct research on all aspects of the mortgage 
foreclosure problem, and help bring advocates, community practitioners, and even financial 
institutions together to centralize information and coordinate solutions to the crisis.  
The first challenge with creating the OFPR was deciding where it would be housed.  
Many of the funders wanted the initiative to be situated within the Mayor’s office.  In 2008, 
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Mayor Kilpatrick had publicly made the mortgage foreclosure crisis a priority for his office and 
had begun to strategize about how to respond (Personal Interview).  However, that same year, his 
growing scandals were threatening the legitimacy of his office and the DNF foundations did not 
want to invest their funds in an administration that was unstable. As one DNF funder related: “If 
we hadn’t been in the moment of crisis, the office would have logically been in the Mayor’s 
Office, but the Mayor’s Office was going through indictments, and the foundation community 
didn’t have any confidence in the City” (Personal Interview). Still wanting the OFPR to be 
associated with city government, the Hudson Webber foundation approached the Detroit 
Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC) about housing it within that agency (Personal 
Interview).  As a quasi-governmental body, DEGC is an arm of city government, while 
maintaining independent oversight and a nonprofit 501(c)(3) status.  The DEGC, however, was 
not active in any housing activities, and the foundations knew it wasn’t perfect (Personal 
Interview):  
It wasn’t particularly natural to put it with DEGC, but foundations had a reluctance to 
create a new nonprofit. While it could last forever, the likelihood was that it would be 2-3 
years in operation then the things of value would filter out into existing institutions…We 
wanted to find a home, and DEGC was amenable.  [The person who oversaw it], thank 
God she had a community development background.  But her title is Vice President of 
Business Development, so it wasn’t totally a great fit for her. 
 
The choice to establish the OFPR with the DEGC indicates that there was no existing 
infrastructure for such a coordinating agency.  The DNF had to try and pull something together 
from the existing infrastructure. 
The second major response led by the DNF was to support expanded post-purchase and 
foreclosure prevention counseling.  This was primarily done through Southwest Housing 
Solutions, an organization with existing homeownership counseling.  Between 2007-2010, 
Southwest Housing Solutions received over $1.2 million in funding from local foundations and 
  
 98 
banks in order to build their post-purchase counseling capacity (Foundation Center 2015).  
Though Southwest Housing Solutions is a community organization that has focused development 
efforts solely in Southwest Detroit, it expanded its counseling to homeowners citywide and even 
outside of Detroit, assisting homeowners who lived in surrounding suburbs. For some 
homeowners facing foreclosure, they preferred going outside of their community to receive 
counseling to avoid public embarrassment or stigma. To meet all of the needs for foreclosure 
counseling, Southwest Housing Solutions went from one part-time post-purchase counselor in 
2007 to seven to eight fulltime foreclosure prevention counselors by 2010  (Personal Interview).    
In June of 2008, the Office of Foreclosure and Prevention (OFPR) was operational.  
Program and deputy staff had been hired, though it took longer to hire a director.  The OFPR’s 
first order of business was to research the nature and magnitude of mortgage foreclosures: “We 
researched the biggest challenges related to foreclosures, and went to meet partners we didn’t 
know. Then we did a SWOT [Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats] analysis on several 
topics we should focus on” (Personal Interview).  The OFPR had an advisory committee that 
included a small number of foundation representatives, the community development arms of 
banks, county and city agency representatives, as well as representatives from CDAD, 
Community Legal Resources (CLR), and the State’s community development trade association, 
Community Economic Development Association of Michigan (CEDAM).  The committee met a 
few times a year to help inform OFPR’s strategies.  With such a diverse advisory body, OFPR 
aimed to establish itself as a neutral body relative to the causes and solutions to the foreclosure 
crisis.  It did not advocate on behalf of borrowers, lenders, or neighborhoods, but tried to stay “in 
the middle” (Personal Interview).   
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Because there were other stakeholders conducting foreclosure response activities in the 
city, OFPR did not provide direct services.  It saw its role as a connector and convener, and a 
source of data, information, and best practices to help inform and build the capacity of 
organizations providing services.  OFPR realized there was a gap in information about the 
Detroit housing market overall, including the impact of the foreclosure crisis.  In the middle of 
2008, OFPR started working with the Next Detroit Neighborhood Initiative (NDNI), who had 
been working with Social Compact on creating better data on what was happening in the city.  
Social Compact is a national nonprofit organization that advocates for greater business 
investment in “inner-cities” by using data to unearth evidence of market strength and buying 
power in cities (Social Compact 2015). The NDNI had been working with Social Compact to 
establish a centralized data center in Detroit to collect, house, and share information on trends in 
Detroit’s population and housing market.  Supported by additional foundation funding from the 
Ford Foundation and W.K. Kellogg Foundation, this is also when the OFPR and NDNI helped 
start the Detroit Area Community Information System, which eventually became known as Data 
Driven Detroit (D3) (Data Driven Detroit 2015).   
Subsequently, one of the first big data collection projects undertaken by D3 was a parcel 
survey pilot study in three neighborhoods, which documented vacant and abandoned properties, 
and when combined with foreclosure data, provided critical information about the extent of 
mortgage foreclosures in these communities. In 2009, D3 worked closely with Community Legal 
Resources to expand the pilot study to survey parcels citywide.  This information became critical 
when the City pursued federal funding to address mortgage foreclosures in Detroit.   
In 2009, the Michigan Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF) worked with legislatures to 
successfully change Michigan’s foreclosure law to add what was called the 90-day Pre-
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Foreclosure Negotiation Law.  This amendment allowed homeowners to request an opportunity 
for their mortgage to undergo consideration for a workout, such as a loan modification or short-
sale, that would prevent a foreclosure (Coffman 2013).  This provision was intended to only be 
temporary with a sunset provision for 2011.  Unlike the law in Maryland, the provision was not 
self-funded, nor included any fees to contribute to foreclosure prevention counseling.   
In 2009, the City of Detroit Planning and Development Department (PDD) had received 
its allocation of NSP1 funds, totaling $47.1 million.  As mentioned above, about 30% of the 
funds were allocated for demolition of vacant foreclosed properties beyond repair.  Another 30% 
was for rehabilitation costs in order to try and resell homes in order to get them back into 
productive use.  The PDD had met with CDAD, LISC, NDNI and the OFPR to devise strategies 
and target areas.  Ultimately, PDD chose eight target neighborhoods.  Six of those overlapped 
with NDNI’s target neighborhoods, and four overlapped with LISC’s target neighborhoods, but 
none of the target areas were completely aligned.  
With this infusion of funding from NSP dollars, the City was able to start the Detroit 
Land Bank Authority (DLBA), which would be the main entity administering and implementing 
NSP funds (City of Detroit 2009).  Despite years of advocacy from community organizations, the 
Detroit City Council had previously resisted approving the establishment of a land bank.  
However, with the growing number of vacant properties due to mortgage foreclosures and the 
millions of dollars now flowing through the City for foreclosures, the City needed an entity that 
could manage real estate and property acquisitions, demolition, and rehabilitation, and there was 
no other city department that had this capacity.   
While implementation of the NSP1 program was rolled out in Detroit, MSHDA applied 
for NSP2 funding representing itself as a consortium of local municipal governments throughout 
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Michigan.  The consortium application received $224 million dollars, with the City of Detroit 
receiving about $43 million of that (MSHDA 2009).  The Land Bank was also the administrator 
of NSP2 funds, for which the Planning and Development Department had chosen 5 much smaller 
areas to target for revitalization, three of which were smaller areas within NSP1 target areas.  
Despite the amount of vacant properties and the need for remediation, the Land Bank struggled 
to spend the NSP2 dollars in a timely fashion. Detroit was required to spend at least half of its 
award or risk giving it back to HUD by February of 2012. It had not even spent $6 million, only 
14% of its award (Spangler 2012).  Eventually, the Land Bank caught up, and was able to keep 
the funds.   
For NSP3, once again the PPD applied on behalf of the City.  This time, it reached out to 
organizations like LISC and NDNI to determine collaboratively which areas should be targeted.  
NDNI was particularly influential in urging PDD to focus on more middle-income 
neighborhoods.  Five very small areas were targeted, which were, composed of primarily middle 
and upper income neighborhoods.  Figure 3.6 shows the locations of NSP1, 2, and 3 target areas. 
The NSP3 neighborhoods had been relatively stable prior to the mortgage foreclosure crisis. 
However, with the onset of the crisis, these neighborhoods had suffered significant increases in 
vacancy or properties that were purchased by absentee investors in order to either flip them or 
rent them out, which had a destabilizing effect.  Grandmont Rosedale Development Corporation 
(GRDC), a longtime and well-respected community development corporation that worked in one 
of those neighborhoods, had been requesting NSP1 and NSP2 funds without success.  The 
inclusion of the Grandmont Rosedale neighborhood and similar communities in NSP3 
demonstrated an acknowledgement on the part of the City of the value of investing in 































































Grandmont Rosedale was also the site of Detroit’s participation in the National 
Community Stabilization Trust (NCST).  In other cities, NCST worked through a local 
clearinghouse that centralized this process, usually a city department or a local community 
development intermediary.  In Detroit, however, the NCST did not have a local entity that had 
the capacity to serve in this role.  In this case, GRDC worked with NCST directly.  In the first 
year of operating in 2010, GRDC acquired, rehabbed, and resold 10 homes through the NCST  
(Michigan Foreclosure Task Force 2015).  In 2011, NDNI began functioning as the local 
clearinghouse and NCST was able to expand into other neighborhoods in Detroit.   
Missing from the responses from local stakeholders in Detroit was gaining more 
accountability from the banks, lenders, and servicers who were at the center of the cause of the 
foreclosure crisis.  In 2015, local investigative reporters revealed that in 2010, the corporation 
counsel under Mayor Bing had drafted a proposal to bring suit against Wells Fargo and Bank of 
America for predatory and unfair lending practices (MacDonald and Kurth 2015b).  Bing 
contended that it was never brought to his desk and other city officials admitted that the issue 
was contemplated, but ultimately they decided against it because they did not feel like the City 
had the financial resources or political bandwidth to bring a suit when there were so many other 
problems in the city.  Some advocates associated with MFTF and OFPR also admitted that they 
didn’t feel like this option could be pursued because of the involvement of the lenders on their 
advisory boards.   
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter tells the story of how Baltimore and Detroit stakeholders addressed the 
onslaught of mortgage foreclosures in their communities.  Although the problem was great in 
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both cities, the foreclosure rate was higher in Detroit, which did not have the same kind of 
existing institutional infrastructure to respond as swiftly.  Both cities engaged in activities at the 
community, citywide, and state level, and utilized federal foreclosure response programs.  Both 
cities expanded homeowner counseling as well as initiatives to address foreclosed properties.  
Detroit received far greater resources from philanthropy and the federal government both for 
counseling and addressing distressed properties left behind from foreclosures.  However, the 
response was not as coordinated in Detroit, particularly along the network of community 
development groups, local funders, city agencies, and state networks and departments.  That 
Baltimore was able implement a response so quickly and broadly across communities with less 
than half of the financial resources speaks to the strength of the network of the community 
development sector and it connection to state government.  Baltimore also had greater leadership 
from its state and federal elected leaders both in assisting homeowners and in making lenders 
more accountable.  The story of the local responses in each city related here took the form of 
chronological account.  The next chapter will analyze the activities using a resiliency framework 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion: Assessing Urban Resilience 
 
Introduction  
My analysis of local responses to the mortgage foreclosure crisis is organized by a 
framework influenced by Kathryn Foster’s work an assessing regional resilience (2006).  This 
chapter aims to bring together all of the research presented earlier in this dissertation to 
understand the local responses and the context within which those responses occurred. It presents 
the findings from my research about what occurred in Baltimore and Detroit during the 
foreclosure crisis, organized by the categories Opportunity Space, Response to Foreclosure, and 
Housing Market Stability.  As presented in Chapter One, the framework for my argument is 
below in Figure 4.1.  
 











I argue within this framework that elements of the “Opportunity Space,” including state 
foreclosure laws, local economy, and community development infrastructure, influence how 
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stakeholders were able to “Respond” to the foreclosure crisis.  The responses are broken down 
into three different capacities: the abilities to assess the problem, to create readiness through the 
development of organizational infrastructures and systems, and to devise and implement 
responses that have the ability to address the problem.  The Opportunity Space and the 
Responses, in turn, affect the extent of “Recovery” from the foreclosure crisis.  Recovery is be 
determined by the continued foreclosure rates and other housing market indicators.  The 
following sections are organized by the Urban Resiliency Framework and its sub-categories 
outlined above.   
 
Opportunity Space 
State Foreclosure Laws  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Maryland is a judicial state with a longer and slower 
foreclosure process that requires servicers to enter into mediation with homeowners. This may 
have helped prevent foreclosures by providing more opportunities for homeowners and lenders 
to work out alternatives to foreclosure.  In Michigan, an administrative state, foreclosure laws 
make foreclosures more expeditious, but the redemption period is quite generous in the hopes of 
preventing significant abandonment in its communities.  In both states, however, the most 
preferable outcomes of foreclosures only occur if homeowners are aware of this process and/or if 
they seek guidance from a counselor or attorney.  Unfortunately, in both states, and across the 
country, many, if not most, homeowners are familiar with foreclosures.  Commonly, once in 
foreclosure, homeowners vacate the homes and left it unmaintained to become REOs.  As more 
properties became REOs, banks were ill equipped to become asset managers and, at best, 
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properties fell into disrepair or, at worst, became sources of crime, decreasing housing values, 
and instability in many neighborhoods.   
 
Local Economy 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, Baltimore and Detroit had similar economic histories, 
especially until the year 2000.  From 2000-2010, however, their economic and housing outcomes 
diverged.  The median household income (MHI) in both cities was right around $30,000 in 2000, 
but by 2009, Baltimore’s increased to $41,385, about $15,000 more than the MHI in Detroit, and 
Detroit’s MHI decreased between 2000-2009 to $26,325.  The change in unemployment and 
poverty rates followed a similar pattern.  Detroit had a higher unemployment rate in 2000, 13.8% 
compared to 10.7% in Baltimore.  Yet, in 2010, Baltimore had increased only slightly to 11.2%, 
while Detroit’s unemployment rate nearly doubled to 24.8%. With the significant declines in the 
auto-manufacturing industry in Detroit during this time, Detroit’s economy suffered a great deal 
more than Baltimore’s during this time.   
 
Community Development Infrastructure 
 As has been described in previous chapters, Baltimore’s network of stakeholders in the 
community development sector was very connected and interwoven, leading to strong 
collaboration among players at different levels and institutions toward shared goals and 
activities.  Prior to the foreclosure crisis, the community development sector in Detroit was 
highly fragmented and unorganized.  The crisis helped bring Detroit’s stakeholders together in 
new ways, but this new arrangement was less integrated and less collaborative than in Baltimore.   
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 The formation of the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative in the late 1990s was 
fundamental to the development of an alignment between community organizations and 
foundations that supported them.  During that time, Mayor Schmoke also actively supported 
neighborhood revitalization initiatives, including Sandtown-Winchester, which became a 
national model for comprehensive community development.  Though these priorities weren’t 
equally shared by Mayor O’Malley, he did throw his support behind the Healthy Neighborhoods 
Initiative, at least publicly. Also, the City Council provided a millions of dollars of funding for 
this program.  In addition, O’Malley’s administration paid attention to and supported actions 
taken against predatory lending, as evidenced by the Baltimore City Property Flipping Task 
Force.  This led to the formation of the Baltimore Housing Preservation Coalition in 2005, before 
the foreclosure crisis really took hold, which ultimately became the primary leadership for 
Baltimore’s response to mortgage foreclosures.    
 Integration in the community development sector was also bolstered by individuals who 
moved from serving in different roles in community organizations and foundations to local and 
state government and who brought with them their knowledge and commitment to Baltimore’s 
neighborhoods.  Examples of this were described in Chapter 2 and included Jacqueline Cornish, 
Ken Strong, Anne Norton, and Carol Gilbert, who moved from community organizations to city 
or state agencies, or from philanthropy to state agencies.  In addition to the transfer of knowledge 
that occurred among agencies when these individuals switched roles, their ability to move around 
also demonstrates a high degree of respect on the part of policymakers of community 
development and its practitioners.  Community development is more a part of the culture of 
public service in Baltimore than in Detroit. Anika Foster moved from LISC Detroit to work for 
Mayor Kilpatrick, but she was the only example of this in the community development sector. 
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 In terms of priorities, the launch of the Healthy Neighborhoods pilots in the early 2000s, 
and then the solidification of it as a nonprofit organization and overall city-supported strategy, 
speaks to Baltimore’s focus on middle-income neighborhoods, building the tax base, and raising 
property values.  As described earlier, mortgage foreclosures occurred in those target 
neighborhoods, but Healthy Neighborhoods organizations had relationships with residents and 
were connected to BHPC in order to be able to either provide foreclosures counseling services or 
refer them to other resources.  In addition, Healthy Neighborhoods Inc. was well poised to take 
advantage of NSP2 dollars to address vacant properties in the neighborhoods it supported.   
 Prior to the foreclosure crisis, the community development sector in Detroit was 
primarily focused on affordable housing production or social service provision.  The Community 
Development Advocates of Detroit (CDAD) formed in the mid-1990s as an attempt to create a 
trade association for community development organizations in Detroit. CDAD was developed to 
build the capacity of community development organizations as well as the sector as a whole and 
to advocate for better policies to support neighborhood revitalization.  The board of directors of 
CDAD included executive directors from many longstanding organizations that provided 
leadership for CDAD’s work.   
 During this time, local foundations did not play a significant role in Detroit’s community 
development sector.  Many foundations provided support to specific housing projects or other 
larger capital projects in the city.  However they did not work together with other funders, share 
strategies, or try to align their efforts throughout the city.  In 2006, Mayor Kilpatrick invited 
many of the foundations together to achieve better alignment as well as garner support for his 
neighborhood revitalization strategy, the Next Detroit Neighborhood Initiative (NDNI).  Many 
foundations, including Kresge Foundation, Knight Foundation, and W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
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got behind NDNI and supported it with large multi-year grants.  Kilpatrick’s leadership faltered 
as he and his administration was besieged by scandal, which provided an opening for 
philanthropy to play a larger role in community development in Detroit.  With the formation of 
the Detroit Neighborhood Forum (DNF) in late 2006, foundations, primarily led by the Kresge 
Foundation, continued to meet together and invited other stakeholders, including community 
organizations and city agencies, to discuss issues pertinent to neighborhood revitalization in 
Detroit.   
 The BNC in Baltimore and DNF in Detroit are similar in that they brought foundations 
and other local funders together to coalesce around community development issues.  There are 
important distinctions, however, the first one being that BNC is almost 10 years older.  The BNC 
formed in Baltimore during a time when there was greater leadership on neighborhood 
development from local government as well as community organizations.  This created a 
dynamic where community organizations and foundations were perceived as equal partners.  The 
DNF formed in Detroit during a significant vacuum in leadership from the public sector.  
Because of this, some of the foundations started to take on a greater leadership role in setting the 
community development agenda. In addition, the Detroit city government, for decades, had not 
engaged community development organizations very deeply and did not view them as important, 
which may be why Kilpatrick brought the foundations together, rather than community 
development leaders, to support NDNI.   
Another difference is how grants were made. The BNC pooled resources from 
foundations, banks, and government and jointly redeployed them toward shared community 
development initiatives, such as the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative.  Individual members of 
the DNF made some grants to the same organizations, especially as part of the response to 
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mortgage foreclosures.  However funds were not pooled and collaboratively deployed as with the 
BNC.   
Finally, the BNC’s formation of the BHPC created a regular and substantive venue for 
community organizations to share information with each other as well as funders about the 
challenges they were facing in their neighborhoods.  This was how the foreclosure issue came to 
light, which prompted action on the part of the funders to research the extent of the problem and, 
with the community partners, devise strategies to respond.  Within these venues, what was clear 
from my research was that the relationship between community development organizations and 
funders in Baltimore was much more collaborative than in Detroit.   
In fact, most of the respondents in Detroit who represented community development or 
nonprofit organizations talked about the “animosity and mistrust” between them and funders 
(Personal Interview).  Another respondent from a city nonprofit noted: “[The funders] aren’t 
talking to folks on the ground.  They aren’t asking them.  They are telling them what to do and 
then they call it engagement” (Personal Interview). A number of respondents described it as 
“Very top down. Those [foundations] are the ones who have the resources, so its hard for the 
[community based organization] to say no,” (Personal Interview).   In contrast, community 
organizations described the foundations in Baltimore as “advocates” and able to “influence the 
city on community issues,” (Personal Interviews).  Further, one respondent explained the 
relationship between her community development organization and foundations as follows: “We 
know these foundations very intimately.  They will call us to ask us for what we think.  They 
care about what we think because we’re on the ground.  Their foundation initiatives are based on 
input from us that happens in both formal and informal ways,” (Personal Interview).   
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The difference between the relationships between community organizations and funders 
exemplifies the contention of this dissertation that they were a part of the governing coalition in 
Baltimore, but not in Detroit.  Because community organizations were integrated with 
foundations in the governing coalition and community development sector, the connection 
between assessing a problem, devising a solution, and getting the resources to implement it was 
shorter.  This contributed to Baltimore’s response resiliency.   
 The role of local government agencies in both cities should be mentioned.  In Baltimore, 
during Mayor O’Malley’s term, his administration promoted the development of public and 
subsidized housing through Baltimore Housing.  However, he did not prioritize community 
development outside of support for the Healthy Neighborhood Initiatives (HNI) and the launch 
of Project 5000, the initiative to address vacant properties that focused on enforcement, property 
transactions, and demolition.  Baltimore Housing’s Department of Housing and Community 
Development administers the local Community Development Block Grant programs.  The City 
supported HNI through CDBG as well as direct homeowner assistance for many years, including 
between 2007 and 2010 (HUD Exchange 2015d). Overall, however, city government did not 
explicitly initiate community development strategies. O’Malley’s gubernatorial administration 
was very active in the foreclosure response.  He convened a task force that led to the statewide 
housing counseling network, tried to bring services to task for not being responsive to 
homeowners, and passed legislation that required more actions from lenders to help keep 
homeowners in their homes.   
 In Detroit, several mayoral administrations focused development efforts on the 
downtown and riverfront, rather than in the city’s struggling neighborhoods.  Mayor Archer took 
his administration through a citywide planning process that prioritized redevelopment of 
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neighborhoods, but the City did not have resources to implement any major initiatives.  Mayor 
Kilpatrick was different in that he developed NDNI with the intention of launching a 
neighborhood development initiative.  However, it lost momentum under his involuntary 
successor, Mayor Cockrel, and Mayor Bing couldn’t get enough foundation support to sustain it.  
By the time Mayor Bing threw his support behind NDNI, the foundations had moved on to other 
issues, namely the foreclosure crisis and the Detroit Works Project.  The City’s Housing 
Commission managed the city’s public housing authority and was involved in no activity related 
to neighborhood development.  In addition, the Planning and Development Department focused 
primarily on zoning and approving or denying requests for projects rather than strategically 
initiating any of their own.  Finally, as discussed earlier, the Community Development Block 
Grant process in Detroit was well known for being widely dispersed to hundreds of the city’s 
community organizations, rather than bundling funds that could be strategically targeted towards 
certain neighborhoods or activities.  As reported to HUD, through 2010, the City of Detroit used 
all of its CDBG funds dedicated to housing for construction and rehabilitation and not for 
homeowner counseling or other assistance (HUD Exchange 2015d).    
 
Conclusion: Opportunity Space  
Overall, the opportunity spaces in Baltimore and Detroit were distinct in a few different 
ways.  First, the foreclosure laws in Maryland favored keeping homeowners in their homes and 
preventing foreclosure with multiple opportunities for mediation to explore alternatives. The 
laws in Michigan may expedite the foreclosure process, but with a long redemption period after 
the foreclosure sale, they try to prevent eviction for homeowners as well as more vacant 
properties in neighborhoods.  Second, during 2000-2010, the local economy in Baltimore was 
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faring much better than in Detroit.  The 2007-2010 recession and the longer-term struggles of the 
Big Three automakers in Detroit were devastating to the economy of Detroit.  This was also 
during the time that the City was beginning to drown in debt, so the government’s ability to 
function at a minimal level, let alone in the community development sphere was limited.  Finally, 
the community development sector in Baltimore was better organized and coordinated prior to 
the foreclosure crisis, with close and integrated relationships between community organizations, 
foundations, and government agencies at the local and state level. Community development 
stakeholders had begun to come together in Detroit, but organizations did so separately from 
funders and there was little to no integration between these groups and local and state 
government.   
 
Response to Foreclosures 
Assessment Capacity 
 Kathryn Foster defined assessment capacity as the ability to understand trends, utilize 
lessons from previous disturbances, set action priorities, and to communicate findings that enable 
others to take action on them, among other qualities (2006).  This assessment capacity in 
Baltimore and Detroit is another way that resilience in each of the cities differs; mostly due to 
the fact that Baltimore’s community development sector had already been networked and 
organized toward homeownership preservation prior to the foreclosure crisis.   
 There are a few examples of the availability and utilization of data in Baltimore’s 
community development sector.  In 2000, many community development nonprofits, 
government representatives, and funders came together with a need for better neighborhood data.  
Thus, the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance (BNIA) was started, in partnership with 
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the University of Baltimore (BNIA 2015).  The BNIA provides open data on a range of 
neighborhood indicators in the areas of housing, employment, affordability, education, and 
safety, and has been a source for data on mortgage foreclosures as well.  The BNIA is well 
integrated into the community development networks in Baltimore.   
 As Belair-Edison was beginning to voice its observations about mortgage foreclosures in 
its neighborhood, the first action taken was the commission of the 2006 study of the problem by 
The Reinvestment Fund, which was funded by the Goldseker Foundation (2006).  This study 
documented foreclosure sales from 2000-2005, and investigated the types of loans that were 
made to Baltimore residents.  It found that foreclosures were concentrated in communities of 
color, and were having a profound impact on vacancy and property values in many of the 
neighborhoods targeted by the community development sector.  The TRF study is what prompted 
the BHPC to take further action.   
 The BHPC also had a strong partner in the City for data.  Baltimore Housing provided 
data on foreclosure filings and property tax arrears for BHPC to incorporate into its strategies for 
addressing the crisis.  Foreclosure filings are a good indicator of trouble spots and helped 
Baltimore practitioners target neighborhoods and households for assistance (Personal Interview).  
Further into Baltimore’s foreclosure efforts, Belair-Edison worked with the Community Law 
Center (CLC), a nonprofit that provided legal services to community organizations.  The CLC 
used data on mortgage types (such as subprime loans and adjustable rate mortgages) and 
properties in tax arrears as a way to identify homes that may be struggling financially to pay 
housings costs (Personal Interview).  Belair Edison then sent letters to these homes encouraging 
them to seek free counseling assistance.  This was an innovative way to try and prevent homes 
from even going into default and foreclosure.   
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 Prior to the foreclosure crisis, there was little data available to the public or practitioners 
in Detroit.  Some organizations had neighborhood data, such as the Center for Urban Research at 
Wayne State University and the local United Way of Southeast Michigan, however, it was not 
widely shared (Personal Interview).  Practitioners knew that the City had property data, but 
departments did not share it and practitioners were under the impression that most departments 
did not know what to do with the data they had (Personal Interview).   
This challenge was evidenced with the start of the Detroit Vacant Properties Campaign 
(DVPC). The Community Legal Resources had to access property data and analyze it on their 
own, and even provided their data to the City’s Planning and Development Department (Personal 
Interview). In 2006, the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation brought the national data 
consulting group, Social Compact, to Detroit to create baseline data on a number of economic 
and housing indicators.  While working with Social Compact speaks to the lack of available data 
in Detroit, it was also important because Social Compact is known for unearthing data that is not 
normally available from the U.S. Census or other traditional data sources.  It’s work particularly 
helpful in cities with high poverty, people and conditions can be undercounted and miscounted 
because traditional data collection techniques may not work as well in areas with a lot of vacancy 
and transience (Social Compact 2015).   
 Through its work in Detroit, Social Compact also started bringing mortgage foreclosure 
data to local organizations in 2007, including NDNI, the DVPC, and CLR, and the nascent 
Office of Foreclosure Prevention and Response (OFPR).  Then, the Ford Foundation, Kresge, 
and W.K. Kellogg created Data Driven Detroit (D3) in late 2007, and its office was established 
in early 2008.  With its start, D3 had a staff person dedicated solely to corralling and sharing 
foreclosure data with OFPR and other partners (Personal Interview).  One of D3’s first projects 
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was the citywide parcel survey, which again, aimed at creating a foundation for community 
development data in the city.   
 Baltimore’s assessment capacity was rather high given the existence of data centers prior 
to the foreclosure crisis and a practice of using neighborhood data to inform community 
development efforts.  Detroit did not have this capacity prior to the crisis, but the crisis was the 
primary reason why neighborhood data began to be centralized, organized, and utilized by local 
stakeholders.  Further, practitioners were able to establish D3 and start sharing data fairly 
quickly, which indicates that the capacity existed within local practitioners.  The foundation 
support for building this capacity so quickly was critical to stakeholders’ ability to respond to the 
foreclosure crisis.   
 
Readiness Capacity 
Readiness capacity is the degree to which local stakeholders had systems and practices 
already in place, including “effective networks and connections” that could be utilized to respond 
to a crisis (Foster 2006, p. 18).   Related to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, readiness to respond 
would include strong capacity to assist individual homeowners with counseling, address 
vacancies caused by foreclosures through property rehabilitation or demolition, and for 
organizations to work together to be able to the maximize impact of their work.  Stakeholders in 
both cities had capacity in these areas, and this section will describe how this readiness supported 
their local responses.   
As many practitioners described it, the role of community development organizations in 
Baltimore was primarily to provide a multitude of programs and services to residents including 
community organizing, social services, youth development, housing assistance, and 
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homeownership counseling (Personal Interviews).  One practitioner described it, “[Baltimore 
has] a very anemic nonprofit industry in terms of number of units and the number of 
organizations that [produce affordable housing].  The scale of their work in the city, is that you 
have several one or two elderly developers, several special needs, then you have one or two, 
maybe, family rental developments,” (Personal Interview). The sentiment was often expressed 
that community development organizations did not have a big role in housing development; this 
was a role primarily for private, for profit developers who used different housing subsidies to 
produce affordable and special needs housing. St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center (St. Ambrose), 
Druid Heights Community Development Corporation (Druid Heights CDC), and Neighborhood 
Housing Services (NHS) were exceptions, but even they just produced small numbers of housing 
units in Baltimore.  These organizations also had robust homeownership counseling services.   
In Detroit, however, the perception of community development organizations is that they 
produced affordable housing as the primary neighborhood development activity, rather than 
community programs for residents.  As one nonprofit practitioner explained, “Many CDCs had 
nonexistent connections to the community or have gotten away from their core constituents and 
are more real estate developers and asset managers.  They work for developer fees,” (Personal 
Interview).  Those organizations with historical ties to the neighborhood, such as Southwest 
Housing Solutions (SHS), Grandmont Rosedale Development Corporation, and USNAP BAC 
required and/or provided homeownership counseling for homes they sold.  Southwest Housing 
Solutions may have been one of the only community development organizations that provided 
other, more comprehensive, programs in the neighborhood (Southwest Solutions 2015).    Many 
other organizations, however, were very small in terms of staff, and primarily focused on 
housing production.   
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When the mortgage foreclosure crisis began to require great homeowner counseling, 
there were a number of organizations in Baltimore that had the readiness capacity to quickly 
expand this services.  St. Ambrose, Druid Heights CDC, NHS, Belair-Edison, Southeast 
Community Development Corporation and others were able to expand their existing counseling 
services and many, as reported in the previous chapter.  In total, these groups received about 
$2.35 million in philanthropic and National Mortgage Foreclosure Counseling (NMFC) funds 
between 2005-2010. In addition the connection to BHPC and the Maryland Housing Counselors 
Network (MD HOPE) enabled organizations to share information, best practices and resources in 
order to provide high-quality counseling services to homeowners.   
Some community development organizations in Detroit were able to do the same, namely 
Southwest Housing Solutions, which, with new foundation funding, went from one part-time 
staff person to eight fulltime foreclosure prevention counselors within two years from early 2008 
to 2010 (Personal Interview).  SHS was the primary provider of foreclosure prevention services, 
evidenced by the almost $1.5 million in philanthropic and NMFC funding that it alone received 
for foreclosure counseling between 2007-2010 (Foundation Center 2015).  The Michigan 
Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF) started in 2007, with leadership from SHS and 
USNAP BAC.  It was housed within the state community development trade association, the 
Community Economic Development Association of Michigan (CEDAM).  Coordinated with the 
Detroit OFPR, the MFTF helped build the capacity of about a dozen small organizations in 
Detroit to provide foreclosure counseling through trainings and sharing best practices (Mortgage 
Foreclosure Task Force 2015).   
Another side to responding to foreclosures was to address properties left vacant. This was 
primarily implemented through rounds 1, 2, and 3 of the National Stabilization Program.  In 
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Baltimore, this capacity existed in a small number of nonprofit developers named above as well 
as private, for-profit developers who were, historically, the primary producers of affordable 
housing in the city.  These developers also had experience acquiring and rehabbing mortgage and 
tax foreclosed homes in the past.  Baltimore Housing and Healthy Neighborhoods, Inc., had 
previous experience working with many of these developers, so the system for establishing 
contracts for acquiring and rehabbing homes preexisted before the foreclosure crisis. In total, 
Baltimore received $32 million of NSP funding.   
Developers in Detroit had capacity in this regard, too.  Many nonprofit developers were 
capable of acquiring and rehabilitating foreclosed homes.   In both cities, the scale needed for the 
redevelopment of the large amount of homes that were left behind foreclosures was a challenge.  
Detroit established the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) to centralize the process for 
property acquisition, disposition, and rehabilitation, though that did not occur until 2010.  In 
total, the City of Detroit received $110 million in NSP funding, an amount that, for a city 
government with little community development and planning capacity, took significant time and 
effort to launch an effective response to foreclosed and vacant properties. 
The final piece of the readiness capacity is the degree to which organizations were 
coordinated and networked.  In Baltimore, the existing relationships between BNC, BHPC and 
MD HOPE at the state level helped integrate foreclosure response activities across a number of 
funders, organizations and government agencies on both the local and state level. While 
Baltimore government agencies were not major players, they were, at least indirectly, connected 
to and responsive to the existing community development network.   
In Detroit, however, the community development sector was described as “siloed, 
disconnected, and competitive,” (Personal Interview).  The local Community Development 
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Advocates of Detroit (CDAD) and state-based CEDAM helped community development 
stakeholders share their work, though these associations did not coordinate efforts among 
member organizations.  Local Detroit foundations had just begun to meet together in 2006 as the 
Detroit Neighborhood Forum (DNF), but did not establish collaborative processes among each 
other, either.  The purpose of the DNF was primarily for sharing information, not organizing and 
coordinating activities.  Between practitioners and funders, collaboration was not only 
nonexistent, but the relationship between those two groups was riven with tension.  Among 
community organizations and city government, there was also very little collaboration.  Many 
organizations received funding from the City through federal sources, however, the degree of 
partnership was low.   
Overall, the extent of readiness in Baltimore was higher than in Detroit.  With its robust 
system of housing counseling; housing development among nonprofit and for-profit developers; 
and integration of organizations, agencies, and funders on the local and state level, local 
practitioners had a stronger foundation from which to launch responses for homeowners and 
neighborhoods facing high foreclosures. In Detroit, nonprofit organizations had high capacity for 
redeveloping properties and the potential to expand homeowner counseling, but the degree of 
coordination and collaboration was very low.  In terms of readiness, this would lead to a longer 
time necessary to develop and implement responses to mortgage foreclosures.   
 
Response Capacity 
We can assess the local responses in each city based on three elements: the 
appropriateness of the actions taken given the problem, the degree of collaboration in the 
response, and the extent to which the response could be sustained over time.  The latter element 
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relates to the ability of the responses to have a lasting impact and to contribute to future 
resilience. As we saw above, Baltimore had higher readiness capacity than Detroit.  This section 
will describe how that readiness contributed to local response capacity.   
The first element is whether the responses taken were appropriate to the problem.  Each 
city is different and experienced different effects from the mortgage foreclosure crisis depending 
on factors such as strength of the housing market and the state laws that govern real estate 
practices. As such, stakeholders in different cities devised strategies appropriate to their local 
context (Immergluck, 2008). For both Baltimore and Detroit, major responses to the foreclosure 
crisis were similar because, as weak markets, the effects of the crisis were also similar.  First, 
mortgage foreclosures caused many homeowners to lose their homes leading to financial 
hardship, relocation, and neighborhood instability.  Second, presuming that foreclosed homes 
were vacant for a period of time, those properties could have damaging effects on communities, 
and potential to becoming sources of blight in otherwise stable, high-homeownership 
communities.   
Thus, the responses in both cities shared two strategies.  One strategy was to prevent 
foreclosures by providing counseling and assistance to homeowners and the other was to employ 
property mitigation strategies to prevent blight by acquiring foreclosed properties.  The second 
strategy focused on acquiring properties to either be redeveloped and resold, if the neighborhood 
housing market would support it, or demolished if redevelopment was not feasible. Given the 
effects of mortgage foreclosures in these cities, the types of response local stakeholders 
implemented were appropriate and matched the nature of the problem.   
A second part of appropriateness, however, is whether the extent of the response matched 
the extent of the problem. Related to homeowner counseling, one respondent admitted that, 
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“Over the past couple of years we’ve outreached to about 10,000 families, which has resulted in 
one-on-one counseling sessions with 4,200 homeowners.  Out of those, we’ve been able to help 
22% stay in their homes, and another 10% to solve their financial problems [by selling their 
home],” (Personal Interview). This counseling program was able to help about 1,000 
homeowners stay in their homes when in 2009 alone, there were 69,000 foreclosure filings in 
Detroit and 15,000 in Baltimore (Realty Track 2010).  The gap here is due to factors beyond the 
control of local stakeholders.  First, there weren’t enough resources to reach larger numbers of 
homeowners, and second, many homeowners did not seek help from counselors.  They may have 
dealt with their servicer on their own, or they just walked away from their property and suffered 
the consequence on their credit report.   
In terms of property mitigation efforts, with the millions of dollars that each city 
received, the resources were intended to make a significant impact.  However, again, the extent 
of the problem far outweighed the resources and capacity to address them. Healthy 
Neighborhoods, Inc. proposed to rehabilitate a minimum of 349 units in its NSP2 application 
(Healthy Neighborhoods Inc., 2010). Though the number of foreclosure filings does not equal 
the number of foreclosed and vacant homes because not all properties completed foreclosure, this 
number is only 2% of the number of filings mentioned above.   Furthermore, according to their 
final NSP2 activity report, Healthy Neighborhoods Inc., through its development partners, 
acquired and rehabbed 117 homes and another additional 24 vacant homes were sold directly to 
buyers who would do rehabilitation themselves, for a total of 141 foreclosed homes acquired 
and/or sold (Healthy Neighborhoods, 2012).  This is less than half of the 349 that they projected.  
According to the Baltimore Housing’s final report to HUD, its NSP partners acquired and 
completed rehabilitation of 70 units of foreclosed housing units, (Baltimore Housing, 2012).   
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As another example, Detroit’s application for NSP1 funding indicated that about 65% of 
its 69,000 foreclosed properties are vacant, but that only 1,400 properties would be demolished, 
(City of Detroit, 2009). Like counseling, there are only so many resources available for property 
mitigation, and so there were limitations on the extent of property mitigation efforts that could be 
deployed.  In its latest NSP1 reports, the City of Detroit reported having demolished 3,189 
properties, more than twice what they had projected, and rehabbing over 170 units of homeowner 
or rental housing affected by mortgage foreclosures (City of Detroit 2015a).  
The second element of response capacity is the extent of coordination and collaboration 
among actors. Much of this has also been described.  The degree of prior coordination between 
stakeholders in Baltimore only deepened during the foreclosure crisis, especially among local 
community organizations, advocates, and the philanthropic sector.  Collaboration was also 
strengthened between these Baltimore stakeholders and agencies on the state-level.  The high 
degree of involvement from the state government had two important benefits.  First, the State 
ensured counseling services across the state were of high quality by distributing consistent and 
thorough training and information to organizations working directly with homeowners.  Second, 
the State provided opportunities for direct connections between counselors and lawyers working 
on the ground to State agencies and the legislature, which could use lessons learned by 
practitioners to change or strengthen policies, practices, and laws at the state level.  There was 
little need for organized advocacy by stakeholders because practitioners were already working so 
closely with the State government entities that influenced laws governing the foreclosure 
process.  This led to important changes in the law during the foreclosure crisis, which were 
intended to help homeowners either avoid foreclosure or find an alternative that would avoid 
significant hardship.   
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The Detroit OFPR helped bring many stakeholders together and coordinate different 
foreclosure strategies throughout the city.  Among OFPR, the Detroit Vacant Properties 
Campaign, Detroit LISC, NDNI, D3 and community development groups, there was greater 
communication and shared strategy development to address mortgage foreclosures and 
neighborhood development, more generally.  They shared mortgage foreclosure data, and 
devised initiatives, such as the parcel survey and intensive community outreach activities that 
would collectively benefit its partners as well as reach homeowners in foreclosure. This type of 
collaboration occurred in a way that hadn’t existed before the foreclosure crisis, as described by 
one Detroit practitioner (Personal Interview): 
Our ability as a community to find resolve and convene around an issue is 
probably not much more apparent in anything than in the foreclosure crisis…To 
the extent that we formed advisory groups, collaborations, and collectively shared 
knowledge and best practice around the foreclosure crisis, I think, is pretty much 
unprecedented in this city. 
 
This was definitely the case among community organizations and nonprofits in Detroit.  
The OFPR and partners were also connected on the state level to the MFTF, which aimed to 
implement this collaborative activity across the state, building capacity of counselors statewide, 
and serving as a vehicle for advocacy for stronger foreclosure laws. However, MFTF was not as 
connected to state agencies or to the Michigan Legislature as was MD HOPE in Maryland.  
Though the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) served on MFTF’s 
Steering Committee, its participation wasn’t perceived as being substantive, “There isn’t a real 
spirit of partnership with MSHDA. It seems like they really just don’t want to get in trouble, by 
not participating, rather than be very active with the Task Force,” (Personal Interview).   The 
MFTF was independent of state government, compared to MD HOPE, which was formed out of 
then Governor O’Malley’s office.  MFTF did not enjoy such an insider’s role related to proposed 
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changes foreclosure laws.  The MFTF’s was successful in advocating passage of the 90-day Pre-
Foreclosure Negotiation Law in 2009, but the law was not as strong as in Maryland.  The 
mediation law in Maryland provided more time for homeowners to respond to lenders and 
included fees that the lender had to pay that supported foreclosure prevention counseling.  
New forms of collaboration and coordination were also evident among the philanthropic 
sector with the formation of the Detroit Neighborhood Forum.  However, the DNF served mostly 
as an information sharing body, and less one of collaboration that coordinated funding strategies 
toward shared community development goals.  In addition, because of the challenges described 
earlier between the philanthropic sector and community organizations in Detroit, there was a 
need for stronger relationships, mutual respect, shared understanding, and better coordination.     
The third element in the response capacity is the degree that impacts from the responses 
could be sustained.  Despite the ways in which Detroit’s response may not have been as strong as 
in Baltimore, the mortgage foreclosure crisis created a unique and unexpected opportunity for 
stakeholders to engage in extensive citywide strategic planning.  In late 2008, “In response to 
foundation targeting and the foreclosure crisis, members of CDAD created a Crisis Task 
Force…But, then we realized that focusing on the crisis wouldn’t get us very far, so we changed 
the name to the Futures Task Force in early 2009,” (Personal Interview).  The Future Task Force 
spent eighteen months together undertaking strategic planning with numerous community 
development and resident groups, eventually producing a Strategic Framework for Detroit.  This 
report divided each of Detroit’s neighborhoods into one of ten neighborhood typologies.  For 
example the Traditional Residential Typology represented dense residential neighborhoods with 
single-family and multi-unit housing, where as Green Venture Typology would utilize areas with 
vacant factories and lots for nonpolluting industry such as fisheries and hydroponic gardening 
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(Community Development Advocates of Detroit 2010).  The Strategic Framework also laid out 
processes for implementing these neighborhood plans.   
For all of the work that contributed to this report, there was very little acknowledgement 
of what it produced.  It did not get much media or other attention locally outside of the 
community development sector.  One practitioner active in producing the report commented, “It 
was like that axiom: no profit in your own land…At the time, it was probably one of the most 
important things produced in this city” (Personal Interview). It received attention from the New 
York Times (Saulny 2010), was included in national community development sites about best 
practices, and has been sited in a number of books related to community development (Patterson 
and Silverman 2013, Bohm et al 2014).  Despite the lack of local fanfare, CDAD began 
implementing the plan in two neighborhoods where they created local residential advisory 
committees and engaged hundreds of residents in community planning sessions (Personal 
Interview).   
In 2010, Mayor Bing launched his own strategic planning process in partnership with the 
Kresge Foundation.  Given the City’s financial challenges, Kresge provided the funds for this 
process and hired nationally renowned urban planner, Toni Griffin, from Boston to facilitate this 
process, called the Detroit Works Project.  Heavily criticized for the lack of community 
engagement and resident input, the City later recalibrated this process into a short-term and long-
term planning process.  The City would be responsible for the short-term process, which was 
most responsible for improving city services and meeting residents’ more immediate needs, 
while the long-term planning was undertaken externally, by the University of Detroit’s Detroit 
Collaborative Design Center, and heavily supported by Kresge and the Ford Foundation 
(Patterson and Silverman 2013).  The long term planning process was eventually renamed as 
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Detroit Future City and its report and subsequent implementation organization was launched in 
January 2013 (Detroit Future City 2013).  Similar to, and perhaps taking inspiration from, 
CDAD’s Strategic Framework, the Detroit Future City plan also divides up areas in the city for 
specific uses depending on existing infrastructure, and has received attention on a national scale.    
  
Conclusion: Responses to Foreclosure 
Overall, there were strengths and weaknesses to both Baltimore and Detroit’s response to 
the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  In both cities, the challenges and problems far outweighed the 
resources available to address them.  There were not enough counselors to reach all of the 
homeowners, at least those homeowners who wanted to be reached.  There was not enough 
capital to rehabilitate all of the homes that were left vacant behind displaced homeowners.  
Despite this, Baltimore used its existing, and Detroit built new, networks and collaborations of 
public, private, and philanthropic stakeholders to address mortgage foreclosures.  By no means 
perfect, particularly in Detroit, working together through this crisis created and strengthened a 
more integrated community development sector in both cities.  In Baltimore, community 
development stakeholders already had a well-established, citywide strategy in Healthy 
Neighborhoods, and this did not change throughout the crisis.  In Detroit, however, the crisis 
created a new opportunity for intensive strategic planning in the community organization sector, 
as well as the public and philanthropic sector.  These processes unfolded in Detroit, however, as 
separate initiatives; first among community development organizations and then within local 
government, supported by foundations.  This further exemplifies the disconnection among these 




Recovery Capacity and Housing Market Stability 
 Knowing the extent to which Baltimore and Detroit have recovered from the foreclosure 
crisis is the main limitation of this study.  There are a number of challenges when reporting on 
the extent of recovery.  First and foremost, the damage done to neighborhoods because of the 
high numbers of foreclosures takes time to ameliorate because the impact is dispersed.  As 
described earlier, foreclosures affect individual households who experience financial hardship 
and displacement, in addition to the physical and economic impact experienced by the 
neighborhoods where foreclosures occur.   
The focus of this study has been on the community development systems in both cities; 
how they were organized prior to as well as how they were changed by the crisis.  The purpose 
of such community development systems is to improve the quality of life in urban 
neighborhoods, particularly those neighborhoods that have disparately experienced 
disinvestment.  Thus, indicators useful for assessing the degree of recovery in each of the cities 
could center on changed neighborhood conditions.  The challenge there, however, is that it is 
really too soon to make conclusions about the relationships between the initial responses to the 
foreclosure crisis between 2007-2010 and neighborhood conditions only five years after that.  In 
fact, the data suggests that, in some neighborhoods, the conditions continued to get worse, even 
amidst recovery in other neighborhoods and in other parts of the economy.  Thus, this section 
will include data and information that is available about such indicators, and discuss limitations 
to consider.   
 First, this section examines foreclosure rates. This requires a bit of explanation about 
changes in the way that foreclosure rate data has been calculated, gathered and made publicly 
available. The foreclosure filings data that were presented in Chapter One is no longer available 
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for this study.  Despite attempts to obtain these data from Data Driven Detroit, it was not 
available. Foreclosure filings are available in Baltimore up to 2013, but filings data were not 
available for Detroit.  Furthermore, Realty Trac, a common source of foreclosure data across the 
country changed their own method of calculating foreclosure rates over the years.  The Realty 
Trac data from 2007 and 2009 provide the rate of foreclosure filings per number of housing 
units.  Now they calculate “foreclosure inventory,” meaning the rate of mortgaged homes, not 
housing units, in any stage of foreclosure, from notice of foreclosure to foreclosure sale, (Realty 
Trac 2015). In addition, Realty Trac no longer makes their foreclosure rate data publicly 
available.   
 The Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) devised foreclosure rates by using LPS 
Analytics data on foreclosures from 2010 to 2013, and shared it publicly in partnership with the 
Urban Institute and the Center for Housing Policy, on Foreclosure-Response.org (2015).  The 
foreclosure rate calculated by LISC is similar to Realty Trac’s newer process: the number of 
mortgages in any stage of the foreclosure process out of the pool of all mortgaged homes. The 
rate is reported for individual months, not annually, and it is reported for the metropolitan 
statistical area, not each individual city.  The data used by LISC cannot be compared with the 
foreclosure rates calculated between 2007-2010 in Chapter One because the rates are calculated 
differently and its calculated for region instead of the city.  However, they can be used to 
compare the regions overall, which offers a glimpse at what happened after 2010.  Overall 
foreclosure rates year to year in September, as well as those for prime and subprime mortgages 
are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Foreclosure Rates in Metropolitan Baltimore and Detroit by Month Between 
2010-2013* 
Month/Year Baltimore Detroit 
 Overall Prime Subprime Overall Prime Subprime 
September 2010 3.5% 2.3% 15.1% 5.5% 4.1% 15.6% 
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September 2011 4.3% 2.8% 17.1% 5.5% 3.7% 17.2% 
September 2012 6.4% 4.0% 26.2% 4.9% 3.2% 14.5% 
September 2013 5.0% 3.2% 22.3% 3.3% 2.3% 10.2% 
*Source: Foreclosure-Response.Org. Metropolitan Delinquency and Foreclosure Data, 2014. 
To demonstrate how the foreclosure rate changed in each metropolitan region, Figure 4.2 
compares the overall foreclosure rate in both areas.  
 
Figure 4.2. Overall Foreclosure Rate in Metropolitan Baltimore and Detroit by Month 
Between 2010-2013* 
 
*Source: Foreclosure-Response.Org. Metropolitan Delinquency and Foreclosure Data, 2014. 
 
Over the course of these four years, metropolitan Baltimore’s foreclosure rate climbed 
from 3.5% to 5.0% and peaked in September 2012 at 6.4%.  Conversely, the rate in Detroit’s 
metropolitan area declined from 5.5% to 3.3%.  One explanation for this increase may be 
because of Maryland’s foreclosure laws. Because of the laws that were passed there in 2010, the 
length of time between the notice of foreclosure and foreclosure sale was extended and there was 
more time built into the process with the addition of the mediation requirement.  This increased 
the amount of time it took to complete foreclosure process.  Table 4.2 presents average length of 














Table 4.2. Average Number of Days of Foreclosure Process During the First Quarter in 
Maryland and Michigan Between 2009-2014*  
Year Maryland Michigan United States 
2009 338  89 206 
2010 373  157 248 
2011 463  235 298 
2012 618  275 370 
2013 575  282 477 
2014 473 265 572 
*Source: The Baltimore Sun, 2014.  
 
Though the average number of days increased in both states, and even in the nation 
overall, for several of the years between 2009-2014, the length of time it took to foreclose on 
properties in Maryland was double that of Michigan, with a peak of 618 days in the first quarter 
of 2012, or almost 21 months.  This, combined with the change in how foreclosure rates were 
calculated may contribute to higher foreclosure rates.  Using the newer practice of including all 
mortgages in any stage of foreclosure, the number of mortgages included might be higher if the 
length of the foreclosure process was longer.   
In Detroit, the foreclosure rates may have decreased because there were just fewer 
mortgages left to foreclose.  Given the high numbers of foreclosures in the early years of the 
crisis, many of those homes were foreclosed on multiple times and eventually also underwent tax 
foreclosures, becoming the property of the county and the City of Detroit (MacDonald and 
Kurther 2015a).  So, it is possible that fewer homes in the city were mortgaged.  Despite these 
challenges, the foreclosure data is still useful for comparing foreclosure activity and recovery 
between the cities.   
 Another source of information about recovery in the housing markets is the degree to 
which there have been changes in other housing indicators.  Chapter One presented data on 
median housing value, as well as rates of vacancy and homeownership in 2000 and 2010.  Table 
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4.3 presents these data again as well as the same data estimated for 2010-2014.  These latter data 
are shaded.   
 
Table 4.3. Housing Market in Baltimore and Detroit 2010-2014 
 Baltimore City Detroit City 
Homeownership Rate1   
2000 50.3% 54.9% 
2010 48.3% 51.9% 
2010-20142 47.2% 50.7% 
Median Housing Value1   
2000 $69,100 $63,600 
2010 $157,900 $50,400 
2010-20142 $155,000 $45,100 
Vacancy Rate1   
2000 5.6% 4.7% 
2010 7.7% 11.3% 
2010-20142 18.3% 30.0% 
1Source: U.S. Census, 2000, 2010 
2Source: U.S. Census, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
 
The American Community Survey Data for 2010-2014 are not exactly comparable with 
the decennial census data for 2000 and 2010, since ACS a five-year averaged estimate.  Given 
that caveat, however, these data are helpful in comparing the two cities to each other and getting 
a broad sense of outcomes.  Between 2000-2010, the housing markets diverged substantially in 
Baltimore and Detroit.  For example, the median housing value (MHV) changed dramatically in 
each city during those years.  Baltimore’s MHV almost doubled, while Detroit’s MHV decreased 
by 21 percent.  The vacancy rate increased in both cities, but only by about 2 percentage points 
in Baltimore compared to almost two and a half times in Detroit.  In both cities, between 2010 
and 2014, the homeownership rate and the median housing value changed very little. Housing 
values in Detroit decreased by 10.5 percent.  The vacancy rate in both cities, however, appears to 
have increased significantly by 2014, by 138 percent in Baltimore and 165 percent in Detroit.   
Overall, regarding the outcomes in the housing market, Baltimore fared better than 
Detroit. Even with increases in vacancy in both cities, the impact in Detroit was far greater and 
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the increase in vacancy in Baltimore seemed to have little effect on the median housing value.  
Despite this, the impact of the mortgage foreclosure crisis has been deeply felt in both cities.  
This is supported in local studies.  In 2015, the Detroit News tracked the conditions of 65,000 
mortgage foreclosures that occurred since 2005 and found that 56 percent of those properties are 
now blighted or abandoned (MacDonald and Kuther 2015a).  Out of those 36,400 homes, 13,000 
are on the list of structures that will be demolished by the Detroit Land Bank Authority.  Many 
neighborhoods have experienced significant declines due to mortgage foreclosures over the past 
10 years.  In Baltimore, somewhere between 16,000 and 40,000 properties are vacant and 
17,000, or about 8 percent of the city’s stock of housing has been classified as inhabitable (Lewis 
2015, Calvert 2015).  In recent years, the City of Baltimore has demolished 1,500 houses, and 
plans to tear down hundreds more in the future (Calvert 2015).   
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation argues that the ability of urban stakeholders in Baltimore and Detroit to 
respond to foreclosure crisis depends on the opportunity space in each city, which contributed 
their capacity to assess, prepare readiness, and devise strategies to address the crisis.  The 
opportunity space and the response, then helps determine how the city will experience a 
recovery.  This chapter aimed to detail each of these elements in Baltimore and Detroit.   
In Baltimore, the opportunity space included judicial mortgage foreclosure laws that 
incorporated longer periods through which homeowners could arrange to stay in their homes or 
make alternative arrangements, which would result in less hardship.  In Detroit, foreclosures 
were subject to administrative procedures not overseen by a judge and left less time for a 
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homeowner to find remediation, though a long post-foreclosure redemption period enabled 
residents more time to either move out of try and recapture their home after the foreclosure sale.  
The local economy in Baltimore and Detroit had been weakened by decades of 
disinvestment, and both cities were challenged with tens of thousands of vacant properties, high 
unemployment and poverty, particularly until the year 2000.  After this, the economy in 
Baltimore seemed to strengthen, especially relative to Detroit.  Its housing value increased as 
Detroit’s decreased substantially.  The decline of the auto manufacturing industry in the mid-
2000s had a huge impact on Detroit’s economy, doubling its unemployment rate.   
The community development infrastructure was deeply connected among community 
practitioners, nonprofit support organizations, funders, and government agencies (particularly the 
State), in Baltimore, starting in the early 2000s.  The city government put its support behind, 
what became its de facto community development strategy, Healthy Neighborhoods, and this 
was supported by funders in the BNC and the community development sector more broadly.  In 
Detroit, however, the community development sector only began being organized in the late 
2000s.  Some funders and LISC began to organize their investments in targeted neighborhoods, 
and Kilpatrick’s administration began to do this, as well, with NDNI.  Funders shared 
information and strategies with the formation of the DNF, and CDAD played a similar role 
amongst community development organizations. However, the integration that existed in 
Baltimore between practitioners, funders, and government, was much more siloed in Detroit.  
Overall, community development organizations were not perceived as particularly influential 
with the funders or with city government.  
The response in both cities was, ultimately, the best they could do at the time and with 
the resources they had to work with.  The problem they faced was much greater they could 
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possible address, in many ways, and for many stakeholders, they were learning about the best 
approaches while they were implementing them.  Both cities responded with efforts to assess the 
problem bolstering the use of data to inform their practices.  Stakeholders expanded counseling 
services to homeowners and developed property mitigation strategies for homes left behind by 
foreclosures.  Baltimore’s Healthy Neighborhoods strategy was strengthened through the NSP 
program that helped address the impact of foreclosures in its target neighborhoods.  In Detroit, 
the crisis actually led to new efforts to undergo strategic planning in the community development 
sector, however, this also occurred in a fractured manner.  CDAD developed a plan, while the 
Mayor and local foundations developed their own plans.   
During the period of recovery, the national economy improved, with unemployment rates 
having fallen to pre-crisis levels and incomes slowly rising again.    Despite these gains, some 
cities still faced great challenges, and some neighborhoods within those cities, like those 
confronted with high rates of foreclosures in Baltimore in Detroit, are still not seeing great signs 
of recovery. In particular, between 2010 – 2014, the foreclosure rate in metropolitan Baltimore 
rose substantially, eventually surpassing the rate in Detroit.  However, despite this, the housing 
market in Baltimore was still stronger than in Detroit in terms of housing value and vacancy.  
Given the disparate histories of the community development sector in the two cities, the strength 
or weakness of this sector was a major contributing factor in their recovery.  Before the crisis, 
better relationships between funders, local government and community development 
organizations in Baltimore created a stronger and more strategic focus on housing and 
community development.  It was through this kind of collaboration that Baltimore’s major 
community development agenda, Healthy Neighborhoods, was born.  Baltimore’s focus on 
raising property values through Healthy Neighborhoods strategies, compared to the focus on 
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building affordable housing in Detroit, was a central factor in the ability of Baltimore’s overall 








This research project started with an interest in how two seemingly similar cities, 
Baltimore, Maryland, and Detroit, Michigan, diverged so greatly with regard to rates of 
mortgage foreclosures during the housing crisis between 2007-2010.  The foreclosure rates of 
Baltimore, during most of this time, were almost half of what they were in Detroit.  The cities 
share elements of their history: economic decline with the exodus of manufacturing jobs, white 
and middle class flight, racial turnover leading to majority African American cities, and high 
poverty rates and large numbers of vacant properties.   But such similarities do not explain the 
different outcomes in the two cities.  In particular, the dissertation asks whether the community 
development sectors in each of the cities were different, and if that might be a factor in why the 
cities outcomes during the foreclosure crisis diverged.   
 This final chapter begins with a bit of an epilogue for each city.  Since 2010, the systems 
and response mechanisms established during 2007-2010 have changed and developed, and so 
have the cities themselves.  There have, most critically, been notable changes in the national 
sphere related to the foreclosure crisis, described in the first part of this chapter.  Second, it will 
summarize my findings and examine whether my hypothesis was correct and what factors 
supported or disproved it.  It returns to the theoretical framework described at the outset and 
relates my findings to the broader literature.  It will also suggest some alternative explanations 
for my findings and areas for further research.  It concludes by exploring suggested implications 




Epilogue: Baltimore, Detroit, and the Nation  
 Since 2010, there had been a number of changes in the institutional infrastructure that 
responded to the mortgage foreclosure crisis in each city.  There have also been new laws and 
developments on the national level that attempted to both mitigate the impact of the foreclosure 
crisis and prevent new ones from happening in the future.  This section will describe all of these 
changes, as well as a brief status of each city as of 2015.   
 
Local Foreclosure Response Activities 
The primary stakeholders in Baltimore that responded to the mortgage foreclosure crisis 
were the Baltimore Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC), the Baltimore Homeownership 
Preservation Coalition (BHPC), and the Maryland Foreclosure Counselors Network (MD 
HOPE).  Out of those three, in 2015, only MD HOPE exists in its original form, as a state 
network to train foreclosure counselors across the state and as a resource for homeowners in 
foreclosure seeking assistance.  In August 2014, the BNC ceased operations concluding 18 years 
of pooling national and local funding for neighborhood development in Baltimore (Association 
for Baltimore Area Grantmakers 2015a).  Their activities were transferred to a working group 
within the Association for Baltimore Area Grantmakers, a thirty-year-old membership 
association of 140 foundations and philanthropists in the region that works to organize and 
inform the philanthropic community (Association for Baltimore Area Grantmakers, 2015b).   
A month prior to the BNC’s conclusion, the BHPC also ceased operations as had it 
existed during the foreclosure crisis.  The BHPC’s activities were transferred to a state advocacy 
coalition called the Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition (MCRC) (Barbour-Gillet 2014).  This 
is a network of individuals and organizations that work to advocate for stronger protections for 
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consumers as well as educate and inform citizens about lending and financial literacy.  Related to 
BHPC activities, MCRC continues to convene members of the BHPC coalition to support its 
information sharing function (MCRC, 2015).  As is the pattern in Baltimore, the former 
coordinating staff of the BHPC moved on to the Office of the Commissioner of Financial 
Regulation at the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation.   
Many of the primary community development organizations, including Druid Heights 
CDC and St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center continue their programs and services including 
homeowner and foreclosure prevention counseling (Druid Heights CDC 2015; St. Ambrose 
Housing Aid Center 2015).  Healthy Neighborhoods Inc. is also still very active and has 
continued its middle-neighborhood strategy in fourteen neighborhoods in Baltimore (Healthy 
Neighborhoods, Inc. 2015).  It concluded its NSP2 program in November 2012, actually a few 
months before the federal deadlines of February 2013.  
In Detroit, the major entities that convened the local response in Detroit were the Office 
of Foreclosure Prevention and Response (OFPR) and the Michigan Foreclosure Task Force 
(MFTF).  In 2011, OFPR’s Executive Director left his post (Panchuk 2011), and after that, much 
of other staff was subsumed by Community Legal Resources as part of their work on the Detroit 
Vacant Properties Campaign (Community Legal Resources 2012).  The official OFPR operations 
dissolved in 2012 as funding ran out and activities became integrated in CLR’s other programs. 
The major nonprofit organizations that provided foreclosure counseling have continued to have 
counselors on staff, including Southwest Housing Solutions and U-SNAP-BAC (Southwest 
Housing Solutions 2015; and U-SNAP-BAC 2015).  Finally, as the major recipient of NSP1 and 
NSP3 funds, the City of Detroit reported that, as of September 2015, it was still finalizing the 
closeout of portions of both NSP1 and NSP3 funds (City of Detroit 2015a).  
  
 141 
Though the crisis-like attention to mortgage foreclosures in Detroit may have subsided, 
advocates stated that it helped bring attention to the longer standing problem of tax foreclosures 
(Personal Interview).  Community Legal Resources and the Detroit Vacant Property campaign 
had long advocated for a land bank to deal with thousands of tax-foreclosed properties.  The 
parcel and property data collected through the OFPR was the foundation for a better 
understanding of just how prolific tax foreclosures were, and the strengthening of the networks 
that were built during in the foreclosures crisis enabled advocates to address this problem in new 
ways.  In addition, the establishment of the Detroit Land Bank Authority provided the city with 
new tools to tackle management of vacant properties. 
Beyond foreclosures and vacant properties, the planning process that Community 
Development Advocates of Detroit (CDAD) undertook as part of its Futures Task Force, helped 
CDAD gain greater foundation support, which led to the hiring of an Executive Director and 
several staff members.  Over the past few years, CDAD built district committees of block group 
and organizational representatives in each of Detroit’s city council districts and has strengthened 
its role, particularly as an advocate for policies and issues, including tax foreclosures and vacant 
property, related to neighborhood development (Community Development Advocates of Detroit 
2015).   
The MFTF continues to have a role in Michigan and advocated for extensions of the 90-
Day Pre-Foreclosure Negotiation Law in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 (Coffman 2013).  In July 
of 2013, the Michigan Governor, Rick Synder, signed into law two amendments to the State’s 
foreclosure statues.  The first amendment authorized the final extension of the 90-Day Law to 
January 2014, primarily because of the institution of regulations by the newly formed Federal 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, (which will be discussed below).  It also created the right 
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of the purchaser of a foreclosed property, usually the lender at the sheriff’s sale, to inspect the 
interior and exterior of a homeowner’s property to determine whether there has been any damage 
to the property (Coffman 2013).  If there is damage, the purchaser could shorten the redemption 
period and forcibly evict the previous homeowner. This law was presumably passed to prevent 
foreclosed properties from being vandalized, and further blight the neighborhood.  
 
Federal Programs 
During the foreclosure crisis, as discussed previously, the national government responded 
with funds, programs and initiatives that were aimed at helping homeowners and communities 
with more immediate problems through TARP, NSP, HAMP, HARA, HARP and the NMFC 
funds. The federal government also moved beyond these short-term responses to try and address 
the systemic failures that helped cause the tidal wave of mortgage foreclosures, the subsequent 
burst of the housing bubble and the recession that followed.   
First, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank Act) established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) whose charge was to 
establish, strengthen, and enforce laws and practices that affect consumer lending (Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau 2013).  In 2013, the CFPB drafted stronger guidelines related to 
servicer responsibilities for mortgage foreclosures.   These new rules lengthened the time 
between when homeowners are delinquent and when servicers can send notices of foreclosure 
homeowners from 90 to 120 days.  Servicers are required to provide information on alternatives 
to foreclosure under “loss mitigation procedures” that allows a homeowner to apply for a loan 
modification or other workout options, and servicers are prevented from pursuing a foreclosure 
sale if the homeowner has faithfully complied with an application for a workout of modification 
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(Long 2014).  These new CFPB rules preempted state foreclosure laws and this was the first time 
that state foreclosure laws were standardized in this way across the country.  This is also why 
Michigan concluded its 90-Day Law.  The rules, however, only apply to lenders and servicers 
who service at least 5,000 mortgages, so if a homeowner had a mortgage with a small lender or 
community bank, they are not be protected by all of these regulations (Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau 2013).   
While the CFPB, HAMP, and HARP aimed to prevent mortgage foreclosure in the future, 
other actors aimed to make lenders accountable for the 2007-2009 mortgage foreclosure crisis.  
In February of 2012, forty-nine state attorneys general along with the United States Departments 
of Justice, the Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development won a joint settlement against the 
country’s five largest mortgage servicers: Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JP Morgan 
Chase, and Wells Fargo.  Known as the National Mortgage Settlement, this settlement was the 
largest of its type in history, totaling $50 billion (National Mortgage Settlement 2015).  It found 
that these servicers participated in illegal “robo-signing” activities, which included signing 
documents outside of the presence of a notary public and without knowing whether the 
documents were correct, both of which are illegal.  The settlement required these lenders to 
provide direct financial awards to foreclosed homeowners, write down and refinance mortgages 
of homeowners at risk of foreclosure that are valued for more than what houses are worth, and 
provide direct awards to the signing states for consumer protection and foreclosure prevention 
activities.   
The National Mortgage Settlement was in addition to the $175 million that Wells Fargo 
was ordered to pay to a half dozen cities, including Baltimore, as part its settlement with the 
Department of Justice for racial discrimination in lending (Yost 2012).  Further, the country’s 
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largest mortgage servicer, Ocwen Financial Corporation, was also sued in 2014 and entered into 
a settlement with the federal government to write down $2 billion in mortgage principal amounts 
for underwater borrowers and pay $125 million to foreclosed homeowners for improper 
mortgage servicing activities (National Ocwen Settlement 2015).  Finally, SunTrust, another 
large mortgage servicer was sued in 2014 for the same reason and was ordered to write down 
$500 million in mortgage principal amounts and provide $40 million in cash awards to 
foreclosed homeowners.   
The National Mortgage Settlement also established national mortgage servicing standards 
that require servicers to establish a single point of contact for homeowners, have adequate 
staffing levels and training to serve homeowners effectively, provide better and consistent 
communication with borrowers, follow appropriate standards for executing documents in 
foreclosure cases, cease the practice of imposing improper fees on homeowners, and end dual-
track foreclosures (meaning servicers proceed with foreclosure sales while homeowners 
complete applications for workouts or modifications) (National Mortgage Settlement 2015).  In 
2012, the CFPB created new practices to monitor subprime lending that limited the amount of 
risk that lenders could allow for borrowers.  Applicable to bank and non-bank lenders, the 
monitoring ensures that lenders are following laws related to limiting risk factors in underwriting 
and using clear communication practices with borrowers (Hilley 2012).   
Thus, even after the peak of the foreclosure crisis during the late 2000s, local 
organizations and stakeholders continued to respond to the needs of homeowners and 
communities.  However, the foreclosure crisis was caused by gaps in consumer protection at the 
federal level, over which local stakeholders and decision-makers have no control.  To respond to 
this problem, the federal government then evolved to try and address the more systemic changes 
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in bank policies and practices aimed at preventing foreclosures in the future.  Through the 
establishment of the CFPB and lawsuits against unscrupulous bank practices, the federal 
government set the stage to make banks more accountable for ensuring equitable lending 
practices.  
 
Baltimore and Detroit Today: Riots and Bankruptcy 
Taking office unexpectedly in early 2010 after the scandal and resignation of Sheila 
Dixon, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake has remained the mayor of Baltimore since.  According to a 
recent article in the Baltimore Sun, during her administration unemployment dropped from 12.1 
percent to 8.2 percent and the city’s economy experienced a growth of about 12,000 jobs, she 
implemented a plan to raise $1 billion to build new schools, all while cutting the city’s $750 
million deficit in half and lowering property taxes (Wegner 2015).  
Rawlings-Blake was preparing for her next mayoral election campaign when, on April 
12, 2015, a twenty-five year old man named Freddie Gray was arrested by the Baltimore police, 
placed in the back of a transport vehicle, and within 45 minutes, suffered a severe spinal cord 
injury that led to his death a week later (Fenton and Rector 2015).   Amid greater nationwide 
attention to and a growing movement against police brutality, citywide protests took place in 
Baltimore calling for justice for Gray’s death.  One protest erupted into a clash with the police 
that resulted in the first riots in Baltimore since 1968.   
The City, at Rawlings-Blake’s behest provided a $6.4 million settlement to Gray’s 
family, and the Baltimore State’s Attorney pressed charges against the officers (Wegner 2015, 
Fenton and Rector 2015). Both actions set Baltimore apart from the responses from other cities 
in the country with similar incidences where police shootings have resulted in few, if any, police 
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held accountable for their actions (King 2015).  While the trials for the police officers are still 
underway as of this writing, many are hopeful things will be different in Baltimore.   
In West Baltimore, where Freddie Gray lived, his death unearthed longstanding issues of 
concern to community developers in all cities: lack of jobs and economic opportunities, severely 
poor housing conditions including lead-paint poisoning, violent crime and mistrust of the police 
(Fenton and Rector 2015).  So, despite the gains that Baltimore has made in many areas and 
perhaps as a city as a whole, the city still faces deep challenges, particularly in its low-income 
neighborhoods, with poverty and racial discrimination at their roots.   
Detroit also experienced a significant recent low-point, though it was more transactional 
in nature.  At the end of Mayor Bing’s administration, and facing up to $18 billion in debt, the 
Governor of Michigan instituted a financial emergency in Detroit in March 2013 and appointed 
an Emergency Manager to shore up Detroit’s finances.  That Emergency Manager, Kevin Orr, 
was a well-respected bankruptcy attorney from Washington, D.C.  Not surprisingly, a half of 
year later, Orr filed the largest ever, municipal Chapter 9 bankruptcy on behalf of the City of 
Detroit on July 18, 2013 (Davey and Walsh 2013).  Orr then spent the next 16 months 
negotiating with all of the city’s creditors, from lenders to pension holders, to take cuts in 
payments, as well as Michigan legislators and local philanthropists to raise funds to settle the 
debt.  Creditors ended up taking deep cuts in the debt owed to them, while pensioners took about 
a 10% cut in benefits. The Michigan legislature and local philanthropic entities pooled a total of 
about $800 million to shore up resources in order for Detroit to exit bankruptcy with the least 
impact on the city’s assets, including artwork at the renowned Detroit Institute of Art (Kennedy 
2014).  The City was able to exit bankruptcy in November 2014.   
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During the bankruptcy proceedings, Detroit also underwent a mayoral election of another 
unprecedented kind.  After launching an energetic campaign for mayor, Mike Duggan was 
deemed ineligible to run in the mayoral primary due to not having been a Detroit city resident for 
at least a year before filing as a candidate.  Though he had a history of involvement in local 
politics, he lived in one of Detroit’s suburbs before moving within the city limits in order to run 
for mayor.  Despite not being on the primary ballot, Duggan won 55% of the primary election as 
a write-in candidate (Guillen 2013).  In November 2013, he then went on to win 55% of the 
general election and became Detroit’s first white mayor since 1974 (Helms and Guillen 2013).   
A year into Duggan’s tenure as Mayor, Detroit exited Chapter 9 bankruptcy and he was 
the first mayor in decades who was able to manage the city without a crippling budget deficit.   
Since elected, the city government has been on overdrive to improve city services, such as 
installing and repairing streetlights, improving police and ambulance response times, and address 
blight both through cleaning up illegal dumping and demolishing thousands of distressed 
structures (City of Detroit 2015b).  However, the Mayor is not without difficulty, as, like in 
Baltimore, high poverty, unemployment, tax and mortgage foreclosures continue throughout the 
city.  New census data released in 2015 showed that Detroit has the highest poverty rate of any 
major city in the country at 39.8% compared to Baltimore at 24.2% (U.S. Census 2015).   
 The mortgage foreclosures crisis had a profound impact not only on Baltimore and 
Detroit, but on the nation as well.  It triggered changes in local stakeholder networks working in 
community development and national reforms to protect homeowners and consumers from 
wayward market practices.  However, both cities moved on both in their successes and their 
challenges, and these experiences provide lessons about urban policies and practices to improve 
people’s lives and the communities where they live. 
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Summary of Findings 
 My research was guided by the following research questions: How did local stakeholders 
respond to the mortgage foreclosure crisis in Baltimore and Detroit, two weak market cities with 
divergent foreclosure rates?  Who were the primary actors in the local responses and how were 
the responses influenced by the governing coalitions in each city?  It hypothesized that a 
governing coalition comprised of a broad and deep network of organizations that engage in and 
support community development gave Baltimore, comparatively speaking, greater resilience 
against the rate of foreclosures and its impact on neighborhoods.   
To answer this question, my argument broke down into three elements.  First, it analyzed 
the opportunity space in each city, which is the context of state laws, local economy, community 
development infrastructure, and composition of governing coalitions that provided the 
foundation for stakeholders to respond to the crisis.  Second, it looked at the response to 
foreclosures, which included the capacity to undergo assessment, develop readiness, and initiate 
actions to address foreclosures.  Finally, it examined the recovery, and in particular examined 
indicators in the housing market between the two cities as a way to explore any relationships 
between the first two elements and the last. Table 5.1 summarizes my findings, which are then 
provided more detail in the following section.  
 
Opportunity Space 
 The research indicates that the opportunity space in Baltimore was more favorable toward 
creating resilience, than in Detroit.  Maryland is a judicial foreclosure state and the foreclosures 
laws allow a significant amount of time and opportunities for the homeowner to engage with the 
mortgage servicer to try and negotiate away from the foreclosure process.  In Michigan, the 
  
 149 
foreclosure process was administrative, not through the courts, and the process was faster and 
was not as friendly to the homeowner.  The local economy was weak in both cities up until 2000, 
and then it began to improve in Baltimore. 
 
Table 5.1. Summary of Findings 











State Foreclosure Laws Judicial with more time and 
opportunity for homeowners to 
negotiate with lenders. 
Administrative and faster, but a 
long redemption period for 
homeowners after foreclosure. 
Local Economy Weak market but higher home 
values and lower unemployment 
and poverty rate. 
Weak market with low home 





Integrated between the BNC and 
BHPC between community 
organizations and foundations 
with local and state government 
support. 
Disconnected with tension 
between community 
organizations and foundations, 




Governing Coalition in 
order of seniority 
(during Foreclosure 
Crisis) 
• Local government 
• Foundations  
• Community organizations 
• Business Leaders 
• Foundations 
• Local Government  















Assessment Capacity Pre-existing:  
• Baltimore Neighborhood 
Indicators  
• TRF Foreclosure Study 
Non-existent prior to foreclosure 
crisis. 
Readiness Capacity Pre-existing: 
• BNC 
• BHPC 
Non-existent prior to foreclosure 
crisis 
Response Capacity Strategies: 
• MD State Task Force 
• Foreclosure Workshops (By 
U.S. Rep Cummings) 
• Foreclosure counseling 
• Property rehab (NSP) 
• City lawsuit against Wells 
Fargo 
Strategies: 
• Statewide Task Force 
• Foreclosure counseling 
• Homeowner financial 
assistance 
• Property rehab and demolition 
(NSP) 
 
Overall, the number of foreclosures was too great to address in full 





















Foreclosure Rates  
2010-2014 
Despite higher foreclosure rates in Baltimore than in Detroit after 
2010, Baltimore’s housing market grew and remained stable during 
this time.  This dissertation argues that a governing coalition that 
included community organizations and an opportunity space with a 
stronger community development network in Baltimore contributed to 







This was also during the time that Baltimore’s community development sector was beginning to 
coalesce around its Healthy Neighborhoods Strategy.  Local foundations, community 
organizations and nonprofits, and even the local government provided support for this initiative, 
which targeted revitalization efforts in the city’s middle income neighborhoods in an attempt to 
raise property values as well as retain and attract middle-income residents.  In Detroit, the 
community development sector was unorganized and did not wield much influence over city 
government practices toward neighborhood development.  Community development 
organizations were generally more neighborhood focused, territorial, and engaged primarily in 
the development of affordable housing rather than community programs or services.  While there 
was a community development association, it was not strong, and at the time, lacked leadership 
and a vision for neighborhood development in Detroit.  
 
Responses to Foreclosure 
 Overall, Baltimore had greater assessment and readiness capacity, and its response 
strategies were more timely and comprehensive.  Baltimore had assessment capacity before the 
foreclosure crisis, but both cities used foreclosure and neighborhood data as a way to assess the 
extent of mortgage foreclosures and its impact on the city.  Existing data capacity at the City of 
Baltimore and with the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance built a foundation for data 
driven decision-making.  In Detroit, however, the City government did not have this capacity and 
so foundations initiated and supported the creation of a new nonprofit data center, Data Driven 
Detroit (D3), in 2008 that would centralize foreclosure and neighborhood data.   Though D3 
helped Detroit stakeholders assess the foreclosure problem, its development, after the foreclosure 
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crisis started, was more a part of the city’s response, rather than an element of their previous 
assessment capacity. 
In terms of readiness, again, Baltimore had existing systems, namely the Baltimore 
Neighborhood Collaborative (BNC), which formed in the late 1990s, and one of its initiatives, 
the Baltimore Housing Preservation Coalition (BHPC), which started in 2005 that allowed it to 
launch activities in response to the foreclosure crisis.  The BNC was made up of several local 
foundations that pooled local and national funding, which was then reallocated toward strategic 
community development efforts.  The BHPC consisted of representatives of foundations, 
community organizations and nonprofits, as well as members of local and state enforcement 
agencies, who strategized together about what would be the best responses to the foreclosure 
crisis.   
In Detroit, this infrastructure did not exist prior to the crisis, but it was created in similar 
form.  The Detroit Neighborhood Forum (DNF), the new collaborative of foundations, came 
together in 2006 by the invitation of then Mayor Kilpatrick.  Led by the Kresge Foundation, 
funders continued to meet together after Kilpatrick resigned from office.  The DNF established 
the Office of Foreclosure Prevention and Response (OFPR) in 2008, housed it at the Detroit 
Economic Growth Corporation, and hired its leadership staff.  Like D3, the OFPR was not 
established before the foreclosure crisis and so did not contribute to Detroit’s readiness.   
The response strategies were similar in both Baltimore and Detroit, though Baltimore was 
able to implement its activities earlier and had greater leadership from city government.  Local 
stakeholders engaged in two major activities, foreclosure prevention counseling and property 
mitigation.  However, both cities struggled with responding to the extent of the foreclosure 
problem in their cities.  Neither city had the resources, even with millions of dollars of funding 
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from private philanthropy and the federal government, to have a great enough impact on 
foreclosures.  
In Baltimore, many community organizations focused primarily on expanding post-
homeownership counseling to include foreclosure prevention counseling.  Counselors worked 
one-on-one with homeowners facing foreclosure to navigate their lenders’ processes for 
workouts or modifications.  These local counselors were networked with each other through the 
Baltimore Housing Preservation Coalition (BHPC) and on the statewide level through the 
Michigan Department of Housing and Community Development’s Michigan Housing 
Counseling Network (MD HOPE).  These networks provided spaces for counselors to share 
information and best practices in order to better serve homeowner clients.   
 In addition to foreclosure prevention counseling, the City of Baltimore and then Healthy 
Neighborhoods, Inc., used NSP funds to implement property mitigation strategies by working 
with both nonprofit and for-profit housing developers to acquire, rehabilitate, and resell 
foreclosed properties where homeowners were not able to keep their homes.  These strategies 
invested funds into neighborhoods where the City and Healthy Neighborhoods were already 
targeting, in an attempt to secure gains that their previous neighborhood development strategies 
had made.  Ultimately, as discussed earlier, NSP funds were not able to address as many 
properties as they had proposed, but they were still able to reactivate hundreds of homes for new 
homeowners.  Lastly, but importantly, the City of Baltimore also responded by filing a lawsuit 
against Wells Fargo for discriminatory lending practices that favored offering subprime loans to 
African American Baltimoreans, which led to higher rates of foreclosures, and therefore, a 
burden on the City’s resources.  Baltimore was the first city to sue the banks related to 
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foreclosures, which demonstrates a willingness to take leadership on a risky move to make banks 
more accountable for the foreclosure crisis.  
 In Detroit, the city’s primary response was the establishment of the Office of Foreclosure 
Prevention and Response (OFPR).  The OFPR acted as a coordinating and convening body to 
provide research and data on the foreclosure problem in the city, support foreclosure counseling 
at community organizations through training, education, and networking; and provide 
information and technical support to entities, including city government agencies, engaging in 
property mitigation to address the problem of vacant properties left behind from foreclosures.   
 As in Baltimore, community organizations in Detroit started or expanded homeowner-
counseling efforts to assist homeowners directly that were undergoing foreclosures.  This was 
supported by the statewide Michigan Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF), which was instituted by 
the Community Economic Development Association of Michigan, a trade association for 
community development organizations.  The MFTF also provided information, training, and 
education to counselors and practitioners across the state and successfully advocated for stronger 
protections for homeowners in Michigan’s foreclosure laws.  Finally, the City of Detroit used 
federal NSP funds to establish a land bank that would acquire, rehab, or demolish foreclosed 
properties.  The Detroit Department of Planning and Development administered the funds and, as 
in Baltimore, worked with both nonprofit and for-profit developers.   
 For both cities, the biggest challenge was the volume of foreclosures that were occurring 
and the costs of assisting homeowners and remediating foreclosed properties.  Organizations 
were able to counsel hundreds of homeowners when thousands or tens of thousands of 
homeowners were facing foreclosure.  Similarly, developers were only able to address a small 
fraction of the foreclosed properties in their neighborhoods and cities.  The ability of 
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stakeholders to have an impact depended on so many variables that were beyond their control: 
the available resources, the willingness of homeowners to seek assistance and not just walk away 
from their properties, and the willingness of banks to work with homeowners and counselors or 
to maintain and address REO properties.   
 
Recovery: Housing Market Stability 
 There are a number of interesting findings about the housing markets in Baltimore and 
Detroit, as well as some caveats.  Overall, the housing market became stronger in Baltimore 
between 2000 and 2010, and, except for the vacancy rate, stayed fairly stable between 2010 and 
2014.  In Detroit, however, the housing market declined substantially in value during these 
periods.  Between 2007 and 2010, the annual mortgage foreclosure rate in the city of Baltimore 
was consistently lower than in the city of Detroit.  After 2010, foreclosure data are only available 
for the metropolitan regions.  In contrast to before 2010, between 2010 and 2013, the Baltimore 
metropolitan region saw foreclosure rates that surpassed that of the Detroit metropolitan region 
through 2013.  This is despite the fact that unemployment and poverty rates were substantially 
lower in Baltimore, and the economy, in general, may have been better there. 
 The caveats are that finding any causal relationship between how stakeholders responded 
to the foreclosure crisis and the status of the housing markets in each city was beyond the scope 
of my dissertation.  The period of time covered by my research did not allow enough time to 
connect any foreclosure response strategies to housing market outcomes.  However, my 
investigation has revealed a reasonably clear relationship between the opportunity space and 
housing market outcomes.  More specifically, the strength of the community development sector 
and the focus on an aligned, strategic effort in Healthy Neighborhoods with a focus on middle 
  
 155 
income neighborhoods and raising property values may be a contributing factor to there being a 
stronger housing market in Baltimore.   
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 The larger questions framing my dissertation tried to address whether governing 
coalitions made up of strong networks of public, private, and nonprofit actors could influence 
outcomes in cities relative to the influence of the market economy.  My findings make a 
contribution to this claim, and against theories that markets have greater influence than politics 
over urban outcomes.  Using the test of how local stakeholders responded to the foreclosure 
crisis in two similarly weak market cities that had divergent foreclosure rates helped make these 
arguments richer.   
 With regard to the question of markets versus politics, there are three findings from my 
research that contribute to the argument that politics have greater influence.  First, while the 
economy was generally doing better overall in Baltimore than in Detroit between 2000-2014, 
foreclosure rates became higher in Baltimore between 2010-2014. Thus, there was not a distinct 
relationship between weak market cities and higher foreclosure rates; rather, the market was not 
the only determining factor in foreclosure rates.  In Maryland, it was thought that the higher 
foreclosure rates occurred, at least in part, due to the judicial and homeowner-friendly 
foreclosure laws in that state, which resulted in longer foreclosure processes.  This increased the 
number of properties over time that were under some phase of the foreclosure process and 
therefore counted in the foreclosure rate.  
 Second, the proactive actions taken by the local governments to sue banks and the federal 
government to institute systemic changes in consumer finance policy speak to the power and 
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importance of government in regulating and stabilizing the market.  Through policies that 
promote less risky homeownership financing practices, there is greater chance of a more secure 
economy for homeowners and the communities where they live.  Finally, the Healthy 
Neighborhoods strategy helped contribute to stronger housing market outcomes in Baltimore.  
Although this was not a government initiative, it was the product of a governing coalition of 
foundations, the public sector, nonprofit and community organizations in Baltimore and helped 
shaped the market in that city.  Thus, in contrast to public choice theorists, it was the actions of 
this governing coalition, not markets alone, which retained and attracted residents to Healthy 
Neighborhoods and which helped bolster the housing market.  
 This researched utilized the resiliency framework as a way to assess the strength and 
weaknesses of local responses to the foreclosure crisis.  As this work developed and concluded, 
the findings revealed some challenges with this theoretical approach.  For instance, in the first 
chapter, the Resiliency Capacity Index (RCI) was described.  Using this rating system, Baltimore 
rated higher than Detroit, except for in Community Connectivity Capacity, which measured 
stability, voter participation, and the per capita rate of community organizations. This 
dissertation research found that the connections within the community development sector in 
Baltimore were stronger than in Detroit, indicating that a purely quantitative approach to 
measuring resilience may have flaws.  Further, the elements of recovery capacity outlined by 
Foster were difficult to apply to the foreclosure crisis given the extent of the problem and long 
timeframe needed to assess the outcomes of interventions in chronic or long-term challenges.  
Thus, the resiliency framework may be more appropriate for short-term disasters rather than 
complex and protracted economic crises.     
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Finally, we can now assess the role of the differing compositions of the governing 
coalitions in each city and how they shaped community development.  In Baltimore, the rise of 
the philanthropic sector into a governing coalition with influential community organizations and 
nonprofits steered stakeholders toward targeted community development strategies.  The strong 
connections between community organizations and foundations in the BNC wielded great 
influence over the institutionalization of Healthy Neighborhoods, which ultimately became the 
city government’s de facto community development strategy.  In Detroit, foundations responded 
to Kilpatrick’s messy and abrupt resignation by filling in the space left by this new leadership 
vacuum, and a new governing coalition formed out of the foreclosure crisis.  The governing 
coalition there was heavily influenced by these foundations.  However, those foundations did not 
have the same strong connections to community organizations and vice versa, so there was no 
aligned strategy and weak systems in the community development sector.  Ultimately, 
community organizations were not a part of Detroit’s governing coalition, to the same degree as 
in Baltimore.  Though not addressed in this dissertation, business leaders still play a role in both 
cities.   
Thus, this dissertation finds that the governing coalition in Baltimore consisted of the 
mayor and local government, foundations in partnership with community organizations, and the 
cities business leaders.  In Detroit, the governing coalition consists of foundations and business 
leaders that work in partnership with (or have influence over) local government.   
 
The Questions Left Unanswered: Areas for Further Research 
 While my dissertation tried to discern relationships between different factors in each of 
the cities, it may have also created more questions than it answered.  Throughout this study, 
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other factors and variables inevitably bubbled to the surface, which though out of the scope of 
this work, certainly warrant further study.  They may, in fact, suggest alternative explanations for 
the differences attributed here to the community development sectors in each city.  These include 
the role of racial and multi-racial politics, why community organizations had more influence in 
Baltimore than in Detroit, the role of political corruption, and the impact of the foreclosure 
response initiatives in each of the cities.   
Beyond the scope of my study were the outcomes from and impact of the foreclosure 
response strategies implemented in each city.  My research was more focused on the networks 
and governing coalitions that helped shape the foreclosure response and the influence of those 
networks on the community development sector.  However, there is certainly more research to be 
done on the effect of the homeownership counseling and property mitigation strategies.  
Questions could be asked about whether those were the right strategies given limited resources 
and the extent of the challenges. Were there other strategies that local stakeholders could have 
employed that may have been more effective at either stemming the tide of foreclosures or 
addressing foreclosed properties in neighborhoods?  Or were local stakeholders ultimately bound 
and limited in scope because of the nature of the foreclosure crisis and the source of the causes, 
which were within national financial policies and markets?  All of these questions and topics 
would be worth exploring further to better understand these cities and the community 
development sector more generally.   
Another factor worthy of more research is the role of racial politics in these two cities. 
One of the differences between the political environments in the two cities was that Baltimore 
had more white mayors in recent history than Detroit.  After Coleman Young was elected as 
Detroit’s first mayor, Detroit experienced almost 40 years of African American leadership until 
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Mike Duggan became mayor in 2013. Baltimore, in contrast did not elect its first African 
American mayor until 1987, a dozen years after Detroit.  Since then, mayors have been both 
white and African American.  The reason why this may have been a factor in this research is that 
the white mayors, Schaefer and O’Malley, won elections in this majority African American city.  
One variable in their elections might have been the relationships they had with organizations in 
African American communities in Baltimore.  To get those votes, community organizations may 
have wanted some influence over, or some concession from local government and this may have 
been the impetus for community organizations being included in and a part of the governing 
coalition in Baltimore.   
 Another reason why community organizations may have had more power in Baltimore is 
that more of them may have originated out of community protest and organizing than in Detroit.  
Other research has determined the degree to which community development organizations 
evolved from community organizing to more traditional and, arguably, market-driven actors of 
neighborhood real estate development (Davidoff, 2015), but perhaps this community organizing 
history is what gave organizations the power to demand a place at the governing coalition table.  
Community organizing did not play nearly as big a role in Detroit generally, and certainly not in 
community development.  Thus, it is possible this is why community organizations have 
relatively little power and influence in Detroit.   
 Finally, the role of political scandal and corruption in governing coalitions, and perhaps 
on neighborhood development, was beyond the scope of this project, but it is something worth 
exploring further.  Corruption has a long and rich history in politics, in cities big and small, and 
in cities with white and African American leadership.  This dissertation treated corruption as a 
common variable between Baltimore and Detroit, rather than something to be explored 
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independently.  However, looking more deeply at the extent of corruption in these cities, and 
perhaps cities without corruption (if that exists), may shed light on the nature of governing 
coalitions and/or the capacity of the community development sector.   
 
Implications for Community Development in Baltimore and Detroit 
 The central question of this study was why the foreclosure rates in Baltimore and Detroit 
diverged over the course of the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  However, this research is situated in 
a larger field concerned with disinvestment in urban, low-income communities of color and 
strategies to equitably redevelop those communities into places where people have a good 
quality of life.  Exploring the responses to the foreclosure crisis and the impact it had on these 
cities provided an entry point to understanding the systems of stakeholders working in that larger 
field of community development.  The findings from this research also offer some lessons for 
practitioners, policymakers, and researchers concerned with this issue. 
 For community developers and the funders that support them, one big implication that 
came out of this work is that communities and neighborhoods need to have leadership that 
influences the strategies supported by foundations. When funders fundamentally value and 
incorporate input from their grantees that do the same thing with residents in the communities 
where they work, the strategies to improve neighborhoods will be more effective because they 
will be more likely to address the most relevant needs.  Baltimore was a model for this kind of 
integration and partnership between community organizations and other cities are as well.  This 
is a lesson not only for funders, but also for the public sector.  Community organizations should 
not be seen as political tools, but rather as partners in making a real difference in neighborhoods 
that need resources.  Furthermore, those strategies will be more effective if they are aligned with 
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different stakeholders, from community organizations to funders, and the public sector.  If 
different actors focus on a number of different geographic areas or issues, the impact is more 
likely to be diffused.   
 In addition to efforts being community-led and aligned, the foreclosure crisis also taught 
us that the promotion of homeownership may not be the most effective way to address inequity 
and improve people’s lives.  The focus on owning homes was one that has been propagated by 
the federal government and trickled down to neighborhood groups who both developed homes 
for sale and enabled residents to achieve homeownership.  “If I could change anything, I would 
change the notion that homeownership is the only indicator of wealth.  If you rent, you can still 
build assets” (Personal Interview).  Homeownership is a process that requires assets at the 
onset—enough savings for a down payment, for instance.  These assets are indicators of whether 
household finances can sustainably bear the costs associated with buying and maintaining a 
home.  Otherwise, the home ceases to contribute to the financial stability and quality of life of a 
neighborhood.  Many advocates stressed a need for greater promotion of financial literacy, which 
would encourage individuals to make better financial decisions throughout their life.  Financial 
education should start in schools and families and continue to be supported by financial 
institutions and our elected leaders.   
 However, as many practitioners agreed, and one expressed, “The foreclosure crisis was 
started by lousy predatory lending practices.  It wasn’t started by people who bought homes they 
couldn’t afford.  If we don’t change that mindset, when banks start lending again, the same 
people are going to be targeted, doing the same practices” (Personal Interview).  Practices around 
homeownership should focus on stronger protections for homeowners going through the home 
buying process.  One approach to this is the stricter lending rules that were developed through 
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the Federal Consumer Finance Protection Bureau.  Lenders should be accountable to 
homeowners and the larger financial markets, beyond making loans and simply to profit from 
homeownership.  As the foreclosure crisis demonstrated, their role should extend beyond the 
mortgage to a commitment to the communities where those mortgages are made.  These 
practices also need to include resources for enforcement of consumer protection laws.  In 
addition, one advocate expressed the need for professional and legal assistance in the home 
purchase process: “We tell everyone they should get a home inspection, and force people to get 
an appraisal.  Those cost money.  Having an attorney should be another element that people do 
regularly so there are no surprises with the mortgage. Financial literacy is one piece, but 
mortgage documents are not easy to understand” (Personal Interview).   
 However, both cities are now better positioned to deal with crises such as these in the 
future.  In Foster’s terms, they have both strengthened their preparation resilience.  Much of 
Baltimore’s community development infrastructure that marshaled the foreclosure response has 
been institutionalized, and the local government has turned greater attention to vacant properties, 
blight and other challenges related to poverty.  Detroit now has the capacity to collect and utilize 
neighborhood and land use data in ways that it never did before.  Community development 
organizations work together more and philanthropy is better coordinated.  Furthermore, the City 
of Detroit has emerged from under debilitating debt with a much stronger capacity to address the 
challenges it faces.  Though there are ways these entities could be stronger and more supportive 
of each other, they are in a much different place than before, when none of them existed prior to 
the foreclosure crisis.   
 The harder challenge in both of these cities is to address the underlying causes of 
mortgage foreclosures.  Whether foreclosures were subprime and predatory, or caused by the 
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economic downturn, as one leader in Detroit put it, “The only real foreclosure prevention is job 
creation” (Personal Interview).  While this dissertation has demonstrated that the state of the 
local economies was not the sole reason for differences in the outcomes in these two cities, 
decision-makers and funders could do more to promote a healthy economy and robust job market 
in order to help contribute to addressing issues like poverty.  The economy is also connected to 
the broad challenge of urban education and how well people are prepared for jobs.  The 
community development sector has a role here, as well, especially if it is willing to be more 
comprehensive.  The sector has learned that affordable housing will not revitalize communities 
by itself and the foreclosure crisis only reinforced that notion.   
 This research examined governing coalitions and their relationship to urban resilience as 
an opportunity to understand what might make cities not only better and more equitable places to 
live, but also stronger against economic or other kinds of threats.  This dissertation demonstrated 
what resiliency researchers described as regions that could perform well or poorly at each stage 
of resilience (Foster 2006).  In Foster’s framework for the Resilience Capacity Index, cities could 
perform well in preparation resilience, but achieve low performance in response resilience, and 
vice versa, depending on the distribution of resources and capacities in cities as well as the 
degree of the threat they are facing.  In a perfect world, or a perfect city, the economy is strong, 
the government is well functioning, visionary, and strategic, the philanthropic sector is 
supportive, but deferential, and high-capacity community organizations work collaboratively 
toward goals shared by government and philanthropy.   
Although Baltimore may have come closer to this level of governing capacity than 
Detroit, both cities have room for improvement.  However, it is important to remember two 
things.  First, both cities have faced long-term economic decline and chronic stressors that were 
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only exacerbated by the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  The challenges facing practitioners and 
decision-makers in each of the cities was far greater than anyone would wish on their worst 
enemy.  Second, however, many practitioners in both of the cities have been completely 
committed to solving those challenges, and to taking on a lot of personal, professional, and 
economic risk in order to do so.  It is this passion that will foster the kinds of experimentation 
and perseverance necessary to make a difference in these cities and to the people who live there.   
 Finally, the future of these and any other cities, however, is not just contained within 
them.  It is not without conspiracy that many urban change makers in cities like Detroit and 
Baltimore feel like their efforts do not matter to others.  A Detroit activist working with youth in 
the Osborn neighborhood, described earlier, shared her experience with young people there: 
“Kids here feel like no one cares about them, not the City, not the police, not their teachers, not 
even their parents, sometimes” (Personal Interview).  This sentiment is not just felt by those 
working in low-income communities.  In a 2016 radio interview with United States 
Congressman, Dan Kildee, who represents Flint, Michigan, expressed his frustration with and 
interpretation of the lack of actions taken by state and local leaders in response to recent findings 
that the Flint municipal water system had been contaminated by lead7 (WDET, 2016),  
 
There’s a tendency among some to write off cites like Flint and the people who live in 
them.  It’s almost as if, ‘What difference does it make, this city isn’t succeeding 
anyway’… If this happened in some affluent suburb and 7,000 children were poisoned, 
they would run out of blue ribbons for all the committees they would appoint to get to the 
bottom of this and fix it right away.” 
 
 The foreclosure crisis was the culmination of the ways that cities like Baltimore and 
Detroit have been, on the one hand, “written off” and, on the other, taken advantage of.  The 
                                                
7 In 2013, the City of Flint switched from sourcing water from the Detroit water system to the Flint River, which is 
more corrosive.  The water treatment plant failed to add anti-corrosive agents to the Flint River water.  For almost 
two years, tap water pumped into Flint homes contained levels of lead double what they should be, putting children 
at risk for illness and irreversible developmental damage (Kaffer, 2015).   
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small number of perpetrators of these practices, sometimes banks and sometimes politicians, 
made a profit off of a large number of people’s suffering—people who are mostly poor and 
African American. That suffering will incur huge costs, both financial and societal, for 
generations to come, especially if there is not more done to alter these dynamics.  While this is a 
moral issue, and one that is critical to living in a world where all human beings are honored, 
(instead of just some over others), it is also a matter of duty.  As Rabbi Abraham Joshua 
Herschel, a leading 20thcentury Jewish theologian said,  “Some are guilty but all are responsible” 
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